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POSTMODERNISM AS THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DECONSTRUCTION
OF MODERNITY
by
Steven C. Ward 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1991
This work seeks to provide a description of the 
theoretical positions and cultural expressions of 
postmodernism and to provide a sociological critique of its 
conclusions. The work uses the writings of the Derrida, 
Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan, and Baudrillard, as well as 
arguments in neo-pop art and postmodern architecture, as 
representatives of the postmodern position on the issues of 
referentiality, subjectivity, and rationality. Postmodernism 
is treated as a skeptical theoretical and cultural system 
which levels all ideational distinctions between belief and 
knowledge and truth and rhetoric. This work argues that a 
social or constructivist epistemology can provide a different 
way of approaching the issues of knowledge and truth, which 
avoids postmodernism's skeptical and nihilistic conclusions. 
Postmodernism is seen as making sociological arguments 
against traditional philosophical distinctions, but drawing 
idealistic conclusions about the end of all meaning. Using 
the Neo-Durkheimians orientation towards cognitive style and 
the constructivist position in the sociology of scientific
ix
scientific knowledge as starting points, it is argued that 
while pure philosophical distinctions between true and false 
and knowledge and belief cannot be made, these distinctions 
remain strong and powerful social distinctions. These 
distinctions serve to foster group cohesion and identity. 
Finally, this work examines how postmodernism can be seen as 
the outcome of the social organization of specific culture- 




GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ON
POSTMODERNISM
Postmodernism is a term that is "at once fashionable yet 
irritatingly elusive to define."1 Since the early nineteen- 
eighties, when the term first came into widespread use, it 
has been employed to describe everything from television 
commercials to post-structuralist philosophy. Furthermore, 
this eclectic, ill-defined, and all-encompassing term has 
been surrounded by a virtual sea of controversy, debate, and 
confrontation. Coalitions have formed, both for and against, 
each hurling accusations against the other. Critics see it 
as announcing the end of all meaning and of collapsing all 
distinctions between belief and knowledge, science and 
literature, authenticity and fakery, and ultimately, right 
and wrong. For these critics, postmodernism forbids us from 
making any type of truth or validity claim. It is 
essentially a skeptical philosophical system which prohibits 
us from saying anything definitive about the world. For 
them, the postmodern movement leads us into an inescapable 
trap of cynicism and nihilism. On the other hand, proponents 
claim it marks an end to the hegemonic, confining, and 
inaccurate philosophical and cultural system of modernity. 
As such, it is a liberating or inevitable movement in the
1 Mike Featherstone, "In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An 
Introduction," Theory, Culture & Society, 5, 1988, p. 195 
(pp. 195-215).
1
history of philosophy and culture.
With few exceptions, previous discussions of 
postmodernism have treated it as a purely cultural
phenomenon: They have generally failed to connect
postmodernism to the broader social context. In this
dissertation, we seek to explore the issue of postmodernism 
from a sociology of knowledge/culture perspective. This work 
has three primary goals: (1) To provide a description of a
general postmodern position or framework. (2) To discuss an 
alternative to the idealism-based epistemological conclusions 
of postmodern thought. (3) To illustrate how postmodernism 
can be seen from within the confines of the organization of 
social groups. With regard to the first point, we seek to 
explore some of the important theoretical and cultural
manifestations of postmodernism. We will use the term
"postmodern" to refer to a series of theoretical and 
practical changes in such diverse realms as linguistics,
philosophy, history, architecture, and art. However, our
purpose is not just to provide a description of the 
postmodern position or framework. We will also discuss what 
a "social" or "constructivist" epistemology can contribute to 
the often nihilistic conclusions drawn by some postmodernist 
philosophers.2 The majority of discussions on postmodernism 
treat it as only an issue of philosophy or epistemology. In
2 For one definition of social epistemology, cf. Steve 
Fuller, Social Epistemoloav (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1988).
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other words, they see postmodernism as either threatening or 
enhancing our ability to ascertain and describe the "way 
things really are." Our point of departure is different. In 
this work, postmodernism will not be seen as either a 
"correct" or an "incorrect" way of perceiving the world or of 
acting in the world, but as a "social construct." As such, 
it is not a matter of truth or lie, but of the ability of a 
philosophical/cultural movement to define and construct 
reality, or the lack of reality in the case of postmodernism. 
Finally, we seek to show how postmodernism can be viewed as 
a product of social organization. Specifically, we seek to 
illustrate how postmodernism can be seen as part of the 
social organization of knowledge producing and cultural­
consuming communities.
Before turning to an outline of the chapters in this 
dissertation, it is important to explore why postmodernism 
has become such an important feature of the contemporary 
intellectual landscape and such an issue of debate and 
controversy. To do this, we will examine some of the uses of 
postmodernism in various contemporary cultural debates. We 
will use these discussions to clarify and delimit the type of 
postmodernism we will utilize in this dissertation. First, 
we will provide a brief history of the term's use. Secondly, 
we will examine the debate over postmodernism in social 
theory. Specifically, we will briefly discuss the dialogue 
between Daniel Bell, Juergen Habermas, Jean-Francois Lyotard,
3
and Michel Foucault on modernity and postmodernity. Thirdly, 
we will discuss the debate between modernists and 
postmodernists over aesthetic style in architecture and art. 
Next, we will explore how the assaults on modernity extend 
into the popular discourse on political foundations. 
Finally, we use the insights gained from these debates to 
provide a general definition of cultural and theoretical 
postmodernism. These introductory treatments are intended to 
illustrate the different uses of postmodernism in different 
fields and to "set the stage” for the more detailed 
theoretical and sociological treatment to follow, that is, in 
the proposed chapters for this dissertation.
The Etiology of Postmodernism 
One means for clarifying the ambiguity of postmodernism 
is to provide a brief chronology of its use. As we shall 
see, postmodernism has gone through several stages and 
redefinitions. Among the first writers to use the term was 
the historian Arnold Toynbee in his voluminous A Study of 
History.3 Toynbee saw the "postmodern age," in part, as a 
result of a rebellion against modern rationality. The modern 
world, with its emphasis on rationality, science, and
3 Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History. Volume IX 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 559. There is 
some disagreement on the origin of the term postmodern. For 
a discussion of this see, Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of
Modernity; Modernism. Avant-Garde. Decadence. KltSgh..
Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 
267-68.
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technological development, had culminated in the two world 
wars.4 Toynbee believed that humanity at the end of World 
War II was beginning to question the outcomes of 
modernization. For Toynbee, this questioning of technology 
and modern existence signaled the beginning of an age of 
decline in the Western world (i.e., a movement towards 
irrationality and relativism). This emerging cultural 
attitude, described by Toynbee, towards modernity was not 
particularly a new one. Nietzsche, Weber, and others had 
earlier pointed out many of the problems intrinsic to 
modernity. What was perhaps new at the end of World War II 
was that the issues were being received by a larger and a 
more trans-Euro-American audience.
Toynbee's identification of the coming of the postmodern 
age did not have much of an impact in the field of history or 
in the conventional social sciences. However, many poets and 
writers, while not specifically using the term postmodern or 
Toynbee's prognosis, began exploring possibilities of 
"overcoming" the problems of cultural and societal modernism 
(e.g. the "new" poetry of the 1950's; writers such as Jack 
Kerouac; and composer John Cage). This era is what Andreas 
Huyssen refers to as the "first phase" of postmodernism in
4 We find a similar anti-Hegelian sensibility in other 
writings of this period. For example, T. Adorno writes, "No 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but 
there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb." 
Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 320.
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the United States.5 During this period, postmodernism is 
taken to refer to a "tenacious trope of tendencies" occurring 
in the humanities.6 It is marked by a loosely-articulated 
protest by younger artists and critics against the 
bureaucratic confinement of social modernity and the now 
institutionalized cultural canons of high modernism (e.g., 
cubism, expressionism, modern literature).
A second phase of postmodernism began in the late 
1960's. Here, postmodernism began to turn from its praxis- 
oriented or "creative" rebellion against modernity to a more 
theoretical position. It is marked by the introduction of 
French poststructuralism into the cultural discourse spawned 
by the creative rebellion of the early anti-modernists. The 
deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida, the psychoanalysis of 
Jacques Lacan, and the genealogy of Hichel Foucault, as well 
as renewed attention given to German critical theory and the 
emergence of feminist theory, gave postmodernism a broader 
intellectual appeal. All these theoretical approaches shared
5 Andreas Huyssen, "From Counter-Culture to Neo- 
Conservatism and Beyond: Stages of the Postmodern." Social 
Science Information, 23, 1984, p. 617. While helpful in
orientation, Huyssen's classifications are somewhat 
simplistic and perhaps misleading. The division between the 
political right and left are often blurred in postmodern 
thought. Cf. Linda Hutcheon's discussion of the politically 
"double coded" characteristic of postmodernism in A Poetics
flf Postmodernism:__History. Theory. Fiction (New York:
Routledge, 1988), pp. 201-221.
6 Ihab Hassan and Sally Hassan, Innovation/Renovation: 
New Perspectives in the Humanities (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983), p. 6.
an attack on modern epistemology and the role of the modern 
subject within traditional philosophy and politics. Each 
approach provided a theoretical "direction" to the growing 
rebellion against cultural and societal modernity. It was 
during this period that term postmodern began to move from 
describing an aesthetic movement to describing a broad and 
diversified cultural and theoretical movement.
The current phase of postmodernism (post-1960's) is 
marked by the emergence of three theoretical and political 
camps. "First, the emergence of postmodernism's alliance 
with neo-conservatism."7 This position sees the fragmented 
nature of modern culture as being responsible for the 
decaying moral and economic fabric of modern life.8 The neo­
conservatives usually call for some type of totalizing system 
of thought (i.e., an all-encompassing explanation and
orientation), perhaps something similar to Medieval
Catholicism, to repair the damage done by modernity's 
fragmentation of value spheres. For this group, history is 
a source of inspiration and valorization (i.e., the "past as 
utopia"). The neo-conservatives see the past as a model for 
repairing contemporary culture and consequently modern
society. Secondly, we can identify what may be called a
7 Huyssen, "From Counter-Culture to Neo-Conservatism and 
Beyond," 1984, p. 621.
8 For an example of this type of approach see, 
Christopher Lash, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its 
Critics (New York: Norton, 1990).
"postmodernism of resistance."9 The resistance position 
shares an attack on the principles of modernity with the neo­
conservative position, yet it does not valorize history nor 
call for a totalizing system of thought. This position seeks 
to utilize the space created by the emergence of 
postmodernism to render a critique of the "status quo and 
historical origins, not a return to them."10 Thirdly, we 
can identify the emergence of what might be called a 
"postmodernism of acceptance." The acceptance position is 
aware of the theoretical and societal problems associated 
with modernity, yet it accepts these problems and often 
celebrates them. The postmodernism of acceptance feels it is 
impossible to draw distinctions between "high" and "low" art 
or between commodification (i.e., as objects of exchange) and 
authenticity. The acceptance position adheres to the socio­
political status quo for lack of a better alternative or 
because new social orders only usher in a different form of 
social control.
This history provides us with an account of the 
"evolution" of the term; however, it tells us little about 
the specific arguments of postmodernists. In the next three 
sections, we will turn to some of the specific debates 
between modernists and postmodernists in order to further
9 Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic; Essavs on 
Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press, 
1983), p. xii.
10 Ibid., p. xii.
Iclarify the issues at stake.
The Debate in Social Theory
While the "problem of modernity" has been a central 
theme in social theory since the writings of Marx, Weber, 
Toennies, and Simmel, it was only in the early and mid-1970's 
that the issues of postmodernism and postmodernity appeared 
in the discourse on social thought (and here only 
sporadically). In the early 1970's, postmodernism was seen 
as either a romantic form of anti-modernity (e.g., Peter 
Berger, et al.) or as a further outcome of modernism's 
fragmentation of culture.11
Daniel Bell, in his influential book, The Cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism, takes the latter position.12 
Bell sees postmodernism as a movement of thought "which 
carries modernism to its furthest reaches."13 In Bell's 
view, modernism, and its extension postmodernism, has ushered 
in an age of fragmentation. Culture, the system of precepts 
and predispositions for guiding and interpreting life, has 
become separated and antagonistic to the social structure. 
Modernism's and postmodernism's reliance on continual
11 Peter Berger, et al., The Homeless Mind: Modernization 
and Consciousness (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 174.
12 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 
(New York: Basic Books, 1976).
13 Ibid., p. 51. As is evident, Bell views postmodernism 
as an extension and intensification of the modernistic ethos.
9
individual innovation is in direct contradiction with the 
discipline needed for a stable social and economic order. 
Bell believes that modernism's and postmodernism's emphasis 
on consumerism and hedonism has destroyed the work ethic and 
has contributed to the erosion of the rational order required 
for economic production in a capitalist economy. In Bell's 
words, postmodernism "demands that what was previously played 
out in fantasy and imagination must be acted out in life as 
well."u It seeks to replace the Protestant Ethic with the 
psychedelic bazaar. In this scenario of fragmentation only 
a totalizing system of theory and praxis can repair the 
damage. In this respect, pell calls for a "return in Western 
Society of some conception of religion" to repair the damage 
done by the culture of separation.15
Bell's position on modernity and postmodernity marks one 
of the important stances in the debate. Bell is certainly an 
anti-modernist as well as an anti-postmodernist. He laments 
the fragmentation caused by the privatization of 
consciousness in modernity. The "cure” in Bell's view is to 
return to a totalizing value system associated with pre­
modernity. Here, society can once again find a firm 
foundation for deciding the merits of morals, values, and 
philosophical positions. This, he believes, will solve the 
problem of moral and theoretical relativism which haunts
14 Ibid., p. 54.
15 Ibid., p. 29.
10
modernity.
In Europe the modernity/postmodernity debate has pitted 
Juergen Habermas, a defender of the Enlightenment principles 
of modernity, against Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, two of modernity's harshest critics.16 This debate 
began in the late 1970's and has been described as "one of 
the most important debates of this decade, if not of this 
century."17 Habermas, in a paper delivered in Frankfurt in 
1980, compared the French poststructuralists with the young 
conservatives (Jungkonservativen) of Weimar-era Germany.18 
Habermas was placed on the defensive with the publication of 
Lyotard's La Condition Postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir in 
1979.19 In the book, Lyotard claims that the metanarratives 
of modernity, that is the discourses or meta-theoretical 
positions which support the modern era, have lost their 
credibility through changes in science, technology, and art 
in the twentieth century. These supporting narratives of 
modernity, such as the belief in human emancipation and the
16 There are other important figures in this debate, 
including Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty. I have chosen 
Foucault and Lyotard only as examples.
17 Ehrhard Bahr, "In Defense of the Enlightenment: 
Foucault and Habermas." German Studies Review, 11, 1988, p. 
97.
18 Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity." New 
German Critique 22, 1981, pp 3-14.
19 The Postmodern Condition:_A Report <?n Enpwledgg/
trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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ability to achieve accurate and totalizing or complete 
knowledge systems, are no longer possible given changes in 
science and society. Social change has "opened new ways of 
life (which) reveal a truth about our basic condition that 
has been covered over by comforting stories about the cosmos 
or about history."20 New knowledge and technology have 
created a world in which we no longer feel the comfort of 
fixed laws or of mastery over our technological creations. 
For Lyotard, our current condition prohibits us from finding 
a transcendent discourse or theory which can avoid the 
incommensurability of competing language games. 
Consequently, no discourse can gain enough legitimacy to 
serve as a foundation for timeless and universal 
authority.21
In Habermas' earlier work, Knowledge and Human Interests 
(1972) , he had sought to ground authority in an "ideal speech 
situation."22 Habermas agreed that we can no longer accept 
the modern correspondence theory of truth (i.e., a direct, 
non-distorted relation between theory and reality) . However, 
even without the correspondence theory of truth, the
20 David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel. 
Heidegger, and After (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
p. 258.
21 Cf. Christopher Norris, Contest of Faculties: 
Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction (London: Methuen 
& Co., 1985), p. 140.
22 Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 
trans. by Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972).
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elimination of power, self-interest, and ignorance remain the 
socially (lifeworld) defined goals of any communicative act 
or discourse. For Habermas, truth is derived from a 
consensus obtained in a forum of open and free communication. 
From this perspective, knowledge obtains its validity 
"because it is intersubjectively recognized to be rationally 
justified in processes of argumentative criticism."23 This 
move on Habermas' part allows him to replace one exhausted 
principle of modernity, the correspondence theory of truth, 
with another of its central precepts, that of reason (i.e., 
the theory of communicative action).
Lyotard responded to Habermas' proposals by questioning
the ability of any strategy to overcome the heterogeneous
nature of contemporary discourses. Lyotard writes:
My question is to determine what sort of unity 
Habermas has in mind. Is the aim of the project of 
modernity the constitution of sociocultural unity 
within which all the elements of daily life and of 
thought would take their places as in an organic 
whole? Or does the passage that has to be chartered 
between heterogeneous language games— those of 
cognition, of ethics of politics— belong to a 
different order from that?24
Lyotard contends that Habermas' ideal speech situation is but
another example of Western society's quest for totality and
certainty. However, the proliferation of competing life
forms existing within contemporary society makes it
23 Stephan Fuchs, "The Social Organization of Scientific 
Knowledge.” Sociological Theory, 4, 1986, p. 128.
24 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. 72-73.
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Iimpossible for the ideal speech situation to overcome the
multiple voicing of competing language games. In this case,
it becomes just another "fairy tale" of modernity— another
metanarrative that no longer works (We will return to this
point in Chapter 6).
Habermas' attack on another important critic of
modernity, Hichel Foucault, was not precipitated by one
particular work. It primarily was sparked by what Habermas
felt was a failure on Foucault's part to outline a legitimate
form of power or a proposal for discursive or social
liberation from the contemporary political condition of
society. For Foucault, the transition from the classical
period to modernity represented a shift of epistemes.2S
Nowhere in Foucault's work does he provide a manifesto for
overcoming the preponderance of power in modern society. As
one critic argued:
He argues we create delinquents and a criminal milieu 
with our prisons and our paroles; he tells us that, 
from the Catholic confessional to the psychiatrist's 
couch, we have produced ourselves as beings with a 
sexuality that must be explored and managed.... but 
he does not tell us what we should do. He does not 
tell us how we could liberate ourselves or what sort of 
society we should have instead....What kind of power 
would be legitimate; on what basis can we distinguish
25 Epistemes are defined by Foucault as "the total set 
of relations that united, at a given period, the discursive 
practices that give rise to epistemological figures, 
sciences, and possibly formalized systems..." Michel 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A.M. 
Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper Colophon, 1972), p. 191.
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between acceptable and unacceptable forms of power?26 
Foucault does not outline a legitimate form of power because 
he thinks that is a paradox. In his view, the movement from 
pre-modernity to modernity does not mean the acquisition of 
a timeless, universal, and non-power laden discourse on 
matters of sexuality, crime, or any other issue. Modernity 
represents a change in epistemes and the acquisition of new 
discourses (and the elimination or exclusion of others) to 
articulate these epistemes. In Foucault's scheme, the 
Enlightenment's, as well as Habermas', most important 
concepts of rationality and universality become rhetorical 
strategies of linguistic and social domination (i.e., 
rationality is power).
It is easy to see why a person raised on critical theory 
would find Lyotard's and Foucault's work objectionable. 
Habermas believes Foucault and Lyotard take a Nietzschean 
turn, thereby negating any firm foundation for critique, 
including their own.27 By equating power and knowledge, in 
what Habermas believes to be a totalizing manner, Lyotard and 
Foucault ignore the possible legitimacy inherent in everyday
26 Keith Gandal, "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Works and 
Politics." Telos, 67, 1986, p. 121.
27 Habermas refers to this as a "performative 
contradiction." Cf. the discussion of Habermas in Chapter 6. 
Habermas also laments what he considers to be the Nietzschean 
turn of Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (New York: Continuum Books, 1972). Cf. Nancy 
S. Love, "Epistemology and Exchange: Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Critical Theory." New German Critique, 41, 1987, pp. 71-94 
for a discussion of this.
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communicative action. This prohibits them from
distinguishing between the intrusion of power in modern 
social systems and the functioning of everyday speech acts. 
By viewing power and communicative distortion in such a 
manner, postmodernists such as Lyotard and Foucault do not 
provide an avenue for any meaningful (non-power distorted) 
discourse to occur. Habermas contends that the Enlightenment 
project (i.e., the principles of modernity) of emancipation 
and the overcoming of prejudice have not failed. They are 
only incomplete. He feels it is his mission to salvage the 
enlightenment from both Bell's anti-modern return to religion 
and Lyotard's and Foucault's postmodern abandonment of the 
project altogether.
As we shall see in the next section some of the issues 
of debate in social theory can also be founded in the debate 
over modern aesthetic form.
The Debate Over Aesthetic Form in Architecture
and Art
In the early 1980's the Polish Movement "Solidarity" 
released a statement on modern architecture. In the 
statement, the union condemned modern architecure for being, 
in their words, "the product of an alliance between 
bureaucracy and totalitarianism."28 In a similar vein, the 
"journalistic novelist," Tom Wolfe, commenting on modern
28 Paolo Portoghesi, Postmodern: The Architecture of the 
Postindustrial Citv (New York: Rizzoli, 1983), p. 8.
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architecture in his 1981 book From Bauhaus to Our House, 
laments Nthe whiteness & lightness & leanness & cleanness & 
bareness & spareness of it all."29 From both of these 
perspectives, the drive of modern architects to create clean 
and pure space have resulted in the negation of community and 
history. Modern architecture has not succeeded in producing 
a livable environment, but has instead left humanity 
"surrounded by a sea of endless monotony," filled with "the 
simplest functionalism."30 In social terms, architecture 
has become a cultural symbol of the ever-increasing 
bureaucratization and rationalization of society and the 
lifeworld, as well as the continual demise of community.
In the realm of art this distrust of modernistic style 
can also be found. Postmodern art incorporates many of the 
anti-modern theoretical perspectives that are found in the 
disdain for modern architecture. Postmodernists see modern 
art as proclaiming an "auratic" superiority.31 Aura 
"entails that a cultural object proclaims its own 
originality, uniqueness, and singularity" through the
29 Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1981), p. 4.
30 Heinrich Koltz (ed.), Postmodern Visions: Drawings. 
Paintings, and Models of Contemporary Architects (New York: 
Abbeville Press, 1985), p. 7.
31 This term is from Walter Benjamin's, "The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed. 
by H. Arendt (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), pp. 219-54.
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socially unrestrained action of artistic creativity.32 
Postmodern critics argue that this modern attribute confines 
art to consumption within the realm of high culture, since 
the only one capable of achieving the auratic qualities are 
those with the proper level of cultural capital. Postmodern 
art attempts to undermine the auratic quality and social 
function of modern art by deliberately allying itself with 
various forms of mechanical and electronic reproduction 
(e.g., Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, Barbara Kruger). This 
alliance or manifestation has the effect of denying a 
privileged position to the work of art, its producer, or to 
its consumer. By showing that art can be constructed from 
the commodified artifacts of everyday life, as pop and neo­
pop art do, and by denying the distinction between high 
culture and pop culture, the postmodernists hope to show that 
the modern orientation is out-dated and confining and that 
art needs new, post-modern forms of "expression."
If we explore the above positions on modern architecture 
and art further we find something more than a disenchantment 
with a particular aesthetic style. We find embedded in these 
critiques a disillusionment with many of the theoretical 
principles and institutional characteristics of the modern 
world. For the postmodernists, modernity, as well as modern 
architecture and art, were built on the theoretical
32 Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized 
Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 
286.
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principles of universality, on a break with history and 
tradition, and on the centrality of the autonomous creative 
subject. For critics, these ideational principles are 
closely related to the often devastating social processes of 
modernity: progressive rationalization, differentiation and
fragmentation of the social world, industrialization, 
urbanization, and the development and expansion of organized 
capitalism. For the postmodernists, the theoretical 
principles, institutional processes, and cultural products of 
modernity have become problematic in the late twentieth 
century. The theoretical principles on which modern 
architecture and art were developed no longer seem adequate 
for describing the style of the contemporary social world. 
Modern style no longer seem to capture the experience of the 
so called post-industrial age or the contemporary social 
processes we encounter in everyday life. Therefore, new 
forms of aesthetic expression are required that more closely 
adhere to the contemporary social and cultural situation.
The Search for Political Foundations 
The debate between modernists and postmodernists also 
extend to the contemporary debate over political foundations. 
Some, often using Bell as a point of reference, see 
Enlightenment-based liberalism and individualism as being 
responsible for the decline of traditional notions of 
happiness and political virtue. This group sees the return
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of a firm socio-political foundation as the only alternative 
to modern fragmentation and the subsequent loss of meaning. 
On the other hand, some argue that we need a new type of 
political consciousness rather than simply a return to a 
romantically-perceived past utopia.
For both groups, there is no more evidence of the
exhaustion of modern political foundations than the decline
of the notion of progress. In the American context,
modernity's grand concept of progress seems no longer
convincing, especially as seen in the after-light of the
Vietnam War or the growing environmental crisis. Robert
Wallace has written:
Even the advocates of nuclear power, the builders of 
the latest McDonald's, and the investigators of 
recombinant DNA, thought they may still occasionally 
apply the word "progress" to these projects, define 
them not as being themselves beneficial but merely 
as generating jobs, or ultimately as being 
"inevitable" ”
Progress and the optimistic, future-oriented attitude of 
modernity no longer seem adequate for defining our experience 
of the contemporary socio-political situation. The idea of 
progress, like foundational truth for Lyotard, has become 
another metanarrative of modernity, one that no longer seems 
to encompass our current social and political condition.
For the German critic Peter Sloterdijk, the fading of 
the political metanarratives of modernity is akin to
33 Robert Wallace, "Progress, Secularization and 
Modernity: The Lowith-Blumenberg Debate." The New German
Critique, 22, 1981, p. 63.
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Nietzsche's description of the void created by the death of
God (and man)— we have succumbed to nihilism. Sloterdijk
sees this political fading as resulting in the rise of the
cynic as the modal personality of contemporary society.34
As the master cynic Diogenes refused to accept the principles
of Platonic thought or the "virtues" of Athenian politics,
the modern cynic no longer accepts the absolute promises of
science or the liberation possibilities offered by Marxism or
the New Social Movements. Sloterdijk describes our current
state as "enlightened false consciousness:'1
It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which 
enlightenment has labored both successfully and 
unsuccessfully. It has learned its lessons in 
enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not 
able to, put them into practice. Well-off and 
miserable at the same time, this consciousness no 
longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; 
its falseness is already reflexively buffered.35
Sloterdijk is describing a social and academic environment
where ideas and theories are immediately deconstructed and
dismissed. Any program for liberation or perhaps even
amelioration becomes susceptible to the "blank stare” of the
cynic who has heard these promises before. Sloterdijk goes
on to provide a very apt description of the manifestation of
enlightened false consciousness in everyday life:
We do our work and say to ourselves, it would be 
better to get really involved. We live from day to 
day, from vacation to vacation, from news show to news
34 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cvnical Reason 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
35 Ibid., p. 5.
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show, from problem to problem, from orgasm to orgasm, 
in private turbulence and medium-term affairs, tense, 
relaxed. With some things we feel dismay, but with 
most things we can't really give a damn.3*
The key to understanding this statement is the word can't.
Modern political consciousness is numb. It has seen the
promises of Marxism turn into the Soviet Gulag, the New
Social Movements turn into state-directed political action
committees, the counter culture being absorbed into the
culture industry, and Enlightenment rationality turn into the
iron cage. In such a social environment, the only avenue
which seems open is a protective cynical retreat into our
private orbits. Sloterdijk believes that the only type of
left politics that is possible is one based on a anarchistic
cynicism. We must somehow forge a new micro politics of
resistance.
The theme of modernistic "homelessness" is also echoed 
in a recent work by Robert Bellah, et al., on individualism 
in middle-class American life.37 Bellah's description of 
the isolation brought on by ontological and utilitarian 
individualism is similar in some respect to Sloterdijk's 
cynicism. Bellah's individual has pulled inward, trying to
36 Ibid., p. 98-99.
37 Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1985). There are important differences 
between Bellah's and Sloterdijk's positions on modernity. 
Sloterdijk's position is a Weberian-inspired account which 
sees modern life as being too bureaucratic and confining. 
Bellah's description is a conservative-inspired view which 
sees modern life as being too individualistic.
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find meaning through material success or ontological escape.
Bellah, et al., write:
The inner tensions of American individualism add 
up to a classic case of ambivalence. We deeply feel 
the emptiness of a life without sustaining social 
c o m m i t m e n t s .  Yet we are hesitant to articulate our 
sense that we need one another as much as we need to 
stand alone, for fear that if we did we would lose our 
independence altogether.38
In Bellah's view, the excesses of modern individualism make
it difficult for us to come to terms with social problems or
our general social condition. Instead of confronting our
problems as a group, we seek refuge in our private orbits.
The "first language" of American individualism, focused on
asserting independence, further complicates the situation by
limiting our ability to express our feelings of commitment or
desire to engage in a discourse on our socio-political
direction.
What we find in Sloterdijk's and Bellah's descriptions 
are attempts to extend some of the approaches in social 
theory to the larger political conditions in Europe and the 
United States. Bellah's approach is a fusion of Bell's 
diagnosis of modernity and Habermas' treatment plan. He 
wants Americans to recognize the depth of their differences 
but still manage to draw from old cultural orientations and 
engage in a political discourse to reach a consensus on 
common goals. Bellah's solution to the problems of modernity 
resembles what was referred to earlier as the "neo­
38 Ibid., pp. 150-151, emphasis added.
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conservative development" in the critique of modernity. His 
solution rests on the creation of a "social ecology" 
consciousness to repair modern society.39 This can be 
interpreted as a somewhat tempered call for a totalizing 
system of thought. Sloterdijk, with his roots in the German 
Green Party, would not see this as a possibility, given the 
fragmented nature of competing language games and the 
association between knowledge, discourse, and power. His 
position is an example of the "postmodernism of resistance," 
described earlier (p. 8). Sloterdijk's political solution 
seems to rest on a non-romantic form of micro or local 
politics— that is a politics that cynically resists the 
status quo, centralization, and individualism.
The Postmodern Framework
The proceeding discussion of some of the debates between 
modernists and postmodernists perhaps confuses the situation 
more than it clarifies it. As we can see, postmodernism 
means different things to different people. All the groups we 
discussed see postmodernism as a rebellion against social and 
cultural modernity. However, from this agreement the 
discussions tends to go in a variety of different directions. 
In this section, we will present our "working definition" of 
postmodernism. This will be the version of postmodernism
39 Bellah borrows this idea and many of his ideas on 
postmodernism from Stephen Toulmin's, The Return to Cosmology 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
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Ithat we will develop and utilize throughout this work
First, we begin with some of the central ideas of modern 
thought. The modern perspective can be seen as encompassing 
at least three overlapping philosophical principles;
universality. egocentrism. and Ipgggentriaa.*0 These
principles serve, not only as the foundation for modern 
science and philosophy, but also for modern aesthetics and 
modern agency. Universality refers, in part, to the attempt 
to construct timeless and cross-cultural laws of natural or 
human action based on a timeless and universal method. 
Embedded within this idea of universality is a belief in the 
progress of knowledge or "scientific accumulation." This 
position sees accurate knowledge as self-evident to all 
rational individuals and is thus universally applicable. 
Egocentrism refers to locating the source of knowledge, 
imagination, or practical agency in the condition of human 
subjectivity. Here, rationality and creativity is thought to 
be a product of some inherent condition of human 
subjectivity. Finally, logocentrism refers to the quest to 
find a foundational truth (the logos, the "Word"). The 
modern discourse has continually sought to develop the one 
correct theory or method that was capable of apprehending the 
world as it really exists. It sought the "final word" on 
matters of truth, justice, and knowledge.
40 Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Toward a 
Postmodern Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988), p. 161.
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At a general level, we see postmodernism as a position 
which seeks to deconstruct (i.e., break down or expose) 
modern theoretical and cultural principles. It seeks to 
illustrate how these modern theoretical principles are 
culturally and historically constructed within the confines 
of a power dynamic and how practitioners act as if these 
principles were reflective of reality. To accomplish this, 
postmodern thought tends to highlight modernity's paradoxical 
or self-defeating qualities. Postmodernism often focuses on 
the hidden or overt metaphors on which the modern 
philosophical principles rests. This is often done by 
pointing out modernity's disregard or avoidance of problems, 
such as language or the negation of the excluded "other" 
(e.g., issues such as non-rationality and power or social 
groups such as Women, the "mentally ill," or the Third 
World). The deconstruction process thus undermines the 
foundations of the philosophical discourse of modernity, 
leaving it as a contingent form of rhetoric. The modern 
narrative becomes just one narrative among others and not the 
foundation for all narratives. In other words, the modern 
discourse has no privileged access to truth.
The above discussion aids us in making a distinction, 
not only between modernism and postmodernism, but also 
between postmodernism and anti-modernism. Anti-modernist are 
critical of the Enlightenment based ideology of modernity, 
yet they seek a new totality to recover the loss of meaning.
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IPostmodernists do not make that move. They agree that the 
Enlightenment is exhausted, but that do not think that any 
new or old system can replace it. We must accept the 
incommensurability of various life forms and language games 
(and the subsequent leveling of meaning) . We cannot hold out 
hope for a position to repair fragmented value spheres. We 
must live with fragmentation and undecidability.
Consequently, we may conclude that postmodernism, in 
both theory and cultural production, can be seen as a self- 
conscious skepticism— a disbelief in the supporting 
metanarratives of modernity. The modern attempt to ground 
its thought and action in a universal and subject-centered 
method is revealed as having a mythical, fictional, or merely 
rhetorical quality. In such a questioning environment, the 
modern theoretical distinctions between subject and object, 
rationality and non-rationality, speech and writing, or 
between "high" and "low" culture become insupportable.
Now that we have some conceptualization of what 
postmodernism is about, or at least our version, we can turn 
to the outline of the chapters to follow.
Plan of the Chapters
This work is concerned with identifying some of the 
underlying themes and issues which unite the "postmodern 
turn" in theory and culture and how these issues may be seen 
sociologically. In this connection, it is perhaps helpful to
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see this dissertation as having three sections. The first 
section is concerned with both discussing the Enlightenment 
philosophical foundations of modernity and the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century critiques of this 
position. The second section seeks to identify the cultural 
and theoretical positions of postmodernism (i.e., to develop 
a postmodern framework). In addition to discussions of the 
theoretical views of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and others, 
this sections contains an examination of neo-pop art and 
postmodern architecture to further illustrate how the ideas 
of postmodern theory are incorporated into the cultural 
production of the late twentieth century. Our final section 
is concerned with discussing what a sociology of knowledge 
position can contribute to an understanding of postmodernism. 
This sections contains both an discussion of social or 
constructivist epistemology and an examination of the 
relationship between postmodernism and the social 
organization of knowledge production and cultural 
consumption. Below, we will discuss the specific 
organization of the chapters.
In order to examine postmodernism as a cultural process, 
we first must develop a theoretical view of modernity. The 
second chapter seeks to provide a foundation for this 
dissertation by exploring some of central ideational 
characteristics of modernity. This will be accomplished 
through an examination of the writings of the French
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Enlightenment, specifically, Condillac, Condorcet, and 
Rousseau. These figures exemplify some of the dominant ideas 
of modernity, such as the optimistic attitude towards 
rationality, knowledge accumulation, societal progress, and 
emancipation.
In chapter three, we turn to late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century critiques of modernity. This period, it is 
argued, is a key for understanding the rise of postmodernism 
as an intellectual and cultural movement. In this chapter, 
we will focus on the ideas of modernist movements in art and 
the writings of Nietzsche, Weber, and Simmel. Their 
critiques certainly do not exhaust the complexities of 
cultural and social modernity, but they do provide an 
interpretation of its paradoxes— one which has influenced 
many postmodern writers.
In chapter four, we begin a discussion and elaboration 
of the postmodern framework. Here, we will explore the 
general postmodern orientation towards language and 
referentiality (i.e., the "linguistic turn"). Linguistics is 
the area where many of the original ideas of theoretical 
postmodernism were forged. We are concerned with the 
internal transformation of the linguistic model from the 
structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure to the 
poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida. Language to many 
modernists was seen as an unproblematic instrument for 
communicating the social and physical world. The modernists
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saw the world as a "fixed object of analysis quite separate 
from the forms of discourse by which men speak of it and by 
which they represent their thoughts."41 For the
postmodernists, this modern position ignores the way in which 
language itself structures or shapes reality.42 This 
sensibility towards language as a definer of thought marks 
one of the most important distinctions between modern and 
postmodern discourse. We will specifically explore how this 
critique of language fits into the overall reexamination of 
modern correspondence or referential epistemology.
In chapter five, we discuss the attack on the timeless 
and universal humanist ego in thought.43 Here we consider 
the writings of Foucault and Jacques Lacan where the "de­
centering" of the subject (i.e., removing the subject as the 
center of knowledge) is an important theme. Following in the 
line of Nietzsche, these writers seek to illustrate that the 
"subject is not something given, it is something added and
41 Timothy Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 24.
42 F. Mauthner has stated, "If Aristotle had spoken 
Chinese or Dakotan he would have had to adopt an entirely 
different logic." Quoted in Peter Burke and Roy Porter 
(eds.), The Social History of Language (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 14.
43 Fredric Jameson has referred to this as the attack 
on the pretensions of the Cartesian cogito. Cf. Fredric 
Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of 
Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1972), p. 135.
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invented and projected behind what there is."44 Foucault 
maintained that "man is an invention of recent date....and 
one perhaps nearing an end."45 We will examine in detail 
the meaning of this statement for both social thought and 
culture-at-large. Also, this chapter seeks to link the 
decentering of the subject with the death of the notion of 
the "creative artist" in postmodern art.
Chapter six examines the postmodern orientation towards 
rationality, progress, and emancipation. Modernists 
typically saw the past as a continuous overcoming of 
irrationality, myth, barbarisms, etc..44 Traditional views 
of the social and physical world were to be replaced with 
modern "scientific" and rational ones. However, recent 
works, which can be labelled as postmodern, take a different 
orientations toward the past. The past is something which is 
discontinuous and can't be willfully overcome. We can never 
escape the structural characteristics which mark the history 
of our language or the historical situation of our existence. 
In other words, we can never gain a timeless "God's eye view" 
of ourselves or the social world.
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 267.
45 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology 
of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 387.
44 An example of this would be William Robertson's, The 
Progress of Society in Europe: A Historical Outline from the 
Subversions of the Roman Empire to the Beginning of the 
Sixteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1972 
(1769)).
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In chapter 7, we begin the explication of a sociological 
approach to postmodernism. Specifically, we will explore the 
challenges posed by postmodern philosophy for contemporary 
social science. As part of our explication, we will discuss 
the recent work of Jean Baudrillard and his "end of the 
social thesis." Finally, we will use Durkheim's discussion 
of American pragmatism as a means for rethinking 
postmodernism's collapse of meaning and leveling of 
discursive formations.
In chapter 8, we will further elaborate upon on the 
social epistemological framework by examining recent 
developments in the sociology of knowledge, specifically the 
so-called strong program and the constructivist thesis in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. We will use these 
developments as examples of how a sociology of knowledge 
framework can respond to the often epistemological nihilism 
of postmodernism.
In Chapter 9, we will use our previous discussions of 
social epistemology and the sociology of knowledge to examine 
postmodernism. Specifically, we will utilize the Durkheimian 
and Neo-Durkheimian description of the social organization of 
groups. We seek to relate postmodernism to the group 
structure and cognitive style of culture producing and 
consuming collectivities. Borrowing from the work of Mary 
Douglas, Richard Whitley, Pierre Bourdieu, and others, we 
will explore how group organization may be responsible for
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the dissemination and reception of postmodern culture.47
Finally, we will end our discussion in chapter ten with 
an overview of the central points of the dissertation and an 
explication of some of the important issues and problems 
raised by this work.
47 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique 
of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1984).
CHAPTER II
THE DOMINANT DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY
In this chapter, we will examine some of the classical 
statements of modern thought as presented by its leading 
proponents; the eighteenth century French Philosphes. In the 
writings of the French Philosphes we find not only the 
origins of much of modern philosophical thought, but also 
many of the ideas representative of cultural modernity. 
Specifically in this chapter, we will explore the writings of 
Etienne de Condillac, the Marquis de Condorcet, and Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau. We will use their writings to construct a 
general modern philosohical framework. In order to 
accomplish this, we will focus upon three important modern 
ideas; 1) the relation between language and knowledge and 
their role in obtaining and perfecting reason (Condillac), 2) 
the evolutionary unfolding of history (Condorcet) , and 3) the 
role of the universal, inner directed "self" in making moral 
and political decisions (Rousseau). The eighteenth century 
Enlightenment philosophers were not, unlike their seventeenth 
century predecessors, content with the construction of 
abstract systems of knowledge. Enlightenment philosophers 
sought to connect theory and practice in order to provide a 
means for criticizing conventional standards and 
institutions. Their philosophy "attributes to thought not 
merely an imitative function but the power and task of
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shaping life itself."1 The treatments of Condillac, 
Condorcet, and Rousseau are intended to provide a 
paradigmatic background for the modern way of perceiving the 
world and humans' role within it. It is also provided in 
order to build a framework for understanding postmodern 
theory's ''deconstruction" of these basic premises. First, 
however, a discussion of the social conditions that set the 
stage for modern philosophical discourse.
Modern Thought and Social Change 
The term modern is derived from the Latin word "modo," 
meaning "just now" or "in this time." However, the term has 
produced another widely held definition. Since the earlv 
nineteenth century, modernity is a term that has been used to 
encapsulate the social and cultural entirety of a historical 
period of time. The modern world, perhaps above all previous 
societies, recognized itself to be "new" and unique. 
Modernity, defined within its own terms, claimed a radical 
break with traditional ways of perceiving the world and 
acting in the world. In general terms, modernity saw itself 
as a period built on the foundations of rationality (i.e., a 
belief in the ability of humans to ascertain the real), 
universality (i.e., the construction of ahistorical and 
cross-cultural laws), progress (i.e., scientific accumulation
1 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
trans. by F. Koelln and J.P. Pettegrove (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. viii.
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and telelogical social change), and the enlightened control 
of nature and society (i.e., the harnessing of nature and the 
societal betterment). At the center of these foundations was 
a thinking and acting Cartesian subject capable of accurately 
comprehending the world and purposefully acting on the world. 
The dogmas of religious authority and traditional lifeways, 
as well as the canons of antiquity, were open to rigorous 
rational scrutiny, reevaluation, and often rejection. The 
modern human being did not need the traditional authority 
embodied in a church or a monarch to make the appropriate 
political, economic, philosophical, or aesthetic decisions. 
Decisions could be made on the basis of a rational 
methodological comparison of means and ends performed by the 
thinking and acting subject.
While our primary concern in this chapter is with the 
ideational features of modernity, it would be a mistake to 
view it only in these terms. Modernity entails more than a 
specific nexus or mode of thought and culture. Modernity 
also encompasses a "historically specific series of complex 
social forms and institutions.”2 These social forms, 
institutions, and processes are often collapsed under the 
catagories of industrial capitalism, rationalization, 
societal differentiation, the (forced) division of labor, 
urbanization, and the development of the modern state, to
2 John Rundell, Origins of Modernity (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 1.
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name but a few. These social forms and processes both draw 
their legitimation from the modern nexus of thought and give 
this nexus of thought its meaning. These institutional 
characteristics have produced a society markedly different 
from those of the past. Traditional economic and political 
arrangements had given way to new institutional forms and 
social organizations: Industrial capitalism dramatically
differed from feudalism in its distribution of resources, its 
class system, and its power relations. The differentiated 
society of modernity was in direct contrast to the unified 
society of Medieval Europe. These social forms provide the 
backdrop for the discussion on the Enlightenment origins of 
cultural modernity that follow.
Condillac: Reason and the Problem of Language
The writings of Etienne de Condillac (1715-1780) were 
directed towards refining, synthesizing, and revising major 
positions of seventeenth century philosophy and science. 
Condillac thought that the rational spirit of seventeenth 
century thought, expressed most poignantly by Descartes 
(1596-1650), had overemphasized the role of deductive reason 
performed by an innately rational subject. In Condillac's 
view, the rationalists had ignored the induction of empirical 
experience and observation. With the development of 
empiricism as an important philosophical and scientific 
movement, represented in part by the writings of John Locke
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I(1632-1704), the importance of the empirical in guiding the 
acguisition of knowledge could no longer be dismissed.3 In 
addition, the advent of Newtonian physics and its subseguent 
success in building predictable systems of knowledge had 
forever altered any purely non-empirical or speculative 
acquisition of knowledge, a point that was later advanced by 
Kant.
However, Condillac, like many of his Enlightenment 
counterparts, did not want to completely dismiss the central 
role of a thinking and acting subject in the construction of 
knowledge. Condillac simply wanted to make the subject a 
recipient of knowledge rather than a producer. Specifically, 
it was Condillac's goal to unite the analytical and the 
synthetic in the manner of Newton. Condillac recognized that 
"Newton's general law of attraction was not the exclusive 
result of theorizing nor of sporadic experimentation or 
observation unguided by theory..."4 Newtonian science 
represented a perfect balance between the rational and the 
empirical. It was a model of how to build valid and reliable 
systems of knowledge. By synthesizing elements of Cartesian 
rationalism with Lockian empiricism, Condillac wanted to 
provide and reinforce a method capable of gaining access to
3 Cf. John Locke, An Essav Concerning Human 
Understanding. ed. by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975).
4 Irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development ef
Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1981), p. 6.
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Iall realms of the unknown. He sought to prove that empirical 
"facts" and human rationality were compatible and necessary 
elements for the acquisition of universal knowledge, as long 
as empirical facts were given a primary role.
For Condillac, the new reliance on empirical facts would
enable knowledge to accumulate and progress. This progress
first required a rejection of the abstract system-building
rationalism of seventeenth-century thought. In its place we
must substitute a method which gives primary value to well
established facts. For Condillac this meant returning to the
origin of empirical experience. Condillac writes,
The more the mind appears to make progress, 
the more it goes astray, and errors accumulate from 
generation to generation. When things have come to 
this point, there is only one means for putting 
order back into thought; that is to forget everything 
we have learned and take our ideas back to their 
origin, to follow the generation of them, and to 
remake them...*
By returning to the simple sensations of experience, a method 
of inquiry could be developed and extended which was capable 
of providing timeless and universal knowledge. Ultimately, 
this would allow the advancement of science and philosophy to 
accelerate greatly.
There was, however, a problem haunting the ultimate 
fulfillment of the perfection and expansion of knowledge; the 
problem of language. Condillac once described his
5 Etienne de Condillac quoted in Charles Frankel, The
Faith q£ Reagpn; xhs Idea <?t Progress in the French
Enliahtenment (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), p. 47.
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philosophical mission as "unraveling the chaos into which the
abuses and vices of language have plunged the moral and
metaphysical sciences."6 For Condillac, language was a
central problem for all systems of knowledge, specifically
the seventeenth-century rationalism of Descartes of which he
was so critical. In specific terms, the ordinary language of
previous metaphysical systems lacked precision. In
Condillac's view, if knowledge was to progress the impasse
caused by the inappropriate use of language must be overcome.
This was to be accomplished by developing a direct
relationship between the signified (idea, concept, object)
and the signifier (symbols, verbal utterances). Since
ordinary language is an historical given and consequently
poorly composed and imprecise, it is not capable of providing
a simple, direct relation between signified and signifier.
Condillac writes,
(We) think according to the habits which 
languages cause us to acquire. We think by means 
of them: as rules of our judgments, they
produce our knowledge, our opinions and our 
prejudices; in a word, they produce all that 
is good and bad in our judgments.7
What was needed was a way around this impasse in the progress
of knowledge.
Condillac's mission was both to explore the weaknesses 
of ordinary language and develop a symbolic code which
6 Quoted in Etienne de Condillac, Logic (New York: Abaris 
Books, Inc., 1980), p. 16.
7 Ibid., p. 22.
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connected the signifier with the signified. The solution was 
to be found in the "well made" and simple language of
algebra.
Algebra is very striking proof that the progress
of the sciences depends solely upon the progress of
their languages; and that well-made languages alone 
could give to analysis the degree of simplicity and 
precision of which it is capable in each area of our 
studies. Well-made languages could do this, I say: 
for in the art of reasoning as in the art of 
calculating, everything is reduced to compositions 
and decompositions; and it must not be thought that 
these are two different arts.8
Algebra's symbolic code held out the possibility of avoiding
the errors of common langauge-based, human reasoning.
"Reasoning is perfected only to the extent that languages are
themselves perfected."9 Ultimately, the perfection of
language allows us to have "empire over our imagination."10
In other words, the imprecise nature of ordinary language
causes a flight of imagination. This flight results in error
and faulty knowledge. Consequently, for knowledge to
progress language must give way to the timeless and universal
logic of mathematics.
With this movement towards a "perfect" language, all 
realms of inquiry, both natural and social, are open to the 
advancement of reason. As Condillac maintains in the above
8 Ibid., p. 305.
9 Ibid., p. 303.
10 Condillac quoted in Charles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 198.
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quotation, the advancement of reason unleashed by empiricism
and the perfection of language means no realm of
understanding is out of the reach of human comprehension and
understanding. Once methodologically foundational reason has
become a dominant mode of understanding, its domain expands
into social considerations. In the social realm the
institutional and social attributes of traditional society
become open to scrutiny and rejection. Describing this
process Ernst Cassirer wrote,
As soon as the power of thought awakens in man, it 
advances irresistibly against this (social) form of 
reality, summoning it before the tribunal of thought 
and challenging its legal titles to truth and validity. 
And society must submit to being treated like physical 
reality under investigation.11
While Condillac was not particularly concerned with bringing
objective knowledge to politics and society, his views would
be influential for others seeking to develop a science of
society or history (e.g., the "social physics" of A. Comte
and the "scientific history" of Leopold von Ranke).
Condillac must be seen as a central figure in the 
Enlightenment's attempt to bring all forms of knowledge under 
the control of pure reason, logic, and empirical experience. 
While he does reject, in part, the rationalism of Descartes, 
he nonetheless wants to refine a method capable of 
constructing reliable knowledge of the social and natural 
world that includes a role for human intellectual activity.
11 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 1951, 
p. 18.
In order for this method to be effective, it must return to 
the basic sensations of experience. Knowledge can accumulate 
only if we dispense with the purely rational or speculative 
construction of knowledge and turn to empirically pure data. 
This process also requires a refinement of language. 
Language, as a carrier of tradition, is a major obstacle in 
the development of systematic knowledge. Once all ideas have 
been reduced to algebra, all forms of knowledge can finally 
progress beyond the confines of tradition.12
Condorcet and the Progress of the Human Spirit 
Marquis de Condorcet's (1743-94) L^sauisse d'un tableau 
historioue des proares de 1'esprit humain. published in 1795, 
remains today a manifesto of modernity.13 Its optimistic 
attitude towards the growth of rationality, the linearity of 
history, and the capacity of humans to control the 
"uncertainties" of the natural and social world influenced 
many early nineteenth century thinkers, including the 
founders of social science Saint-Simon and A. Comte. It is 
ironic that this optimistic work of the enlightenment was 
written at the height of the "reign of terror" and while
12 For a postmodern treatment of Condillac see, Jacques 
Derrida, The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, 
trans, by John P. Leavey, Jr. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1980).
13 Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture 
of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. by J. Barraclough 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955).
ICondorcet himself was in hiding from Robespierre and other 
Jacobins who wanted him dead.
Condorcet's plan in The Progress was to, "show by appeal
to reason and fact that nature has set no term to the
perfection of human faculties; that the perfectibility of man
is truly indefinite...".14 Echoing Condillac, Condorcet
believed that the discoveries made possible by the Newtonian
method was capable of affecting every domain of inquiry. As
we continue to accumulate facts we move closer and closer to
ultimate understanding.
As the number of known facts increase, the human mind 
learns to classify them and to subsume them under more 
general facts, and, at the same time, the instruments 
and methods employed in their observation and their 
exact measurement acquire a new precision....the 
language that fixes and determines ideas will acquire 
greater breadth and precision...the methods that lead 
genius to the discovery of truth increase at once 
the force and the speed of its operation.15
For Condorcet, the scientific method had unchained the human
mind from the dogma of tradition. Now, the acquisition and
accumulation of knowledge did not have to rely on untested
speculative philosophies. Hence, it was only a matter of
time until everyone becomes "enlightened." Condorcet's
aim in The Progress was to transfer the optimism in the
progress of the natural sciences into considerations on
history and society. He related the unfolding of what he
considered to be the natural law of historical progress. The
14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 185.
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Iidea of underlying laws of history, would lead Condorcet to 
proclaim the ever growing capacity for human beings to 
control their world and to ultimately obtain moral 
perfection.16 For Condorcet, humanity had evolved through 
nine stages of development and was on the verge of the tenth 
and ultimate stage. These stages could be viewed as steps, 
leaps, and temporary steps backward towards the inevitable 
goal of the fulfillment of the human spirit. Condorcet's ten 
stages were marked by,
1. The union of humans in tribes.
2. The rise of agricultural societies.
3. The invention of the alphabet.
4 The Greek division of the sciences.
5. The decline of Greek science.
6. The restoration of knowledge with the Crusades.
7. The early progress of science and the invention of 
printing.
8. Science's revolution against traditional authority.
9. The progress of knowledge from Descartes to the 
French Republic.
10. The future progress of the human mind.
The "progress of the human spirit" had begun with the 
uniting of people into tribes. It had culminated with the 
rise of science and the French Republic. Condorcet felt that 
humanity, at the time of his writing, stood before the final
16 Condorcet's views on progress were influenced by early 
writers including Voltaire and Turgot.
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stage of historical evolution. With the method of Newton and
the destiny of history as guides, the modern individual
finally could obtain the before elusive "moral perfection."
With moral perfection, history would effectively end, since
it would reach a plateau where it would not longer be moving
toward fulfillment. Condorcet rhetorically asks,
If man can, with almost complete assurance, predict 
phenomena when he knows their laws, and if, even 
when he does not, he can still, with great 
expectation of success, forecast the future on the 
basis of his experience of the past, why, then, should 
it be regarded as a fantastic understanding to sketch, 
with some pretence to truth, the future destiny of man 
on the basis of his history?17
Just as Newton had described the laws of nature based on
observation and reason, humankind could, with the aid of
Newtonian method and reason, learn to discern cause and
effect in the processes of history. This would enable
humankind to harness the laws of history in a manner similar
to the harnessing of the natural world. With this
harnessing, the world has the potential of becoming
"perfected." In this new rational society, "everyone will
have less work to do, will produce more, and satisfy his
wants more fully."18
It is evident that for Condorcet the unfolding of 
history was not a chaotic flux. History, like the Newtonian 
natural world, succumbed to certain underlying laws of
17 Ibid., p. 173.
18 Ibid., p. 188.
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progress. Humans, with their ability to reason, could
harness and control these laws in order to improve and
ultimately perfect society.
The time will come when the sun will shine only on 
free men who know no master but their reason...
How consoling for the philosopher who laments the 
errors, the crimes, the injustice which still 
pollute the earth and of which he is often the 
victim, is this view of the human race, emancipated 
from its shackles, released from the empire of fate 
and from that of the enemies of progress, advancing 
with a firm and sure step along the path of truth, 
virtue and happiness.19
Once humanity had been "released from the empire of fate," it
could create a world based on reason. The dogmas and
injustices of contemporary institutions would fall aside as
reason progressed and created a new and just social order.
Condorcet felt that "nature has set no limit to the
realization of our hopes.,,2° Humanity had within it the
capacity for perfecting the individual and society.
Condorcet, perhaps beyond all other Enlightenment 
philosophers, exudes an extraordinary confidence in 
rationality, progress, and control. The injustices and 
superstitions of existing society were to be swept away as 
humanity reached the plateau of reason. His and other 
similar views of time and history would become extremely 
important in the justification of scientific and historical
19 Marquis de Condorcet quoted in W.T. Jones, Kant and 
the Nineteenth Century (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 2-3.
20 Condorcet, The Progress of the Human Mind. 1955, p.
175.
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change. When these components of progress were coupled with 
the ideology of the emerging bourgeoisie, one of most 
enduring ideas of modernity was born.
Another important figure in Enlightenment discourse is 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. As we shall see, Rousseau provides us 
with an understanding of another important aspect of the 
dominant discourse of modernity— the reflexive self.
Rousseau; Modernity and the Self
In the work of Rousseau (1712-78) we find a "two-edged"
reaction to the processes of modernization. On the one hand,
Rousseau, like his Enlightenment counterparts, is a champion
of an optimistic attitude toward the "natural goodness" or
"perfectability" of humankind. However, we also find in
Rousseau's work the seeds of a romantic or counter-
Enlightenment discourse. This discourse questions the very
idea of a linear "advancement of civilization"21 Rousseau
was at once a champion of the Enlightenment spirit and one of
its greatest detractors.
For Rousseau, human beings naturally are capable of good
and limitless personal growth. It is civilization which
corrupts this inner goodness and marks the regression of
humankind. In the opening to Emile. Rousseau writes,
Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the 
author of things; everything degenerates in the
21 Cf. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982 (1932)). pp. 178-79.
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Ihands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the 
products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of 
another....He wants nothing as nature made it, not 
even man; for him, man must be trained like a school 
horse; man must fashioned in keeping with his fancy 
like a tree in the garden.22
Modern civilization is marked by an acute disdain for the
natural aspects of humanity. Civilization demands that
everyone be transformed from their natural state into
obedient social beings. In this demand, civilization is
perceived as being the corruptor of the naturally occurring
inner moral goodness of humanity. Part of Rousseau's mission
is to undermine this ideology of social training. The
negative consequences of civilization require Rousseau to
search for redemption from within. In doing this, Rousseau
rediscovers the inner nature of the "self," which was somehow
lost or masked in the civilizing process. In this
connection, much of Rousseau's intellectual project can be
seen as an attempt to defend this inner experience or the
"self” from the onslaught of modernization.
While it is true that contemplations on the individual 
have held a special place in the history of Western thought, 
premodern views, such as Plato's idea of "self mastery” and 
St. Augustine's "tortured soul," are significantly different 
from the conception of the self and individuality in 
modernity. The modern self, which can be traced to the work 
of Descartes in the seventeenth century, emphasized the
22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. 
by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 37.
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innate rationality of human beings. Humans were endowed with 
an innate or God-given ability to discover the essential 
workings of the world around them. Humans' internal capacity 
for disengaged rationality would enable humankind to discover 
the true nature of things-in-themselves. Descartes succeeded 
in raising inner experience to the level of universal 
objectivity. Later, with the work of John Locke, the modern 
self begins to lose its inner directed rationality. As an 
empiricist, Locke conceives the self to be but the result of 
life-long sensate experiences.
With Rousseau, there is a movement beyond the rational
self of Descartes and the empirical self of Locke. There is
the discovery of a deeper and more complex self. Rousseau's
self is rational, like Descartes'; however, it is also
"expressive, projecting into the world and the future."23 .
The inner, expressive self is counterpoised to an outer self
(i.e., empirical) faceted and corrupted by society and
history. In this regard, Kant wrote of Rousseau,
As Newton was the first to discern order and 
regularity in the nature...Rousseau was the first 
to discover beneath the varying forms human nature 
assumes, the deeply concealed essence of man and the 
hidden law in accordance with which providence is 
justified by his observation.24
23 Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750; 
The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 18.
24 Immanuel Kant quoted from Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau. 
Kant. and Goethe. trans. by J. Gutmann, P.O. Kristeller, and 
J.H. Randall, Jr (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1963), p. 18.
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IBeneath the masks of the social existence lies the universal 
essence of humankind. As Kant points out, this essence is 
perceived as being "deeply concealed" underneath the "forms 
of human nature." Through self reflection this inner essence 
could be revealed for all of humankind. Furthermore, this 
essence was available, not through Cartesian logic, but 
through emotion, feeling, and intuition.
In The Confessions. Rousseau comments on how his version
of the self came to him while walking in the woods near
Saint-Germain.
Deep in the heart of the forest I sought and found 
vision of those primeval ages whose history I bravely 
sketched. I denied myself all the easy deceits to 
which men are prone. I dared to unveil human nature 
and look upon it in its nakedness, to trace the 
course of times and of events to which have 
disfigured human nature. And while comparing 
conventional man with natural man, I pointed out the 
the true source of our misery in our pretended 
perfection.25
What Rousseau "discovered" walking in the forest was not 
simply his own inner, subjective experience, but the 
objective essence of humanity itself. Beneath the corrupting 
affects of society, the essential goodness of humanity awaits 
release. By reflecting inward at the nakedness of our being, 
humanity can find an escape from the hegemonic confines of 
civilization.
Oh man, draw your existence up within yourself, and 
you will no longer be miserable. Remain in the place 
which nature assigns to you in the chain of being... 
Your freedom and your power extend only as far as your
25 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ibid., p. 19.
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natural strength, and not beyond. All the rest is
slavery, illusion, and deception.26
Self reflection becomes both a means of salvation from the 
influence of society and a method for discovering the true 
meaning of existence. "All that was needed was for the inner 
voice to cut loose from its yoke-fellow and declare its full 
moral competence."27
From Rousseau we obtain two modern ideas of the self: 
"first, the remarkable inner richness and expanse of the 
self; and secondly, the consequent right to project from the 
subjective structures of one's own mind, and ascertain the 
nature of humanity as such."28 Rousseau deepens and expands 
the purely rational self of seventeenth century rationalism. 
He inaugurates a particular version of the modern self— a 
self that is both rational and expressive. Rousseau is the 
point of origin of "the philosophies of self-exploration, as 
well as of the creed which make self-determining freedom the 
key to virtue."29 This view would be particulary 
influential for subsequent philosophers and artists. The 
inner self of Rousseau would, in the century to follow, 
provide a means and a language for resisting the purely 
rational and instrumental drives of philosophy, science, and
26 Rousseau, Emile. 1979, p. 83.
27 Taylor, Sources of the Self. 1989, p. 362.
28 Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750. 1988, p.
2.
29 Taylor, Sources of the Self. 1989, pp. 262-63.
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Isociety that come from outside. For the romantic poets, as 
well as many today, the Rousseauian self was a haven from the 
ravages of modernity. For Rousseau and many subsequent 
writers the rational/expressive self was a "truer" 
representation of what it was to be human.
Summary: Janus-Faced Modernity 
As alluded to in the early part of this chapter, modernity 
must be seen as a complex array of forms of knowledge and 
social institutions. In some instances these forms and 
institutions are (or appear to be) in direct contradiction 
with one another. Often this Janus-faced aspect is where 
problems with the classification of cultural modernity 
arises. For instance, how is one to reconcile the rational, 
"progressive" ideas of Condillac and Condorcet with the 
expressive, "degenerative" ideas of Rousseau? To begin to 
answer this question, we first must dispense with the 
tempting strategy to collapse aspects of a society or 
historical period into one set of organizing categories, as 
defined by its political, economic, or cultural attributes. 
It is perhaps more productive to recognize that all 
historical periods have contradictory tendencies and 
discourses. Secondly, it is also important to recognize that 
these discourses often compete with one another for power, 
influence, and domination in society. The "better idea" does 
not necessarily rise to the top.
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Condillac, Condorcet, and Rousseau's views on humanity 
are all modern. The optimism of Condillac and Condorcet 
would be influential in shaping a discourse which would have 
its most crucial impact in the realms of science and 
analytical philosophy. This discourse of optimism would also 
be influential in establishing the class ideology of the 
eighteenth-century bourgeoisie and later the orientations of 
certain modern professions and groups. It would spawn series 
of discussions encompassing such topics as; the unfolding of 
the human spirit, the positive effects of industrialization, 
the progress of science, and the socially managed end to 
inequality. The Rousseauian view would inspire another 
related but distinct discourse. This discourse would have 
its most important impact upon artists, poets, continental 
philosophers, "mandarin intellectuals," and in an 
"alternative science" (i.e., the "gay science" of Nietzsche 
in the late nineteenth century and the "anarchistic science" 
of Paul Feyerabend in the late twentieth century) . The 
Rousseauian discourse would inspire discussion of the loss of 
meaning in the world, the fragmentation and 
instrumentalization of society, the commodification of 
everyday life, and so forth.
We must recognize that these rational and romantic 
discourses are both aspects of the modern sensibility. Both 
have held sway over the modern imagination. Both have been 
used as ideologies to justify social institutions and certain
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sets of social practices. By accepting the contradictory 
faces of modernity, we can gain a better understanding of 
both modernity and postmodernism.
In the chapter to follow, we will examine how these 
ideas of the French Enlightenment fared approximately 
one-hundred years later. By this time the optimism in 
rationality and progress expressed by most of the 
Enlightenment philosophers had begun to fade in many 
intellectual circles, particularly in Germany. The period of 
high modernism in art and literature and the age of 
Nietzsche, Weber, and Simmel in philosophy and social theory 
experienced new problems about what came to be called the 
"fate of modernity." In their encounter with modernity, we 
find an avenue for understanding the development of a 
postmodern discourse in philosophy and social thought.
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CHAPTER III
MODERNITY AND ITS CENTRAL PARADOXES
In the previous chapter, we discussed the contributions 
of the French Philosophes to the dominant discourse of
modernity. By the late nineteenth century this optimistic 
discourse had begun to fade somewhat. Various commentators 
began to question the Enlightenment's enthusiastic linkage of 
rational and expressive selfhood with societal progress and 
emancipation. Some began to see recent philosophical
movements, not as a culimation of a trend towards 
perfectability, but merely as a different historical period. 
Furthermore, these commentators began to conclude that this 
historical period was as problematic as those of the past.
In this chapter, we will attempt to gain an
understanding of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century critiques of modernity. This will be done by
focusing on several artistic movements and social 
commentators who sought either to take advantage of the 
"crisis" created by modernity or explore the "dangers" of 
being modern. These various movements and writers do not 
agree on the causes of the crisis, but they all experienced 
the maelstrom of modernity and felt compelled to render an 
explanation and in some cases a diagnosis. Specifically, in 
this chapter we will identify some of the emerging 
philosophical and social paradoxes which accompany the modern 
era. These paradoxes, it will be argued, provide an avenue
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Iinto postmodern culture and society. We will begin with a 
discussion of the early understanding of modernity. This 
will be followed by an examination of the Western "cultural 
attitude" which prevailed in many intellectual and artistic 
circles before World War I. Specifically, we will examine 
the positions on art and modernity of the Italian Futurists 
and the German Expressionists. Afterward, we will begin a 
selective discussion of the work of Nietzsche, Weber, and 
Simmel. These individuals, perhaps more than any others of 
their time, sought to explain the meaning and problems 
associated with being "modern."
The Recognition of Modernity
Marshall Berman has rather poetically described 
modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as "a mode of vital experience— experience of space 
and time, of self and others, of life's possibilities and 
perils."1 However for Berman, the dominant feature of this 
vital experience, and one which separates it from other 
historical experiences, is modernity's "maelstrom of 
perpetual disintegration and renewal."2 The development and 
expansion of industrial capitalism, the division of labor, 
the break-up of traditional unities, and the rationalization
1 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The 
Experience of Modernity (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 
15.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
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process had all contributed to a society-in-flux. The 
promises of the Enlightenment philosophers, the 
accomplishments of science, and developments in the arts had 
spawned a culture which prized continuous individual 
innovation.3 Together these societal and cultural processes 
fused into a paradoxical period of continuous upheaval and 
change. This period, where "all that is solid melts into 
air, all that is holy is profaned," has come to represent the 
zenith of modernity.4 By the mid nineteenth century the
various ideational and material changes dating to the 
sixteenth century and finding their most systematic 
expression in eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophy 
(e.g., rationalism, progress, the rise of industrial 
capitalism, urbanization, etc.) began to become recognizable 
as an important movement of society and as a distinct 
historical moment. This recognition spawned a series of 
cultural and societal writings that sought to analyze and 
explain what was happening in and to Europe. The German 
writer Henerick Heine first used the word "Modernitat" to 
capture the essence of this movement of society and culture 
in his 1826 work, Reisebilder. Here, Heine equates 
Modernitat with the "victory of the British" and
3 Cf. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), p 198-79.
4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Communist 
Manifesto," in The Marx-Enaels Reader, ed. by R.C. Tucker 
(Boston: Norton, 1978), p. 338.
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industrialism. In Heine's view, modernity had "dispossessed 
belief, rendered Romantic inwardness impossible, and 
extinguished the great traditions."5 Heine's perspective is 
negative and romantic. It is part of a developing counter 
Enlightenment discourse of modernity, which would become 
particularly important in the late nineteenth century. This 
counter-modern sensibility, first encountered with Rousseau, 
was shared by many social commentators and writers of his 
period ranging from the Utopian Socialist to the Romantic 
poets. Modernity had spawned a crisis that left many longing 
for a more stable moment from the past.
Others, however, sought to take advantage of a sense of 
excitement created by the dissolution of tradition. This 
approach is perhaps best exemplified in Charles Baudelaire's 
1863 essay, the "Painter of Modern Life." Baudelaire, 
through his discussion of Monsieur G. (Constantin Guys), 
sought to identify the challenge posed by modernity for 
artists. Baudelaire described modernity as "the ephemeral, 
the fugitive, the contingent."6 Monsieur G. was Baudelaire's 
example of an individual who was courageous enough to attempt 
the transfer of the maelstrom of modernity onto the canvas.
5 Albrecht Betz, "Commodity and Modernity in Heine and 
Benjamin." New German Critique, 33, 1984, pp. 181-82.
6 Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life and 
Other Essavs. trans. and ed. by Jonathan Mayne (London: 
Phaidon Press, 1964), p. 13.
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In the next section we will consider how the reconition 
of this new historical period served to spawn a new 
sensibility in the content and meaning of art and literature.
December. 1910 
According to Virginia Woolf, "on or about December, 1910 
human character changed..."7 The historical processes 
described earlier by Heine and Baudelaire were heard in the 
early part of the twentieth century as "the sound of breaking 
and falling, crashing and destruction.”8 Throughout the West 
traditional forms of social life were crumbling as the forces 
of rapid social change associated with modernity began to 
increase in intensity and to incorporate more aspects of 
everyday life. For many intellectuals the crumbling of 
traditional forms of life signaled a renewed commitment to 
innovation. This commitment was supported by new discoveries 
in science (i.e., Einstein, Bohr, and Mach) , by a new 
philosophy (i.e., Bergson, Whitehead, and Ortega), and by 
dramatic social change (i.e., the influence of industrial 
capitalism and the emerging bureaucratic order).9 Together, 
these social and cultural changes meant that art and
7 Virginia Woolf, The Captain's Death Bead and Other 
Essavs (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 96.
8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ricardo J. Quinones, Mapping Literary Modernism: Time 
and Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1985), p. 120.
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literature no longer had to adhere to canons of the past nor 
did they have to accept the previous label of "romantic 
escapism." Art, which was removed from center stage by 
science and rationality, now could resume its former 
intellectual status.
In describing the sense of rebellion which was felt by
modern consciousness in the early twentieth century, Mabel
Dodge wrote in 1913:
Nearly every thinking person nowadays is in revolt 
against something, because the craving of the 
individual is for further consciousness, and because 
consciousness is expanding and bursting through the 
molds that held it up to now.10
The revolt described by Dodge signals the maturation of
aesthetic modernism as a cultural force. The period from the
late nineteenth century until after World War I teemed with
cultural movements which in one way or another sought to take
advantage of the "crisis” created by modernity. Most of
these movements wanted to use the crisis of modernity to
regenerate society. Some of these movements were "nostalgic"
in their outlook while others were "imaginative."11
The "nostalgic" movements followed Heine's line of 
thinking about modernity. They longed for a return to what
10 Mabel Dodge, Camera Work (June 1913): 7. Cited in 
Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1913 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 182.
11 Cf. Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity; Nietzsche.
Heidegger. Foucault. Derrida (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), pp. 114-115. This is a somewhat 
simplistic, but useful dichotomy.
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they saw as the pristine state of premodern society. The 
nostalgic position can be seen in wide array of movements, as 
far ranging as the Boy Scouts of America and the "high 
romantics." T.S. Eliot "with his idealization of the past 
utopia represented by royalism and Catholicism" is perhaps 
representative of the nostalgic type of thought.12
However, most cultural movements of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were "imaginative." Groups 
such as the Italian Futurists, German Expressionists, and 
Cubists, welcomed the disintegration of tradition while 
enthusiastically embraced the "new." The Futurists provide 
an especially vivid example of one particular mode of this 
modern "imaginative" sensibility. The Futurists announced 
their formation in 1909 publication entitled, "The Founding 
and Manifesto Of Futurism."13 The futurists sought to 
develop art and literature in the image of the machine. They 
wanted to transfer the power and speed of technology into the 
aesthetic realm. Their vision of the role of art and 
literature in society is captured in their original 
manifesto.
1. We intend to sing the love of danger, the habit of 
energy and fearlessness.
2. Courage, audacity and revolt will be essential 
elements of our poetry.
12 Ibid., p. 114.
13 Charles Russell, Poets. Prophets, and Revolutionaries: 
The Literary Avant-Garde From Rimbaud Thought Postmodernism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 87.
62
3. Up to now literature has exalted a pensive 
immobility, ecstacy, and sleep. We exalt
aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the 
racer's stride, the mortal leap, the punch 
and the slap.
4. We affirm the world's magnificence has been enriched 
by a new beauty: the beauty of speed. A racing car 
whose hood is adorned with great pipes, like 
serpents of explosive breath— a roaring car that 
seems to ride on graeshot is more beutiful than
the Victory of Samothrace.
10. We will destroy the museums, libraries, academies of 
every kind, will fight moralism, feminism, every 
opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice.14
The Futurists presented a particular pro-modern sensibility
towards art and society. They saw the machine as the model
for transforming both art and society. They deplored any
individual or movement which continued to cling to the past
and which therefore did not accept the vitality of their
artistic experiment. Any institution, such as the museums,
libraries, and academia, which was perceived as clinging to
past modes of thought and action were targets of their scorn.
Charles Russell writes,
Worshippers of force in 'what ever form it occurs,' they 
defined their activities in extreme forms. Their 
targets, and the victims of this tirade, were 
individuals or institutions which represented the 
culture's ties to the pasts: the passeits, the church, 
the monarchy, the bourgeoisie, the schools and art 
establishments, pacifists, and women.15
For the Futurists, modernity opened up a new set of
14 Ibid., pp. 88-89. Some of these ideas were 
incorporated by the Italian Fascists.
15 Ibid., p. 89.
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possibilities for the arts and the conduct of life. Art or
life no longer had to adhere to tradition. The model provided
by technology allowed for a rethinking of the nature of
artistic experience and personal freedom. The Futurists saw
their movement to be both as artistic avant-garde and as a
political movement which would shake and eventually undermine
the confines of traditional authority.
The desire of the futurists to capture the "raw energy"
of modernity and transform it into a social and artistic
movement was met with both enthusiasm and skepticism. Antonio
Gramsci wrote of the Futurists,
(They) have grasped sharply and clearly that our age, 
of big industry, of the large proletarian city and of 
intense and tumultuous life, was in need of new forms of 
art, philosophy, behavior, and langauge....In their 
field, the field of culture, the Futurists are 
revolutionaries.16
Others saw Furturism, with its denial of the past and worship
of force and power, as an extremely problematic artistic
experiment which represented all that was negative about
modernity.
Another important artistic movement which responded to 
the conditions created by social and cultural modernity were 
the German Expressionists. The German Expressionists were a 
loosely affiliated group of writers, poets, artists, and film 
makers who sought to bring emotional, existential, and
16 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, 
trans. William Boelhower (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985, p. 51.
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Isubconscious elements of individual experience into the realm 
of art. They, like the Futurists, sought to take advantage of 
the perpetual upheaval and change associated with modernity. 
Writing in 1914, the Expressionist Franz Marc wrote, "The 
world gives birth to a new age: there is only one question: 
has the time yet arrived today in which the old world will be 
dissolved? Are we ready for the vita nova? This is the most 
anxious question of our day."17 It was clear for the 
Expressionists that modernity marked a new era of history. 
This new era required different modes for the conduct and 
expression of life. The "new life" of the modern era meant 
for the Expressionists new art, literature, poetry, and 
politics.
In forging the new life of modern existence, the 
Expressionists rejected both classicism and realism with their 
models of "objective representation." The Expressionists 
wanted art and literature to reflect "personal emotional 
perceptions" rather than some outer reality.18 This 
orientation towards art also reflected a political vision. By 
exploring and portraying the depths of subjectivity, the 
Expressionists wanted to contribute to "improving the world
17 Franz Marc, quoted in Frederick Levine's, The 
Apocalyptic Vision: The Art of Franz Marc as German 
Expressionism (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 138.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
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and the life of man within."19 The explosive nature of the
inner world of subjective experience was seen as providing the
materials for the destruction of well-ordered bourgeois
society and the construction of a radically new social order.
Particularly important for the Expressionists was the
potential of repressed sexuality to provide the means for
undermining bourgeois culture. Gottfried Benn in his 1917
poem "Synthesis" writes,
Reticent night. Reticent house.
But I am of the stillest stars, 
and I thrust out my self-made light 
out into my self-made night.
I have returned home in brain
from caves, heavens, filth and beast.
Even what is still bestowed on woman 
is dark and sweet onanism.20
Benn, like other Expressionists, wanted to restore an
atavistic vitalism to modern culture. The power of latent
sexuality was one means for accomplishing this goal.
In social and political terms, the Expressionists, like 
many other individuals and groups of this period, saw 
subjectivity as protection against epistemological 
uncertainty, the encroachment of rational, industrial 
capitalism, and the sterility of bourgeois society. 
Describing this sanctity of subjectivity in Expressionism, 
Douglas Kellner writes,
19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 Gottfried Benn, "Synthesis," trans. by R. Allen in, 
German Expressionist Poetry (Boston: Twayne, 1979).
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IExpressionism arose in a period in which analyses of 
the alienation, reification, and dehumanization of the 
individual, and the fragmentation of the human 
personality, had become widespread. As a reaction to 
the crisis of subjectivity, Expressionism contained 
passionate reaffirmations of individuality.21
The Expressionists, like Rousseau and the romantics, thought
that inner experience had the potential of providing the
modern individual with a haven in a rationalized world. This
haven also had the capacity for a radical social renewal.
The Italian Futurist and the German Expressionist
represent but two artistic movements which tried to take
advantage of the crisis of modernity. The disintegration of
traditional society and authority meant the cultural slate had
been wiped clean. Intellectuals and other culture producers,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, felt the
time was right for the creation of a new culture. However, as
will be seen in the following discussion, these movements and
the general intellectual mood, were to face several
unresolvable paradoxes which would eventually mark the end of
cultural modernism.
Nietzsche. Nihilism, and Modernity 
The critique of modernity rendered by Frederick Nietzsche 
must be considered one of the most important and influential 
attempts to establish an anti-modern (and postmodern)
21 Douglas Kellner, "Expressionism and Rebellion,” in 
Stephen Bronner and Douglas Kellner (eds.), Passion and 
Rebellion: The Expressionist Heritage (London: Croom Helm 
Ltd., 1983), p. 13.
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Idiscourse in the wake of the Enlightenment. Nietzsche's self­
stated goal was to "philosophize with a hammer." This hammer, 
as will be seen, was aimed at everything valued by 
Enlightenment and modern thinkers. However, Nietzsche wanted 
to be more than a critic of Occidental culture and its latest 
historical form: modernity. He also wanted to develop a
means to solve the problems of modern existence. However, 
Nietzsche, like the other writers discussed in this chapter, 
finds modernity and any attempt to correct its mistakes to be 
extremely paradoxical.
Much of Nietzsche's critique of modernity focuses upon
the advent of nihilism in European society. In a prophetic
note assembled at the beginning of the Will to Power.
Nietzsche states:
What I relate is the history of the next two centuries.
I describe what is coming, what can no longer come 
differently: the advent of nihilism...For some time
now, our whole European culture has been moving 
as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension 
that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly,
violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach 
the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to 
reflect.22
Nihilism, for Nietzsche, is more than the result of the death 
of God and the demise of Christianity in the West. Nihilism 
marks a historical period when the highest values become 
devalued. God and religion certainly are dead, "but also 
everything that, in rapid succession, has tried to takes its
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by W. 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1968), p. 3.
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place— e.g., the ideal, consciousness, reason, the certainty 
of progress, the happiness of the masses, culture, etc."23 
Nihilism then is a historical moment marking a turning point 
in Western history. It is a time when the foundations of 
European society, were they theological or scientific, are 
revealed as myths. Myths which, for Nietzsche, ultimately are 
connected with an unsatiable "will to power." Nihilism, is 
the result of a series of "unmaskings" set in motion by the 
enlightenment ideals of science and rationality and 
culminating in a final unmasking of these very ideals.
Nietzsche's primary strategy for undermining the 
Enlightenment is to attack one of its most cherished 
principles— that of a foundational truth. In his essay "On 
Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense"(1873) and in Human All 
Too Human (1878), Nietzsche seeks to find a way out of modern 
thought through a "radicalization of its own innate
tendencies." Nietzsche concludes that the modern desire to 
uncover the nature of "things in themselves" (the will to 
truth) inevitably leads to the discovery that truth is 
constructed through the use of metaphors and anthropomorphisms 
which do not correspond to "reality,” but merely reflect the 
dynamics of social relations. In other words, the "will to
truth?' associated with modern rationality leads te the
rational conclusion that truth is an illusion. Rationality
23 Maurice Blanchot, "The Limits of Experience:
Nihilism," in David B. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche. 1986,
p. 121.
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taken to its radical conclusion undermine its own premises.
In an often quoted excerpt, Nietzsche writes,
What, then, is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms— in short, a sum of 
human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically....truths 
are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is 
what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without 
sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and 
now matter only as metal, no longer as coin. 4
The coin analogy is particularly revealing. The historical
origin of truth in the domain of power and social relations
has worn away and been forgotten. However, the canons of
epistemology continued to dominate the discourse on truth.
These canons matter now only because they have come to be
historically recognized to be true. In other words, what
makes these epistemological canons true is not their
correspondence to some external truth, but because they have
been designated and embellished by the power brokers and power
configurations to be "great works."
With this realization, the idea of truth, as well as the 
distinction between truth and lie, become diluted. Truth, for 
Nietzsche, is not something awaiting discovery by philosophers 
and metaphysicians, but a reflection of the power 
configurations of human relations. Beneath the masks of the 
Enlightenment's foundational truth, Nietzsche finds the ever 
present elements of rhetoric and power. The collapse of truth
24 Frederick Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra- 
Moral Sense" in W. Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche 
(New York; Penguin Press, 1976), pp. 46-47.
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as a cultural goal provides an arena for escaping from the 
confines of Enlightenment rationality and its ceaseless search 
for the illustrious foundational truth.25
One of Nietzsche's goals in attacking Enlightenment 
reason is to provide an avenue for the birth of a new culture. 
Through the realization that the truth portrayed by Greek 
philosophy or the Enlightenment is merely a reflection of the 
art of rhetoric and the will to power, we are freed from the 
illusion of truth. We need no longer feel the compulsion to 
find the mysterious underlying truth awaiting discovery. We 
can become willing nihilists, capable of forging a new culture 
built on mythical narrative!
Once the cultural goal of a foundational truth, either in 
theology or philosophy, has been destroyed or merely withers 
away, we enter the historical stage of nihilism. At points in 
Nietzsche's writing he approaches the advent of nihilism with 
a sense of apprehension. He, like many of his contemporaries, 
was somewhat fearful of the sense of loss which begins with 
nihilism's appearance. For instance, when writing about 
modern institutions, particularly marriage, Nietzsche laments, 
"Our institutions are no longer fit for anything: everyone is 
unanimous about that...but the fault lies not in them but in
25 This is related to the position of Hans Vaihinger's 
"philosophy of the as if.” Vaihinger, like Nietzsche, claims 
that man creates illusions and calls them facts; he/she 
treats them as if they had physical existence of their own. 
Humans forget that these are merely ideational constructs. 
Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob (Tuebingen University, 
1912) .
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us.26 However, overall Nietzsche approaches nihilism with a
heightened sense of enthusiasm.27 Nietzsche sees nihilism as
an opportunity for creating a new set of values and a new
culture. In The Gav Science (1882) Nietzsche writes,
Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we 
hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a new 
dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, 
amazement, premonitions, expectations. At long last the 
horizon appears free to us again once more...our ships 
venture out again, venture out to face any danger... 
perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea."28
For Nietzsche, the death of the old god allows us a sense of
freedom, play, and gaiety. The "open sea" of nihilism allows
us the freedom to become accomplished nihilists or "supermen,"
capable of welcoming and celebrating the devaluation of the
highest values.
Nietzsche's celebration of the death of the old god and 
foundational truth is one he shared with many other modernist 
writers. However, part of Nietzsche's work suggests that the 
desire expressed by many modern individuals and movements to 
transcend the modern value system and escape from nihilism may 
be a problematic enterprises. The nature of this problem 
involves modernity's complex attitude towards and relationship 
with the past. This "problem of history," as it has been 
called, is the issue Nietzsche treats in several of his
26 Frederick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. by 
R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1968) p. 93.
27 Ibid., p. 121.
28 Frederick Nietzsche, The Gav Science, translated by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 280.
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Iimportant works, particularly his 1874 essay, "On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life."29 In this essay 
Nietzsche, like some of his modernist counterparts, views 
history as a burden that prohibits modern individuals from 
creating their own history. The past is like a ball and chain 
which continuously limits the freedom of humankind. This 
"historical sickness" can be cured, in Nietzsche's view, 
through the suprahistorical elements of myth, art and music. 
These elements provide an avenue for the (re)discovery and 
projection of truly new culture— free from the burdens of 
tradition.30
However, there is a problem in trying to find a cure for 
the "historical sickness" of modern culture in suprahistorical 
myth. Modern culture is also haunted by the legacy of lineal 
historical change (e.g., a belief that historical change is 
the unfolding of some set of underlying evolutionary laws). 
The belief in lineal historical change is a result of the 
emphasis placed on progress and "overcoming" by industrialists 
and enlightenment philosophers, particularly Condorcet's
29 Frederick Nietzsche, "On the Use and Abuse of 
History" in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. by Geoffrey 
Clive (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), pp. 218-238.
30 This is a particularly modern position on culture. 
These statements have helped fuel the debate on the 
classification of Nietzsche as a modernist or postmodernist. 
For a discussion of this see, Robert Gooding-Williams, 
"Nietzsche's Pursuit of Modernism," New German Critique, 
1987, 41, pp. 95-108. It can also be added that American 
culture has a strong emphasis on escape from the past and 
celebration of the present and the future, or a new beginning 
for the mobile and the rootless.
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historiography and Hegelian metaphysics. Thus, modernity 
poses a paradox for those seeking to overcome it. This 
paradox involves the inability to escape or "overcome" 
modernity. Modernity itself is an era typified by "progress" 
and the perpetual "overcoming" of tradition. Thus, each new 
theoretical or cultural innovation which seeks to overcome 
modernity is simply a repeat of the transcendent element of 
modernity and consequently remains modern in character.31 
Any individual or movement which self-consciously seeks to 
change society is but part of the form of modern thinking and 
action.
Nietzsche's strategy to combat progressive thinking is
the concept of the "eternal return" found in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra.32 The idea of an eternal return serves for
Nietzsche as a narrative weapon against the notions of
progress and linear evolution in history. By seeing the
movement of time as the repeat of the ever same, history loses
its evolutionary quality. In the voice of Zarathustra,
Nietzsche writes:
Behold this moment! From this gateway, moment, 
a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies
an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked 
on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen
31 Cf. Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism 
and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. by Jon Snyder 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 
164-181.
32 Frederich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book 
for Everyone and No One, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1969).
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have happened, have been done, have passed by before? 
....And are not all things knotted together so firmly 
that this moment draws after it all that is to come?
Nietzsche recognized that the narrative of eternal return was
as much myth as the narrative of progress. However, it has
the advantage of undermining Occidental culture's reliance
upon teleological history, such as Condorcet's evolutionary
historical progress. Just as the accomplished nihilist has
discarded the illusion of truth, we also need no longer feel
the need to "progress." For progress too is an illusion. The
myth of eternal return forces us to treasure the here-and-now,
rather than projecting ourselves towards some state of
ultimate perfection. The demise of progress, Nietzsche hopes,
will put us in the position to now forge our own values and
systems of mythically-based knowledge, free from the confines
of the Occidental heritage and modernity.
Nietzsche provides us with an understanding of the
complexities and paradoxes of modernity. Nietzsche wants to
rid culture from the entire legacy of Western thought and its
most systematic expression in eighteenth-century
Enlightenment. To accomplish this, Nietzsche attacks the
Enlightenment's sacred desire to find a foundational truth.
Once this project is underway, he turns his attention to
constructing a vitally new culture. It is at this stage that
the problem of history emerges (i.e., history as linear
progress). Nietzsche wants to lift the burdens of history and
progress from humanity, but he realizes that any attempt to
75
overcome history is merely part of the spirit of modernity. 
Nietzsche's recognition of the inadequacies of this type of 
progressive thinking "designated the moment of the birth of 
post-modernity in philosophy."33 The inadequacies of 
Enlightenment notions of progress forces him, and the line of 
thinkers which lead from Heidegger to Derrida, into devising 
a new strategy for finding a "way out" of modernity and 
nihilism.
Weber; Modernitv-as-Rationalization
Max Weber's organizing concept of rationalization has, 
perhaps beyond all others, come to be the word most often used 
to describe the process of modernization. For Weber "the fate 
of our times is characterized by rationalization and 
intellectualization and, above all by the *disenchantment of 
the world.'"34 In Weber's view, rationalization involved 
both a universal process of demystification and 
systematization embodied in all world religions and a 
particular form represented by Protestantism and the modern 
bureaucratic organization in Occidental culture.35
33 Vattimo, The End of Modernity. 1988., p. 167.
34 Max Weber, "Science as Vocation," in H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills, From Max Weber; Essavs in Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 155.
35 Cf. Mark Shields, "Rationalization, Differentiation, 
and Universalism: Weber, Parsons, and Habermas on Modernity." 
Unpublished work presented at the 1989 meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, San Francisco.
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The appearance of rationalization in Western culture was 
identifiable in the ascetic attitude towards life found in 
early Calvinism.36 Specifically, Calvinism contained three 
ascetic constructs: (1) "The interpretation of the world as
merely creaturely," (2) "The idea of the world as object of 
fulfillment of duty through rational control," and (3) "The 
compulsion to develop an ethically integrated personality, a 
compulsion that also demands an ethical commitment."37 Since 
the world was seen as "creaturely," it was perceived as being 
void of spiritual or "Godly" influence. Initially, this 
results in a devaluation of the world and a (re)turn to the 
spiritual. However, once acted upon by individuals, the world 
becomes an exclusively human realm. Consequently, the world 
becomes profane. It becomes a realm exclusively open to human 
activity and manipulation. When this profane realm is coupled 
with the demand for a self-controlled sense of duty or 
"calling," the modern sensibility is forged. Calvinism aided 
in stripping the world of spirituality or mysticism and 
replacing it with a worldly ethos emphasizing individual 
commitment and action.
These aspects of Calvinistic doctrine, specifically as 
manifested in the doctrine of predestination and the
36 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958).
37 Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber's 
Vision of History; Ethics and Methods (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1979), p. 42.
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importance of a "calling," inevitably led to self-denial and 
an emphasis on a controlled, rational mastery of the world. 
Calvinism succeeded in linking value or ethical rationality 
with instrumental rationality in such a way as to "deeply and 
intensely penetrate so many areas of life for believers.1,38 
Calvinism, as a religious movement, had the effect of bringing 
together individual rationality with the forces of societal 
rationalization imbedded in early capitalism. Calvinism, when 
combined with the force of early capitalism, succeeded in 
making rational, calculative thinking a norm of thought and 
action in the modern world.
The rationalization process, however, did not limit its 
impact to the spheres of religion or the economy. Due to the 
compatibility of Calvinism with early capitalism and the 
emerging bureaucratic state, the ascetic attitude towards life 
became embedded in the conduct of everyday life and the 
organizational structure of all modern institutions. "When 
asceticism was carried out of the monastic cells into everyday 
life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part 
in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic 
order."39 However as we will discuss below, Weber believed 
that the cost for this transformation was very high, that is,
38 Shields, "Rationalization, Differentiation, and 
Universalism: Weber, Parsons, and Habermas on Modernity," 
1989, p. 2.
39 Weber,  Protestant Ethic and the Spirit. ..s£
Capitalism. 1958, p. 181.
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Iin the loss of meaning.
By the end of the nineteenth century the ascetic way of 
life, manifested in the vocational ethos, had become separated 
from its religious foundations. However, it continued to 
prowl "about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious 
beliefs."40 This situation produced an unresolvable paradox 
in modern culture. Formal religion was losing its sway over 
life, but the residue of religious beliefs continued to 
influence our thought and action. Removed from its religious 
moorings, the ascetic attitude was without foundation and 
consequently meaningless. Nonetheless, it remained a 
necessary mode for the conduct of life in the world. 
Asceticism had become an institutionalized standard for the 
conduct of life, yet it lacked any ideational foundation to 
give it meaning. Describing this situation in the case of the 
meaningless pursuit of wealth in the United States, Weber 
writes,
In the field of its highest development, in the United 
States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become 
associated with purely mundane passions, which often 
actually give it the character of sport. 1
Weber believed the stripping of action from religious belief
produced "mundane passions." We become "specialists without
spirit, sensualists without heart" trapped in the meaningless
40 Ibid., p. 182.
41 Ibid., p. 182.
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"iron cage" of instrumental rationality.42 It was this 
situation which was the "fate" and the unresolved paradox of 
modern culture.
The paradox of modern culture resulting from the
secularization of asceticism and the resulting penetration of
the life-world by the rationalization process left the
individual in a state of ethical confusion. The modern
individual, in Weber's view, was forced to choose between
"life abnegation" or "world affirmation" as possibilities for
the conduct of life.43 In a 1908 letter to Robert Michels,
Weber distinguishes the two possibilities,
There are two possibilities; either 'my kingdom is not 
of this world' (Tolstoy, or syndicalism thought to its 
conclusion, which is nothing more than the sentence 
'the goal means nothing to me, the movement everything* 
....) or affirmation of culture (that is, objective 
culture, expressing itself in technical and other 
'achievements') through adaptation to the sociological 
conditions of all technique, whether it be economic, 
political, or whatever else.44
By choosing life abnegation the individual "must be prepared
to live with 'fictions' in order to achieve ethical unity of
belief." In choosing life affirmation one must be willing to
"live with 'antinomies' or 'tensions' in order to achieve
42 Ibid., p. 182.
43 Lawrence Scaff, Fleeing the Iron Cage:__Culture,
Pel i ties, ansi Modernity in ths Thought of Mass wefear
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 98. 
This discussion of the ethical dilemmas of modern life is 
inspired by Scaff's discussion.
44 Quoted in Scaff, p. 97.
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clarity about the world as it 'is.'"45 Weber believes the 
modern individual is placed in the position of choosing 
between utopian narratives which provide a unified, but 
fictive world-view, or accepting the contradictions of 
everyday life, which is void of the promise of ethical unity. 
The choice between life abnegation and life affirmation also 
leaves the individual in the position of choosing between 
value spheres. The individual is forced into accepting an 
ethics of brotherliness, which seeks to end domination, or an 
ethics which is supportive of the socio-political status quo.
The individual and cultural dichotomy between abnegation 
and affirmation was employed by Weber to understand both the 
ethical dilemma of the modern individual and the various 
social movements of his day. In Weber's view, the modern 
individual either retreats into the realm of the subjective, 
where life itself becomes a point of contemplation, or s/he 
seeks to find ethical unity in a utopian movement which 
promises liberation, or s/he accepts the monotony, 
contradictions, and meaninglessness of everyday life. The 
rationalization process has produced both social and ethical 
over-differentiation in modern culture. Ethically there is no 
longer one set of unitary guidelines for the conduct of life. 
Ethical life, like society has been differentiated into many 
irreconcilable realms.
45 Ibid., p. 98.
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IThese insights on the ethical dilemmas facing modern 
individuals were used by Weber to understand the attempts to 
alter collectively the fate of modernity and humanity. The 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by 
a series of social movements which abnegated the world (i.e., 
those movement that sought to turn away from the world-as-is 
towards some type of idealized goal). These movements, such 
as syndicalism, pacifism, and socialism, created the hope of 
an ideal society, void of the problematics of modernity. The 
fragmentation, meaningless, and dislocation of modernity were 
to be corrected by movements which promised a "unity of 
being." However, the incongruities between the "ideals" of 
the movement and the "realities" of contemporary politics 
produced a deep sense of ambiguity in the movement and its 
members.46
Weber can be seen as among the first social commentators 
to link systematically rationality with repression. Instead 
of reason affecting the liberation of humankind, it becomes 
the bars of the iron cage. This "dark side" of rationality 
calls into question the optimistic attitude represented by the 
Enlightenment philosophers (e.g., Condillac and Condorcet) and 
post-Enlightenment (e.g., Comte and Marx). Weber saw the 
"rosy blush" of the Enlightenment as "irretrievably fading"
46 This parallels the experience of left intellectuals 
in France after the failure of the 1968 attempt at 
revolution.
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from modern life.47 The ideology of the Enlightenment was 
being usurped by its own devices. Its praise of the unlimited 
opportunities opened up by rationality for the moral, 
economic, and political perfectability of humankind were being 
undermined bv rationality's intrusion into and domination of 
every domain of social existence.
In the next section, we will explore the reaction to 
modernity by one of Weber's students, Georg Simmel. In 
Simmel, we find a particularly acute sensibility towards the 
effects of modern culture.
Simmel and "The Conflict in Modern Culture"
Perhaps more than any other theorist of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was Georg Simmel 
who sought systematically to explore the contradictions of 
modern life and the cultural meaning of the various modernist 
intellectual and artistic movements of his time. Simmel's 
explorations of the contradictions encountered in modern life 
and by the various modernist cultural movements led him, 
particularly in his later work, to a position which strongly 
resembles the contemporary postmodern position on culture.
Simmel's attitude towards modernity is first encountered 
in his most famous work, The Philosophy of Money, particularly
47 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit g£
Capitalism, 1958, p. i82.
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in the concluding chapter.48 In the work, Simmel argues that
money— which he calls "fluid property"— has, in part, enhanced
personal liberation. The depersonalization of social
relations which accompany the use of money weakens the bonds
of traditional forms of social control.49 Money opens the
door for the development of trade, urbanization, and the
formation of cosmopolitan associations. However, there are
negative consequences to the advent of a money economy. Money
has the effect of reifying and rationalizing life and
individual experience. Simmel writes:
This psychological feature of our times which stands 
in such decisive contrast to the more impulsive, 
emotionally-determined character of earlier epochs 
seems to me to stand in close causal relationship 
with the money economy. The money economy enforces 
the necessity of continuous mathematical operations 
in our daily transactions. The lives of many people 
are absorbed by such evaluating, weighing, calculating 
and reducing of qualitative values to quantitative 
ones.50
In conjunction with the rationalization of life, fflpney
contributes to the societal tendency of objectification. A 
monied economy contributes to the separation of objects from 
their creators. Qualitative or subjective values become
48 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. by Tom 
Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978, 1900).
49 For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of Simmel 
see, Stephan Fuchs, " From Theory to Critique of Modernity: 
The Development of Simmel's Sociology." Paper presented at 
the 1989 meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association, 
Reno, Nevada.
50 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money. 1978, p. 444.
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transformed into quantitative or objective "realities." Money 
therefore aids in the development of an "objective culture;” 
separate and distinct from the individual and his/her 
subjective life experience. The separation of objective 
society from subjective experience ultimately leads to 
alienation. It "exemplifies the tragic tendency of objective 
culture to separate itself from its creators and then subject 
human life and experience to its abstract and impersonal 
laws. "51
For Simmel, life is experienced as an individual, unique,
non-fragmented totality. However, objective culture is
impersonal, banal, and fragmented. The artist creates what is
part of his/her individual totality. However, once the
artist's creation leaves the hands of the individual it
becomes part of an anonymous, impersonal culture or style.
Simmel writes:
Style, as the manifestation or our inner feelings, 
indicates that these feelings no longer immediately 
gush out but take on a disguise the moment they are 
revealed. Style, as the general form of the particular, 
is a veil that imposes a barrier and a distance in 
relation to the recipient of the expression of these 
feelings.52
This, for Simmel, is one of the central paradoxes of 
modernity. We must create on the basis of our individual life 
experiences, however the original intent of our creation loses
51 Fuchs, "From Theory to Critique of Modernity: The 
Development of Simmel's Sociology," 1989, p. 19.
52 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money. 1978, p. 473.
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its subjective value once it enters the realm of objective 
culture or pure form.
From Simmel*s discussion of the consequences of a monied 
economy we gain an understanding of the dual nature of 
modernity. While modernity had liberated certain aspects of 
individuality from the confines of tradition, it had also 
imprisoned individuals in specialized role-sets and created an 
impersonal objective culture. From this general theoretical 
framework, Simmel explored the meaning of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century cultural movements.
Simmel saw the modernist cultural movements, as well as 
Post-Christian religiosity and post-metaphysical philosophy 
(e.g., Lebensphilosophie and pragmatism), as attempts to break 
free of the limitations of objective culture. These movements 
represented Na passionate desire for the expression of life, 
for which traditional forms are inadequate, but for which no 
new forms have been devised...."53 In Simmel's view, 
modernism represented a unique turn in the ongoing conflict 
between the creative endeavors of the human spirit and the 
societal forms they take. In other words, with modernism 
there is strong conflict between the attempt at cultural 
innovation and the routinized social organization which these 
innovations are bound to spawn and become embedded within.
53 Georg Simmel, "The Crisis of Culture" in Peter 
Lawrence's Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 1976), p. 257.
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IPrior to the nineteenth century, Simmel argued, cultural 
movements had simply replaced one another in sequence. Each 
new cultural movement "commanded obedience as an objective 
imperative and then ceded to others after a struggle."54 In 
other works, creative endeavors inevitably became reified into 
an objective cultural form. However, in the later part of the 
nineteenth century this conflict changed. Beginning with the 
"life philosophy" of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Simmel 
argued, "life began to take itself as its own object of 
meaning."55 This advent of culture produced an acute 
awareness of the confining nature of forms. It marked a 
unique cultural rebellion against form itself (i.e., against 
social organizaton).
The rebellion against form, represented by modernism,
produced a paradoxical situation for both Simmel and modern
culture. On the one hand, Simmel realized that the desire to
transcend all forms is an impossibility.
...The process of thinking, wishing, and forming can 
only substitute one form for another. They can never 
replace the form as such by life which as such 
transcends the form. All these attacks against the forms 
of our culture, which align against them the forces
of life "in itself," embody the deepest internal 
contradictions of the spirit. Although this chronic
54 Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, "Simmel and the 
Theory of Postmodern Society," Paper presented at the 84th 
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San 
Francisco, 1989, p. 11.
55 Ibid., p. 11. Also see Chapter I of Georg Simmel's, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. by H. Loiskandl, D. 
Weinstein, and M. Weinstein (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1986).
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Iconflict between form and life has become acute in many 
historical epochs, none but ours revealed it so clearly 
as its basic theme.54
However, Simmel concludes that formlessness itself may be the
most appropriate "form" for the conduct of modern life. In a
Nietzschean tone, Simmel writes,
The bridge between the past and the future of cultural 
forms seems to be demolished; we gaze into an abyss of 
unformed life beneath our feet. But perhaps this 
formlessness is itself the appropriate form for 
contemporary life.57
Nonetheless, formlessness remains a form. Modern life and
culture, or any historical existence, cannot escape from form,
objectification, or organization. In this case, formless
becomes the way social and cultural life becomes organized and
subjectively understood.
Simmel's comments reveal the deep ambiguities and 
paradoxes that exist in modern life and culture. While such 
modernist movements as the Futurists and Expressionists seek 
to transcend form, they remain within its grasp. Since "life 
can only enter reality....in the form of form." all the modern 
intellectual movements remain prisoners of their self 
professed enemy.58 As such, cultural modernism remains but 
a romantic, Rousseauian dream of the absence of authority and 
societal confines. A dream, that Simmel maintains, will
56 Georg Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other 
Essavs. trans. by K. Peter Etzkorn (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1968), p. 25.
57 Ibid., p. 25.
58 Ibid., p. 25.
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Iremain forever unfullfilled.
From Simmel's discussion of the conflict in modern life 
and culture, we can derive his general ontological aim. 
Simmel wants to preserve individuality from the threat of the 
depersonalizing forces of modernity in the form of a monied 
economy and objective culture. Like his mentor Weber, Simmel 
is deeply troubled by the "fate" of modern culture. He, like 
Weber and Nietzsche, advocates a type of heroic individualism 
as a partial remedy for the tragedy of modernity. If unity 
and totality were impossible at the societal and cultural 
level, they could be found in a unified subjective life— a 
retreat into inner life.59
Summary
We began with a discussion of the "cultural mood" which 
was dominant in many intellectual circles prior to World War 
I. The aim of these early twentieth-century movements, such 
as Futurism and Expressionism, was to construct a vitally new 
cultural and social order on the ruins of traditional society. 
We find similar hopes in Nietzsche's writings. Nietzsche 
wanted to construct a new culture, free from the burdens of 
Occidental reason, however, he recognized the inherent 
problems of this reconstructive project. Modernity could not 
be "overcome." It had to be destroyed or simply replaced from
59 The retreat into a subjective holism is reflected in 
Simmel's turn to the "heroic individualism" of Goethe and 
Rembrandt in his later works.
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within. In Weber, we find a more systematic treatment of the 
advent of modernity and its social and cultural consequences. 
Weber is rather ambivalent about the possibilities of a new 
social order. In Weber's view, modern culture is extremely 
paradoxical. In a world stripped off its original religious 
meaning, we are forced to accept the world as it is or create 
idealistic movements which promise some type of cultural and 
individual unity. In Simmel, we find a similar view. For 
Simmel, the conflict in modern culture is one between 
subjective experience and objective culture. Subjective 
experience is continuous and holistic. Objective culture is 
discontinuous and fragmented. For Simmel, in modernity there 
is little hope of uniting the subjective and objective into a 
coherent, unitary framework.
It can be argued that Nietzsche's, Weber's, and Simmel's 
critiques of modern culture point to the contradictions which 
would lead to the collapse of the spirit of the Enlightenment 
and modernism as cultural movements. We find in their 
writings traces of a particular view of modernity and its 
social and cultural paradoxes which would be influential in 
forming a postmodern discourse. Caught between the desire to 
transcend form (i.e., organization) and the inability to do 
so, the modernist attitude would soon give way to a postmodern 
one. The postmodern attitude, as will be seen in the coming 
chapters, would accept the inevitability of "broken form, 
failed mediation, and a subjectivity decentered by
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irreconcilable motives."60
These late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
critiques of modernity opened modern thought up to further 
delineation and provided a pathway for rebelling against its 
philosophical and epistemological positions. In the next 
three chapters, we will take up the specific ideas that have 
come to represent the postmodern orientation or framework. We 
will first turn our attention towards the issues of language 
and referentiality. Specifically, we will examine the way 
postmodernism questions the unproblematic modern view of 
language as tool of rational representation.
60 Weinstein and Weinstein, "Simmel and the Theory of 
Postmodern Society," 1989, p. 13.
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CHAPTER IV
LANGUAGE, REFERENTIALITY, AND POSTMODERNISM
In this chapter, we will focus on the importance of 
language in the movement from modern to postmodern thought. 
Specifically, we will focus on a line of inquiry that 
originates with the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
leads through the anthropology of Benjamin Lee Whorf and 
Claude Levi-Strauss, and culminates in the philosophy of 
Jacques Derrida. This line of thought has proven to be 
instrumental in the shaping of contemporary linguistics and 
philosophy. Undoubtedly, there are other individuals that 
could be included in the development of linguistic thought. 
Consequently, the account to follow is admittedly partial and 
incomplete. However, for the sake of simplicity and economy 
we will focus on the Saussure to Derrida connection while 
down-playing the role of individuals such as C.S. Peirce, M. 
Heidegger, and L. Wittgenstein.
Ernst Cassirer once wrote that "in the whole history of 
science there is perhaps no more fascinating chapter than the 
rise of the 'new science' of linguistics." Cassirer 
concluded that, "in its importance it may very well be 
compared to the new science of Galileo which, in the 
seventeenth-century, changed our whole concept of the
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physical world."1 This dramatic declaration by Cassirer is 
one that was shared by many other twentieth-century 
theorists. For Cassirer and others, the new science of 
linguistics represented a profound change in the outlook of 
philosophy and the epistemology of the human sciences.
As part of the rise of the science of linguistics in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we see a 
profound movement from an epistemology where objects are seen 
as atomistic entities with their own true essences to a 
position where objects are viewed in relation to one another. 
In the first position, objects are believed to have their own 
true meaning apart from discourse and thought. In the second 
position, the supposed meaning of an object is predetermined 
or shaped by language or a relational structure. These 
developments and others in the study of language are often 
called the "linguistic turn.”2 The linguistic turn 
"signifies" the transition of humans from being the "rational 
animal" of the Enlightenment to the "language animal" of the 
twentieth century.3 This transition it will be argued, while 
seemingly subtle, marks an important point in the development
1 Ernst Cassirer quoted in Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand 
de Saussure (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 
147.
2 Cf., Richard Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: Recent
Eggayg is Philosophical Method (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967).
3 Cf. Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 217.
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of postmodernism. As will be seen in the forthcoming pages, 
the idea of humans as the language animal works to undermine 
the description of humans as the rational animal in the 
eighteenth century. Pure rational consciousness, as 
conceived in the Enlightenment, is incompatible with the non­
rat ional effects of language. For pure rationality to exist 
it must be able to remove the influence of tradition and myth 
from the accounts of the social or natural world (cf. the 
project of the logical positivists). With the development of 
linguistic theory, this type of pure rationality is called 
into question. We will begin with a discussion of Saussure.
Saussure and the Arbitrary Nature of the Sian
When Saussure gave his series of lectures which would 
later become the posthumous work, Cours de linouistigue 
aenerale. he encountered a study of language which had 
remained virtually unchanged for several centuries.4 Prior 
to Saussure's unique and ground-breaking approach to the 
study of language, three overlapping ideas were dominant in 
linguistics and comparative philology, as well as modern 
philosophy and theory. These ideas can be summarized as: (1) 
nomenclaturism, (2) the separation of language and thought, 
and (3) theories supporting the idea of a world of 
independent objects. Saussure can be seen as directly or
4 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 
ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. by Wade 
Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 (1915)).
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indirectly undermining each one of these foundations of 
Occidental thought. He will discuss each of these ideas 
separately.
First, "nomenclaturism" can be viewed as an approach 
where language is seen as an act of naming. In this position 
on language, either God in biblical accounts or humans in 
Plato's Cratvlus are seen, in some original state, as 
correctly linking sound with objects.5 To find the true 
meaning of these spoken words, we must turn to what could be 
called a "hermeneutics of recovery." This project of
recovery will enable investigators to find the true relations 
of words and ideas which was somewhere lost in historical 
evolution. The process of hermeneutical recovery will enable 
humans to locate the exact relationship between sound and 
referent.
Secondly, Occidental philosophy, particularly as 
manifested in the Enlightenment, assumes a division between 
the ideas of thought and the everyday words of language. 
"Language was an activity with words and thought was an 
activity with ideas: words depended on ideas, but ideas did 
not depend on words."6 In this view, thought is not 
influenced by the structure of language. It is a non­
linguist ic or pre-linguistic realm. Thought is a private
5 Plato, Cratvlus. trans. by H.N. Fowler (London: Loeb 
Classical Library, 1926).
6 Roy Harris, Language. Saussure and Wittgenstein: How 
to Plav Games With Words (London: Routledge, 1988), p.2.
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collection of ideas internally contained and interacting in 
the mind of the individual. Language comes into play only 
when we try a communicate our ideas to someone else in a 
discursive situation. Thought is a non-discursive activity 
and consequently not susceptible to the distortion of 
interactive speech and writing (i.e., language is a neutral 
medium).
This division between language and thought leads to the 
third position which Saussure encountered. In this position 
another layer is added to the division between ideas and 
words. We are left with a structure which makes distinctions 
between objects, language, and thought. Here the world is 
seen as a "fixed object of analysis quite separate from the 
forms of discourse by which men speak of it and by which they 
represent their thoughts."7 This structure reveals a realm 
of objects which is distinct from our idea of the objects and 
our discourse on the objects. Objects have their own true 
essences or meanings apart from our internal ideas about the 
objects and discourses on the objects. One of the central 
problems in Western philosophy has been how to capture these 
objects in thought and discourse. In modernity, the mind was 
seen as a mirror of reality or a "mirror of nature."8 
Language was seen as a tool to communicate this reality. The
7 Timothy Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 23.
8 Cf. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
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true nature of objects can be captured and conveyed through 
extensive observation and classification as exemplified by 
Newtonian science. This view is represented by Condillac's 
efforts to perfect language through the use of algebra, as 
discussed in the second chapter. From this perspective, 
language is seen as allowing for the accumulation of 
knowledge. We will return later to a discussion of how 
Saussure undermines each of these premises. However, first 
we must discuss some of Saussure's general views on language.
In order to develop and refine a scientific discipline
of linguistics, Saussure thought it was important to define
its primary realm of inquiry, language. Saussure defines
language as a system of signs. The sign is defined as a
union of signifier (verbal utterances, morphemes, word) and
signified (concept, idea, object). Further defining this
union Saussure writes,
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name 
but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not 
the material sound, a purely physical thing, but 
the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression 
it makes on our senses. The sound image is sensory...9
Here, Saussure counters nomenclaturism's claim that language
is merely the act of connecting a name to an object. The
sign connects a mental concept and a verbal image together
into one linguistic unit. The sign only has meaning in its
appeal to a psychologically imprinted structure. In this
connection, signs unite concepts and sound, not an object and
9 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 66.
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its "correct" or "incorrect" name.
With the sign identified as the connection of a
signifier with a signified, Saussure introduces his "first
principle of linguistics;" the arbitrary nature of the sign.
By this, Saussure means that there is no natural link between
the signifier and the signified. In other words, there is no
natural relationship between the verbal utterance and the
concept or idea it defines. The utterance could be anything
as long as it is recognized and understood in a discursive
c o m m u n i t y . For example,
The idea of "sister" is not linked by any inner 
relationship to the succession of sounds s-o-r 
which serves as its signifier in French; that it 
could be represented equally by just any other 
sequence is proved by differences among languages 
and by the existence of different languages.10
This is an obvious characteristic of language which, 
according to Saussure, "no one disputes."11 However, there 
is "more to the arbitrary nature of the sign than the 
arbitrary relation between signifier and signified."12 When 
one engages in comparative linguistics, one quickly comes to 
the conclusion that not only do signifiers vary from culture 
to culture and from situation to situation, but also 
signifieds. Concepts, ideas, etc. are contingent upon the 
structure of a particular language. They vary from culture
10 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
11 Ibid., p. 68.
12 Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure. 1986, p. 30.
98
Ito culture and time to time. They have an arbitrary
character similar to the signifiers. For example, the
process of translating from one language to another does not
entail simply the substitution of one signifier for another.
Different languages have concepts which are not immediately
translatable. For example, "the French 'aimer' does not go
directly into English; one must choose between 'to like' and
'to love.,Nl3 In this regard, it can be concluded that each
language "articulates or organizes the world differently."14
Consequently, languages can be seen as creators of reality
rather than instruments to convey the mind's mirror-like
reflection of reality.
If signifiers and signifieds are both arbitrary, the
questions arise, what defines a sign and gives it meaning?
For Saussure, the sign is defined in terms of its
relationship with other terms in a total system or structure.
Saussure writes,
When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is 
understood that the concepts are purely differential 
and defined not by their positive content but 
negatively by their relations with the other terms 
of the system. Their most precise characteristic 
is being what the others are not.15
Consequently, in languages there are only differences.
Difference is what gives the sign its meaning. Meaning,
13 Ibid., p. 31.
14 Ibid., p. 31.
15 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 117.
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then, is a result of a linguistic system, which organizes 
signifieds based on phonetic differences. In this respect, 
different languages have different types of differentiation. 
Each language can be seen as an independent system which 
organizes reality through unique types of signified 
differentiations.
For the individual, language provides a system of rules 
and forms (la langue) from which we construct everyday speech 
(parole). La langue is a social creation. It is prior to 
the individual and consciousness. It is not within our
conscious will and ability to deviate from its rules. From 
the structural rules of langue, we construct our individual 
parole. The structure of langue is concrete and immutable. 
It is not simply chosen by the individual speaker. For 
Saussure, "language furnishes the best proof that a law 
accepted by a community is a thing that is tolerated and not 
a rule to which all freely consent."16 He are contained 
within what Nietzsche had earlier referred to as the "prison 
house" of language.
The implications of Saussure's thought are both paradigm 
shattering and paradigm forming. It has relevance far
outside the fields of linguistics or semiotics. Saussure*s 
work can be seen as indirectly forcing a reevaluation of much
16 Ibid., p. 71.
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Iof modern philosophical thought and epistemology.17 Each of 
the three overlapping views of language and philosophy we 
encountered in the beginning of this discussion are called 
into question. First, the idea of nomenclaturism is no 
longer viable, since Saussure has shown that language 
encompasses more than link between a sound and an image. The 
sign unifies a concept and a sound. The sound or signifier 
is arbitrary. It makes no difference what sound is 
annunciated as long as the sound is recognizable and is 
meaningful within a speech community. Also, the concept or 
signified is contingent, since other langues have different 
concepts and because signs change may shift their meaning 
across time and space. In other words, reality is not 
immutable; it is mediated through language.
Another consquence of Saussure's work is that the 
important distinction between thought and discourse is 
challenged. By showing how la langue structures the use of 
parole, the idea that thought is somehow disconnected from 
language becomes implausible. The rules of language 
structure both discourse between individuals and individual 
thought. Thought cannot take place outside the confines of 
language. This is an important move away from private
17 This revaluation was not put forward by Saussure 
himself. Philosophers, such as Jacques Derrida, have taken 
up the task of exploring and explicating the meaning of 
Saussure's work for the Western theoretical heritage.
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consciousness to what can be called the public sign.18
Finally, the idea that objects are separate entities 
with their own essence is undermined. The distinction 
between thought, discourse, and objects become blurred. 
Within the Saussurian framework, objects cannot have their 
own essences or independent reality. These perceived 
essences are provided by a community of language. The nature 
of an object is a reflection of la langue. In Fredric 
Jameson's words, "You can see only as much as your model 
permits you to see."19 Objects have no meaning apart from 
their connection to a linguistic community which defines and 
shapes their meaning. Furthermore, the idea that the true 
nature of objects can be captured through an appropriate 
method, performed by a thinking and acting subject is 
challenged. Parole is structured by la langue prior to the 
individual's encounter with objects. Thus, the
classification of objects by an individual is a result of the 
rules of la langue. The thinking and acting subject is a 
passive recipient of la langue and cannot escape to give some 
"god's eye view” of the object. The object's meaning is 
already determined before its encounter with individual 
consciousness.
18 Seyla Benhabib, "Epistemologies of Modernism: A 
Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard," New German Critique 33, 
1984, p. 110.
19 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language:__&
Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 14.
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Saussure's only published work was influential in the 
development of three important theoretical movements of the 
twentieth century: structuralism, semiotics, and
deconstructionism. Two of these, structuralism and 
deconstructionism, will be discussed in forthcoming sections.
Language and Anthropology; Whorf and Levi-Strauss
In the United States, the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf can 
be seen as a complementary, yet distinct, contribution to 
what was described earlier as the "linguistic turn." Whorf, 
who was a student of the eminent linguist, Edward Sapir, 
although unfamiliar with Saussure's work, gave 
anthropological support to the arbitrary nature of the sign 
and its theoretical and epistemological implications in 
ethnolinguistics. Sapir had argued that "the 'real world' is 
to a large extent built up on the language habits of the 
group."20 From this insight, Sapir reached the conclusion 
that "the worlds in which different societies live are 
distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different 
labels attached"— distinct in human relations, view of the 
sacred, and emotional expression.21
Working from Sapir's assumptions, Whorf's work succeeded 
in providing empirical support for Sapir's observations.
20 Edward Sapir, Selected Writings in Language. Culture.
and Personalitv. ed. by David Mandelbaum (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1949), p. 162.
21 Ibid., p. 162, emphasis added.
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Whorf's insights on linguistics came, in part, from fieldwork
he conducted with the Hopi Indians of Arizona. Through a
careful analysis of their language, Whorf concluded that the
Hopi language have no words to express the movement of time.
After long and careful study and analysis, the 
Hopi language is seen to contain no words, grammatical 
forms, constructions or expression that refer directly 
to what we call "time," or to past, present, or future, 
or to enduring or lasting, or to motion as kinematic 
rather than dynamic...22
In Saussurian terms, it may be said that the Hopi language
has a different set of signs. As a result, the Hopi have not
only a different langue, but a different metaphysics and
cosmology. No word in the Hopi language is capable of
expressing the Western idea of the perpetually flowing realm
of time (i.e., a flow of past, present, and future).
Instead, the Hopi see time in terms of manifested and
manifesting. Manifested includes "all that is or has been
accessible to the senses."23 Manifesting refers to what we
call future and "all that we call mental— everything that
appears or exists in the mind."24 For the Hopi, the
manifesting does not represent the flow of time from future
22 Benjamin Lee Whorf, "An American Indian Model of the
Universe, in Language. Thought, and Reality:__Selected
Writings of Beniamin Lee Whorf. ed. by John Carroll
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), p. 57. With regard to the 
development of modern Western conceptualizations of time, cf. 
Jerome H. Buckley, The Trlumnh of Time (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1966).
23 Whorf, "An American Indian Model of the Universe,"
1956, p. 59.
24 Ibid., p. 59.
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into present into past. Manifesting represents something 
that is "already with us in vital and mental form."25
From Whorf's encounter with the structure of Hopi 
language, he concludes that "concepts of 'time' and 'matter' 
are not given in substantially the same form by experience to 
all men but depend upon the nature of language or 
languages."26 In turn, language is the result of the 
cultural formations of different peoples. Socially produced 
languages give us our particular view of space, time, and 
objects. There is no such thing as pure experience 
unencumbered by the effect of language. The community in 
which language is embedded shapes and molds experience. 
Langauge provides the inner structure by which we experience 
the world. This view, like Saussure's, stands in complete 
contrast to the Enlightenment'a view of language as a mirror 
of reality.
Levi-Strauss: Language. Structure, and Myth
In a statement reminiscent of Cassirer's, Claude Levi- 
Strauss once predicted that the advent of structural 
linguistics would "play the same renovating role with respect 
to the social sciences that nuclear physics has played for
25 Ibid., p. 60.
26 Benjamin L. Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought 
and Behavior to Language," in Ibid., p. 158.
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Ithe physical sciences."27 In Levi-Strauss' view, the 
structural linguistics inaugurated by Saussure and refined by 
the Russian Formalists provided the human sciences with the 
material for the construction of a rigorous new method. This 
new method was capable of revealing not only the phonetic and 
syntactical makeup of various languages, but more importantly 
for Levi-Strauss, the underlying structures or general laws 
of culture. In general, Levi-Strauss' work attempted to fuse 
together the linguistic insights of Saussure, and other 
structural linguists such as N. Troubetzkoy and R. Jacobson 
with the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss into 
something that came to be called "structural anthropology." 
With Levi-Strauss, structuralism as a method expands and 
becomes further refined. As the structural method 
progressed, Levi-Strauss felt it would eventually succeed in 
bridging the gap between the exact and social sciences.28
Just as Saussure had stressed the importance of 
understanding words (signifiers or morphemes) in negative 
relation to other words and in terms of the larger system of 
language (la langue), Levi-Strauss wanted to understand the 
cultural whole based on the inner relationship of a society's 
elementary parts. These elementary parts did not have 
meaning by themselves, but only as part of larger system of
27 Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. 
by Clair Jacobson (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 33.
28 Cf. Ibid., p. 70.
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relations. Particularly important in this method was the 
identification of binary categories, an idea borrowed from 
the Russian Formalists. Binary categories or oppositions
provided the unconscious material on which a culture
constructs its understanding of the world. Identifying the 
underlying and unconscious binary scheme would inevitably 
lead to a deep understanding of the culture. The Ntruth" of 
a culture was to be found in the unconscious structure which 
in turn provided the rules for everyday practice, discourse, 
and ritual.
By employing the structuralist method, a seemly
meaningless endeavor such as comparing the cuisine of two
cultures becomes a means for determining the unconscious
inner structure of a society. Levi-Strauss writes,
Like language, it seems to me, the cuisine of a 
society may be analyzed into constituent elements, 
which in this case we can call 'gustemes,' and which 
may be organized according to certain structure of 
opposition and correlation. We might then distinguish 
English cooking from French cooking by means of three 
oppositions: endogenous/exogenous; central/peripheral; 
marked/not marked.29
English and French cuisines are distinguishable by their
binary oppositions. English cuisine emphasized staple food
with ingredients that are national and prepared in a bland
manner. Conversely in French cuisine, the distinctions
between endogenous/exogenous and central/peripheral are
blurred. French culture makes a distinction between marked
29 Ibid., p. 86.
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and non-marked (i.e., those with and without particular 
spices added). What is of paramount importance here is that 
the unconscious constituent elements of a society's cuisine 
provides a means for understanding the structure by which the 
society categorizes and organizes, not just food, but the 
world.
Much of the structural method of Levi-Strauss was
directed at some of anthropology's most persistent areas of
confusion, specifically kinship systems and mythologies.
Understanding the logic of kinship systems had been an
important methodological problem throughout the relatively
short history of anthropology. However, using the structural
method Levi-Strauss argued,
Like phonemes, kinship terms are elements of meaning; 
like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they 
are integrated into systems. Kinship systems, like 
phonemic systems, are built by the mind on the level 
of unconscious thought....Although they belong to 
another order of reality, kinship phenomena are of 
the same type as linguistic phenomena.30
From the insights of structural linguistics, kinship systems
were to be understood in relation to one another and as part
of the logic of an entire system of kinship rather than as
isolated elements. For Levi-Strauss, this inquiry revealed
that "the kinship system is a language."31 By treating
kinship as a language, it was possible to uncover a deeper
logic of a culture under examination. Essentially, Levi-
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 Ibid., p. 47.
Strauss concluded that when each member of a society was 
placed within the context of the distinctions that make-up 
kinship terminology and role distinctions, the entire logical 
system of that culture could be determined. As such, general 
laws of culture could be developed.
The explanation of myth had also been a methodologically 
problematic enterprise for anthropologists. Unlike language 
or kinship systems, myths seemed to lack an overall logic and 
continuity. Myths seemed to vary from myth teller to myth 
teller and from situation to situation. However, myths also 
have the characteristics of being timeless and universal. 
There exists an "astounding similarity between myths 
collected in widely different regions.”32 The seemly 
arbitrary nature of myths and myth telling coupled with their 
apparent universality made it extremely difficult to grasp 
the meaning of myths in a cultural setting. In order to 
understand myths, Levi-Strauss felt it was important to 
employ and transcend the Saussurian distinction between 
langue and parole. Myth, like language, has a part that 
"refers to events alleged to have taken place long ago."33 
However, it also "explains the present and the past as well 
as the future."34 Myth is at once an explanation of
32 Ibid., p. 208.
33 Ibid., p. 209.
34 Ibid., p.209.
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historical phenomena and a timeless philosophy of life. This
dual nature of myth requires that it be seen as a special
case of language. Levi-Strauss writes,
It is that double structure, altogether historical 
and ahistorical, which explains how myth, while 
pertaining to the realm of parole and calling for 
an explanation as such, as well as to that of langue 
in which it is expressed, can also be an absolute 
entity on a third level which, though it remains 
linguistic by nature, is nevertheless distinct from 
the other two.35
From this distinction of myth, Levi-Strauss comes to the 
conclusion that "mvth is language. functioning on an 
especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at 
'taking off' from the linguistic ground on which it keeps on 
rolling."36 With this view of myth-as-language as a 
foundation, Levi-Strauss proceeds to examine several myths 
appearing in different cultures. The myths he explores, such 
as the Oedipus myth, the Zuni origin and emergence myth, and 
Plains mythology reveal a deep structure of meaning. The 
structure can be found by examining the bundles of relations 
within a mythology. The bundles or mythemes can be revealed 
by examining only the elements of a myth which are necessary
35 Ibid., p. 210.
36 Ibid., p. 210, emphasis added. In some ways this 
parrells Alfred Schutz's phenomenological notion that 
language is a hidden treasure, partly not even accessible to 
same members of the in-group. Denotations of words, 
connotations, idioms and dialects relate at a semi-counscious 
level that interlinks the historical experience of a group. 
Cf., Schutz essay on the "Stranger” and the "NewComer" in 
Collected Papers. Vol. 2 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff: 1964), pp. 91-119.
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Ito tell the story. The mythemes reveal an even deeper code 
than that of langue. "Behind the individual telling or 
parole, and behind the langue from which that parole 
derives," there exists "a kind of super-langue, which emits 
a fundamental message."37 For Levi-Strauss, primary among 
these mythemes is a search for the resolution of oppositions, 
such as the distinction between nature and culture.
The inner structure of myth is as logical as any in 
contemporary Western science. Levi-Strauss concludes that 
"the same logic processes operate in myth as in science, and 
that man has always been thinking equally well...”3*
It was Levi-Strauss' goal to show, "not how men think in 
myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their 
being aware of the fact.”39 Following the lead of the 
structural linguists, Levi-Strauss concluded that "if the 
human mind appears determined in the realm of mythology, a 
fortiori it must also be determined in all its spheres of 
activity."40
One of the founders of structural linguistics, N. 
Troubetzkoy, reduced the importance of structural linguistics
37 Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), p. 44.
38 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology. 1963, p. 230.
39 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. 
by John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1969),
p. 12.
40 Ibid., p. 10.
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to four basic positions:
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study 
of conscious linguistic phenomena to study of their 
unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat 
terms as independent entities, taking instead as its 
basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, 
it introduces the concept of the system.... finally, 
structural linguistics aims at discovering general 
lavs..
These positions, with minor revisions, also can be used to 
summarize the importance of the work of Levi-Strauss. 
Structuralism, in all its varieties, is part of an important 
shift away from emphasizing the importance of consciousness 
towards that of structure. For the structuralist the "truth" 
of a language or a culture resides in the deep unconscious 
structure which is prior to individual consciousness. In 
many ways the structuralists extend the project which began 
with the sociological writings of Marx and Durkheim in the 
nineteenth century by ellaborating the notion of structure 
exterior to the individual. Marx, Durkheim, and the
structuralist all seek to treat humans as part of larger 
system of determination. The coherent ego of the 
Enlightenment, inaugurated by Cartesian rationalism, becomes 
suspect. Behind the back of this ego resides a structure 
which molds its everyday speech, modes of expression, and 
action. The outcome is that the system or structure, whether
41 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology. 1963, p. 33. 
As we shall see in the next section, the ability to discover 
"general laws" is one of the central distinguishing features 
between structuralism and 
poststructuralism.
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conscious or unconscious, is placed above individual elements 
and the rational ego.
However, the structuralist position was not free from 
critiques or revisions. As we shall see with the work of 
Jacques Derrida, in the 1960's there arises a post­
structuralism which, although informed by structuralism, 
seeks to rethink some of structuralism's central positions on 
language, such as the search for general laws of language or 
culture. This movement, it will be argued, constitutes the 
most radical break with modern thought and marks the movement 
into the postmodern.
Derrida:__Language and Presence
Jacques Derrida begins one of his most important works, 
the 1967 book Of Gramatologv. with the declaration that the 
problem of language "has invaded the global horizon of the 
most diverse researches and the most heterogeneous 
discourses."42 The so-called "problem of language" 
expressed by writers such as Nietzsche, Saussure, and 
Heidegger, had by the early 1960's, infiltrated almost every 
domain of inquiry. Few intellectual domains remained 
untouched by the revolutionary insights associated with the 
"linguistic turn." Particularly affected by the emphasis on 
language were the areas of philosophy and literary theory.
42 Jacques Derrida, Of Gramatologv. trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravory Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), p. 6.
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In Derrida, we encounter the most radical treatment of 
language in contemporary thought. Futhermore, we find 
language used as a means for reassessing the project of 
philosophy and the entire Western theoretical tradition.
As discussed earlier, structural linguistics sought to 
make explicit the system of relations embedded in language. 
The goal was to identify the structural elements which make 
speech or culture possible. However, for Derrida this is a 
highly problematic project. In Derrida's view, Saussure and 
the structuralists are guilty of presenting the signifier and 
signified as being clearly distinguishable parts of the 
linguistic sign. Essentially, in the structuralist's view of 
the sign, there is a clear and definable distinction between 
signifiers and what they signify. The signified is a phoneme 
or morpheme, while the signified refers to a referent 
somewhere "out in the world." However, according to Derrida 
there exists no such clear delineation between the signified 
and the signifier. Signifiers and signifieds are so closely 
intertwined that it is impossible to draw a distinction 
between these two aspects of the sign. Signifiers often 
serve as signifieds. Likewise, signifieds can serve as 
signifiers. Summarizing this phenomenon of the sign, Madan 
Sarup writes,
Suppose you want to know the meaning of a signifier, 
you can look it up in the dictionary; but all you will 
find will by yet more signifiers, whose signifieds you 
can in turn look up, and so on. The process is not 
only infinite but somehow circular; signifiers keep 
transforming into signifieds, and vice versa, and you
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never arrive at a final signified which is not 
a signifier in itself.43
For Derrida, this means that language is much more unstable
and problematic than had been recognized by Saussure, and the
structural linguists and anthropologists. The basic elements
of a language or a culture cannot be clearly defined, since
they are in continuous movement and transformation. Thus,
the structure or basic elements, which serve as the
foundation for structuralism, become extremely hard to
locate, "pin-down," and analyze. As a result, the search for
general laws of language and culture becomes suspect.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly in Derrida's
overall philosophical project, this view of language implies
that meaning is never totally present in a sign. The sign,
which is marked solely by its difference from other signs, is
influenced by traces of these other signs which are absent
from the original sign. These traces, although absent,
affect the sign's meaning. The sign "is always inhabited by
other signs which do not present themselves as such; there is
always a deferral to something absent."44 For example in
ordinary language,
The sound sequence bat is a signifier because it 
contrasts with pat, mat, bad, bet, etc. The noise
43 Madan Sarup, An Introductory guide ts PQStr.
structuralism and PggtfflPdernjgn (Athens, Georgia: The
University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 35.
44 Gayatri Spivak quoted in Keith C. Pheby,
Interventions:___ Displacing fchs___Metaphysical Sufrles.t
(Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 1988), p. 57.
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Ithat is 'present' when one says bat is inhabited by 
the traces of forms one is not uttering, and it 
can function as a signifier only insofar as it 
consists of such traces...what is supposedly present 
is already complex and differential, marked by 
difference, a product of difference.45
As a consequence of this differentiation and its traces,
"meaning is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of
signifiers; it cannot be easily nailed down, it is never
fully present in any one sign..."46 Signs are composed of a
series of signifiers and signifieds which are never fully
present in the sign. As a consequence, meaning is never
fully present in a sign. Describing this process, which
Derrida refers to as differance or difference (to defer and
to differ), he writes,
This concept can be called gram or differance.
The play of differences supposes, in effect, 
syntheses and referrals which forbid at any 
moment, or in any sense, that a simple element 
be present in and of itself, referring only to 
itself....no element can function as a sign 
without referring to another element which itself 
is not simply present. This interweaving results 
in each 'element' being constituted on the basis 
of the trace within it of the other elements of 
the chain or system....There are only, everywhere, 
differences and traces of traces.47
Meaning can never be fully present since it is constructed
through signifiers which contain traces of other signs not
45 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and 
Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca, N.Y.; Cornell 
University Press, 1982), p. 96.
46 Sarup, introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and 
Postmodernism. 1988, p. 35.
47 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. by Alan Bass 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 26.
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Ipresent.
The implications of this view of the sign are very 
important for the discipline of philosophy and Western 
thought in general. Despite the insistence in Western 
thought that the true meaning of an object or a text can be 
summoned before the investigating subject, meaning, in 
Derrida's view of language, is always deferred or suspended. 
Since the sign is differential and is filled with traces of 
signifiers which are not immediately present, meaning can 
never be fully present to consciousness. Western thought, 
particularly as manifested in the Enlightenment, felt the 
essence or true meaning of an object was graspable. The 
outcome of this position on language is an undermining of the 
idea that objects can be immediately present and, as a 
consequence, grasped by the ego.
With this particular understanding of language as the
play of deferring and differing as a backdrop, Derrida
develops his most famous device for reading a text. It also
becomes a powerful device for rereading the history of
Occidental thought. This process of reading or rereading has
come to be known as deconstructionism. Describing one of the
"steps" in the process of deconstruction, Derrida writes,
...In a classical philosophical opposition we are not 
dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, 
but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two 
terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, 
etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the 
opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy
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at a given moment.48 
To a large degree Western thought has been governed by binary 
conceptual oppositions such as rationality/irrationality, 
signifier/signified, sensible/intelligible, nature/culture, 
speech/writing, subject/object, etc. In these oppositions 
one of the terms has been given a privileged position in the
conceptual hierarchy. However, what this ignores, in
Derrida's view, is that if the distinctions are pushed far 
enough they collapse. The position of the other term relies 
on the subordination of the other. The dominant term has a 
trace of the subordinate within its signification. Without 
this difference in the system of language the higher term 
would not have meaning since meaning is given bv difference. 
As a consequence of this deconstruction, the privileged 
concept loses its superior position in the conceptual 
hierarchy. For example, rationality does not exist as a 
clearly distinguishable sign from irrationality. 
Irrationality is contained with the definition of 
rationality.
The goal of deconstructionism, like semiotics, is to 
"transform concepts, to displace them, to turn them against 
their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other 
chains...and thereby to produce new configurations."49 In 
the deconstruction process the privileging of one term in a
48 Ibid., p. 41.
49 Ibid., p. 24.
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hierarchy is revealed as being a rhetorical strategy more 
than a true representation of some reality "in the world.” 
As an early example of deconstuctionism, one can point to one 
of Derrida's intellectual predecessors, Nietzsche, and his 
deconstruction of causality. In Nietzsche's perspective, 
cause comes in a sequence after effect, rather than the 
traditional view otherwise. It is only after we discern an 
effect that we look for a cause. Temporally, it can be 
illustrated that effect precedes cause. Only through a 
tropological operation is it reversed into the received 
scheme of causality. "If the effect is what causes the cause 
to become a cause, then the effect, not the cause, should be 
treated as the origin."50 The deconstruction of causality 
and the context of discovery illustrates that effect can 
serve as a foundation in the same manner that cause has. The 
deconstruction reveals that the elevation of cause over 
effect is a matter of rhetorical positioning. This has the 
affect of "causing" the privileged term to lose its position 
in the conceptual hierarchy. "If either cause or effect can 
occupy the position of origin, then origin is no longer 
originary; it loses its metaphysical privilege.”51
50 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and 
Criticism after Structuralism. 1982, p. 88, emphasis added. 
The example of Nietzsche's deconstruction of causality is 
taken from Culler's discussion.
51 Ibid., p. 88.
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For Derrida, one of the most important binary
distinctions in the history of Western thought is the one
between speech and writing. In the history of Western
thought, speech has had the privileged position over writing.
Writing was seen as something derivative, and consequently
profane. The Western tradition has seen the written
signifier as being "always technical and representative."
Unlike speech, writing "has no constitutive meaning."52
Speech, on the other hand, provided the most reliable means
to consciousness and truth since it has represented immediate
presence and a direct pathway from thought. Derrida writes,
From this point of view, the voice is consciousness 
itself. When I speak, not only am I conscious of
being present for what I think, but I am conscious
also of keeping as close as possible to my thought, 
or to the 'concept,' a signifier that does not fall 
into the world, a signifier that I hear as soon as I 
emit it...53
In Derrida's view, this positioning of speech over writings 
is indicative of Western thought's search for immediate
presence. Since writing has been seen as derivative of
speech, Western thought has seen it as a place for 
misunderstanding, ambiguity, and ultimately the absence of 
"presence to consciousness." Conversely, speech represents 
a form of communication where "the words bear a meaning and 
the listener can in principle grasp precisely what the
52 Derrida, Of Gramatolocrv. 1976, p. 11.
53 Jacques Derrida, Positions. 1982, p. 22.
Ispeaker has in mind."5* However, Derrida argues that the 
privileging of speech over writing is an opposition that can 
be deconstructed.
Derrida's deconstruction of the speech/writing hierarchy 
is developed primarily through a reading of Saussure. In the 
Course in General Linguistics. Saussure, in keeping with the 
Western tradition, warns other linguists against treating 
writing as a primary foci of inquiry of linguistics. For 
Saussure, "writing obscures language; it is not a guise for 
language but a disguise."55 Furthermore, for Saussure, "the 
tyranny of writing" precedes "by imposing itself upon the 
masses, spelling influences and modifies language."56 
However, the irony of the position is that Saussure is forced 
to present his most important concept of language, that of 
the differential linguistic system, through the example of 
writing. "Thus writing, which Saussure claimed ought not to 
be the object of linguistic inquiry, turns out to be the best 
illustration of the nature of linguistic units."57 Saussure
54 Culler, On Deconstruction. 1982, p. 101. Today, this 
orientation towards speech is represented by the work of 
Jurgen Habermas, one of the most important critics of 
poststructuralism. For Derrida, Habermas' notion of an "idea 
speech situation" is build on the privileging of speech over 
writing and is thus consistent with the Western metaphysical 
heritage. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests 
(Boston, 1971).
55 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 30.
56 Ibid., p. 31.
57 Culler, On Deconstruction. 1982, p. 101.
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undermines his own privileging of speech over writing. His 
argument brings about a reversal of his position on the 
speech/writing division. Despite Saussure's intentions, 
speech becomes a form of writing.
Saussure position on speech and writing, Derrida argues,
is part of Western metaphysical thinking, particularly its
division or binary distinction between mind/body.
Saussure points at the inversion of the natural 
relationship between speech and writing. It is not 
a simple analogy: writing, the letter, the sensible 
inscription, has always been considered by Western 
tradition as the body and matter external to the 
spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos.58
However, as Derrida attempts to show, if this division
between speech and writing, as well as the division between
mind and body, are pushed far enough they fall under their
own weight. Saussure is not able to present a description of
speech without recourse to writing. The deconstruction of
speech/writing reveals that the hierarchy is a construction
of the Western metaphysical heritage which places supreme
value on presence rather than a reflection of any "real" or
absolute distinction. Speech represents a loaocentrism.
where the privileging of one term over another serves as a
foundation for a system of knowledge (e.g., rationality over
irrationality).
Derrida's deconstuctionism, although primarily aimed at 
philosophical works, has had it most important impact in the
58 Derrida, Of Gramatologv. 1976, pp. 34-35.
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area of literary criticism. In literary criticism, 
deconstructionism has become a tool for reexamining the 
literary work. It has had the effect of removing the author 
as the primary vehicle for uncovering the text's "true 
meaning." Likewise, it has had the effect of elevating the 
critic to the same level as that of the author of a text. 
This stands in complete contrast with the New Criticism of 
the 1950's, which saw the author's intentions as a primary 
focus of critical inquiry.
Deconstructing a literary text is done in a manner 
similar to the deconstuction of philosophical work. By 
showing how an established hierarchy eventually undermines 
the work's initial strategy, the work's rhetorical play is 
brought to the forefront. The outcome of this, in a broad 
sense, is that the interpretation rendered by a critic is as 
"valid" as the author's "original intentions."59 There is 
no need for the critic to engage in a search for the authors 
"original meaning." Original meaning is not that central, 
since it is no closer to the "truth" about a text than 
critical interpretation.
One of the most important implications of 
deconstructionism for literary criticism and other allied 
disciplines is its ability to level any privileged access to
59 This conclusion is similar to the one in Gadamerian 
hermenutics. Cf., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. 
trans. by G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 
1986).
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truth. In other words, no individual (lay or professional) 
has the ability to determine the true nature of meaning. If 
the play of difference in the sign makes it impossible for 
meaning to be immediately present or "nailed down," 
philosophy and all forms of communication simply become 
texts. These philosophical texts are as much "fictional" as 
literary works. This prohibits the elevation of philosophy, 
or for that matter social science (or any discourse), over 
literature as a superior form of discourse. The final 
outcome of this is that the world is revealed as being a 
text, which, unlike in depth hermeneutics, must undergo 
endless interpretation from different perspectives. Each of 
these perspectives are potentially as "valid" as the 
other.60
For Derrida, "there is nothing outside of the text." 
This is because "beyond the text there are only more texts 
and traces of texts," where meaning is never fully 
present.61 In this regard, "external reference can only be 
a matter of intertextuality.w62 In other words, no form of 
discourse can escape the interweaving of language to find and
60 By "potentially as valid," I mean that the 
interpretation of text (which includes everything) is still 
limited by the social credentials of the interpreter. We 
will return to the epistemological idealism of postmodernism 
in chapters 7 and 8.
61 Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy 
(eds.), After Philosophy: End or Transformation (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 122.
62 Ibid., p. 122.
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capture a transcendental signified. Thus, from the Derridean 
perspective, all we have are discursive formations or texts 
about the transcendental (reason, truth, etc.), not the fully 
present idea or concept. Consequently, objective knowledge 
about the world is impossible.
What is the outcome of all this deconstructing? Is 
Derrida offering an alternative to the Western tradition? Or 
have we, as one interviewer of Derrida once remarked, been 
led into a labyrinth.63 First of all, we can conclude that 
for Derrida meaning is something that is constructed rather 
than something that is given. Furthermore, the differential 
structure of language means that the signifier shapes the 
meaning of the signified. With this view of the sign, 
language becomes a tool for a reconsideration or rethinking 
of Western thought. The search of Occidental thought for 
immediate presence is revealed as being an impossible dream. 
Language and its system of differences will always defer 
(i.e., delay) the idea of presence. The outcome of this is 
not a new system of knowledge as such. Derrida is not 
proposing a new system of knowledge, which, for example, 
treasures absence over presence or writing over speech. 
Rather, he is showing that all systems of knowledge, while 
they must rely on certain distinctions, are susceptible to 
being undermined by the very distinctions that make the
63 Cf. Henri Ronse's remarks in Jacques Derrida, 
:ions. 1981, p. 5.
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system possible (e.g., science reliance upon the binary 
hierachy of rationality and irrationality or belief and 
knowledge). Derrida illustrates "the necessity of regarding 
the distinction of signifier and signified as functional and 
provisional rather than substantial..."64 In other words, 
the hierarchy that makes a system of knowledge possible is 
perhaps necessary for the validity of the system, yet it 
cannot be grounded by some transcendental signified. This 
realization, it can be argued, calls for a very sensitive 
reappraisal of current discourses and the Western theoretical 
tradition in general.
Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn 
If we can say that the modern way of knowing was built 
on the distinction between objects, discourse, and thought, 
then it is clear that the developments in twentieth-century 
linguistics have seriously questioned these distinctions. In 
twentieth century thought, there exists a marked shift from 
seeing language as a tool to capture the essence of reality 
to viewing language as a means bv which that reality is pre­
structured . This movement, which began with the attempt of 
Saussure to establish linguistics as a science, culminates 
with Derrida's use of language to rethink the entire Western 
philosophical tradition. Language and its ability to refer 
has unquestionably become, in this century, one of the most
64 Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure. 1986, p. 144.
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Iimportant topics in the human sciences and one of the primary 
issues in the rebellion against cultural modernity.
In summary, we can say that the linguistic turn helped 
bring about three related ideas that are central to 
postmodern thought: (1) consciousness is predetermined by
structure (a point further developed in the next chapter), 
(2) thought and discourse are determined by language, and (3) 
objects have no essences apart from those given by language. 
In regard to the first idea, the insights of Saussure, Whorf, 
Levi-Strauss, while certainly diverse, all share the 
conviction that language structures consciousness. Despite 
Descartes' claim that consciousness is the center of 
knowledge, developments in linguistics point to the fact that
consciousness is already predetermined fey language-
Consequently, the subject is displaced as the center of 
knowledge by an immutable structure. The second point 
proceeds from the first. If consciousness is predetermined 
by language, there can be no thought which takes place 
without language, or some form of symbolic communication. 
Thought, unlike its Enlightenment descriptions, is not a 
separate and unique realm. It is a product of language and 
linguistic differentiation. Thirdly, this means that objects 
do not have their own independent essences. Any supposed 
essence attributed to objects are merely products of a 
particular language that arranges and describes the world in 
a certain way. When this view is taken to its extreme, as
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with Derrida, there literally can be nothing outside of 
language or in Derrida's terminology, "the text." The nature 
of objects, societies, and the cosmos are all given by the 
language. They do not exist without the mediating effects of 
language.
At this juncture it is important to discuss in more 
detail what makes Derrida postmodern. Why does his work mark 
a break with the modern and a full-fledged movement into the 
postmodern? From the earlier discussion, we can see the 
influences of Saussure and Levi-Strauss upon Derrida. What 
separates Derrida from his predecessors is the degree of his 
radical stance toward language. The linguistic insights of 
Saussure were directed at developing the sciences of 
linguistics and semiology (semiotics, i.e., the sciences of 
signs). For Saussure, as well as Levi-Strauss, language 
provides the scientific base or basic elements for the 
exploration and understanding of the "superstructural" 
components of speech or culture. Derrida's stance on 
langauge makes this search for the basic elements of language 
or culture a highly problematic enterprise. Derrida's view 
that language defers meaning is such a radical approach that 
it makes the search for basic elements or foundations an 
impossibility. The idea of presence, on which most systems 
of knowledge rely, is always deferred by the characteristics 
of language. Derrida's poststructuralism also closes the 
possibility of finding a point outside of language from which
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to make objective or scientific claims and construct general 
laws of society or culture. Unlike the structuralists, 
Derrida's position on language makes it impossible to have 
objective views about the world. To summarize the 
deconstructionist point, all we have are "texts" and all 
knowledge producers are engaged in literary criticism. In 
Nietzsche's words, "We are prisoners of our grammar."65
In the next chapter, we will explore another one of 
postmodernism central tenants— that of the decentering of the 
subject. As we shall see, this issue is closely related to 
the issue of language and referntiality. However, we will 
discuss it as a seperate and unique part of the postmodern 
framework.
65 Frederick Nietzsche, quoted in Keith Pheby, 
Interventions* 1988, p. 43.
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CHAPTER V
THE DECENTERING OF THE SUBJECT IN POSTMODERN THOUGHT
In the last chapter, we discussed the postmodern 
orientation towards language and referentiality. One of 
the implications of the postmodern treatment of language is 
that the all-knowing or expressive subject of modernity 
comes to be view as embedded within a system of 
signification that structures his or her ability to know 
and feel. In other words, the subject becomes "decentered" 
as the source of knowing and feeling. In this chapter, we 
will further explore the issue of the decentering of the 
subject. By "decentering" it is meant that the subject, 
which served as the center piece of much of modern thought, 
has been undermined or displaced as a firm foundation for 
epistemology and creativity.
Specifically in the following discussion, we will 
consider how the works of Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Michel 
Foucault have contributed to the postmodern project of 
decentering the subject. In addition to a consideration of 
these writers, we will explore how the decentering of the 
subject has manifested itself in other areas of culture.
In this regard, this chapter contains an examination of 
recent developments in the cultural production of what is 
labeled "pop art" and "neo-pop art." We will explore how 
the phenomenon of pop art may be seen as part of
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decentering process. First, however, we will examine the 
meaning of the modern subject.
The Meaning of the Modern Subject
The grounding of knowledge and creativity in the 
conditions of subjectivity has been manifested in at least 
three related forms. First, in philosophical discourse 
there is a Cartesian derived notion of the subject as both 
an instrument of, and condition for, the creation and 
accumulation of knowledge. Within Cartesian thinking, 
rational consciousness is "the guarantor of certainty and 
knowledge."1 The second form of the modern subject, is 
the Rousseauian idea of the romantic or expressive self.
As discussed in Chapter 2, this Rousseauian self is thought 
to be "deeper" and "truer" than the fully coherent, 
rational ego of Cartesianism. The final form of the modern 
subject is manifested in the universal subject of the human 
sciences. This version of the subject can perhaps be 
viewed as a combination of Cartesian and Rousseauian 
formulations. It is evident in various biological, 
psychological, and sociological theories which seek to 
locate a universalistic and ahistorical human nature or 
essence. The purpose of this search for a human nature is 
to construct a general theory of humankind. This search
1 Keith C. Pheby, Interventions: Displacing the 
Metaphysical Subject (Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 
1988), p. 17.
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for a foundational human nature has appeared in such 
diverse forms as; utilitarianism, Marx's labor theory of 
human nature, the biological body, behaviorism, ego 
psychology, and developmental psychology, to name but a 
few.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the modern 
subject, in either its Cartesian or Rousseauian form, began 
to come under considerable scrutiny, reappraisal, and in 
some cases, attack.2 In part, this reassessment was 
directed at what some writers believed were the pretensions 
and theoretical failings of the autonomous modern subject. 
Since the writings of Descartes in the seventeenth century, 
philosophy had held that the conditions of subjectivity 
were responsible for the acquisition of knowledge. Other 
forms of reassessment of the modern conceptualization of 
the subject were the result of the unintended outcomes of 
various lines of theoretical investigations found in such 
disciplines as linguistics and psychoanalysis.
For Nietzsche, from whom many of the early critiques 
of the subject originate, "the 'subject' is not something 
given, it is something added and invented and projected 
behind what there is."3 For Nietzsche, as well as
2 Some critiques predate this. Hume and G.
Lichtenberg had rendered crtiques of the self in the 
e ighteenth-century.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by W. 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1968), p. 267.
132
contemporary postmodern theorists, the Cartesian subject is
a rhetorical construct— a product of a particular cultural
and linguistic orientation. In a fragment from The Will to
Power. Nietzsche elaborates his attach on the modern,
Cartesian subject;
'There is thinking; therefore there is something that 
thinks': this is the upshot of all Descartes' 
argumentation. But that means positing as 'true a 
priori' our belief in the concept of substance— that 
when there is thought there has to be something 'that 
thinks' is simply a formulation of our grammatical 
custom that adds a doer to every deed.4
For Nietzsche, the concept of the subject in philosophical
discourse is a subjectification or anthropomorphism created
by a creature which "can only prosper through a relative
rightness..."5 In other words, the autonomous subject of
modernity is a supreme fiction. However, this fictionally
constructed subject has nevertheless, managed to serve as
the foundation for much of modern thought.
As we shall see in the forthcoming discussion, the 
modern desire to ground knowledge of the world in either a 
coherent, deep, or natural subject is attacked in 
postmodern thought as being inaccurate, fictional, or at 
least highly problematic.
4 Ibid., p. 268.
5 Ibid., p. 266.
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Freud. Lacan, and the Unconscious 
It is perhaps an understatement to say that the 
totality of Freud's work constitutes one of the most 
influential doctrines of thought in the twentieth century. 
The view of the subject provided by Freud calls for a 
reappraisal of many modern and Enlightenment notions of the 
subject and the conditions of subjectivity. Paramount 
among these Freudian notions is the concept of the 
unconscious. For Freud, the unconscious was a vast, 
unchartered "region" which contained the raw, essential 
energy of humankind. While consciousness may be the 
outcome of a culturally-specific reality-order, the 
unconscious contains the essential material of human nature 
itself. In other words, the unconscious contains the 
foundational characteristics of all humankind. Freud's aim 
was to bring this foundational material into the realm of 
scientific investigation and classification, thereby 
revealing the hidden elements which unite all individuals 
in all places and times.
In a much discussed example from the annals of 
psychoanalysis, Freud relates the story of "Rat Man." This 
example can serve as an avenue into the Freudian 
understanding of the unconscious and its relationship with 
the conscious subject. Freud describes the case of Rat Man 
as follows:
One day when he was away on his summer holidays the 
idea suddenly occurred to him that he was too fat
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and that he must make himself slimmer. So he began 
he began getting up from the table before pudding came 
round and tearing along the road without a hat in the 
blazing heat of an August sun. Then he would dash up a 
mountain at the double, till, dripping with 
perspiration, he was forced to come to a stop...Our 
patient could think of no explanation of this 
senseless, obsessional behavior until it suddenly 
occurred to him that at that time his lady had also 
been stopping at the same resort; but she had been in 
the company of an English cousin, who was very 
attentive to her and of whom the patient had been very 
jealous. This cousin's name was Richard, and, according 
to the usual practice in England, he was known as Dick. 
Our patient, then, had wanted to kill this Dick.6
In this case the unconscious desire to kill Richard is
manifested in the surrogate form of losing weight. The
reality principle makes it impossible for the conscious
contemplation of Richard's murder to become an actual
possibility. Consequently, this desire is relegated to the
unconscious where it "is associatively related in some way
to the its original presentation" (i.e., the relationship
between the English signifier "Dick" and the German
signified "losing fat").7
In this example, and at various other points throughout
his work, Freud reveals two important ideas about the
functioning of the human mind. First, is the obvious
illustration of the workings of the unconscious. The
unconscious is understood to be a central, yet vastly
6 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. X, ed. by J. 
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), pp. 188-89.
7 David Archard, Consciousness and the Unconscious (La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1984), p. 
26.
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different, aspect or realm of the human psyche. For Freud, 
this realm was capable of being "mapped" with the use of 
proper psychoanalytical methods. In Freud's work, the 
unconscious, is shown to be the harbinger of symbols, 
images, and impulses which have a direct effect upon 
conscious behavior. What this reveals is that the 
unconscious is the most essential part of the individual 
which "speaks most truthfully...in slips of the tongue and 
other errors..."8 The unconscious speaks the truth, not 
the rational consciousness.9 For Freud, the subject 
(i.e., the human being as a focus of understanding) is 
split into two irreconcilable parts, the rational conscious 
and the non-rational unconscious. Freud's development of 
the dual nature of the subject has important ramifications 
for Cartesian inspired thought. If the fully coherent, 
rational subject of Descartes, is shown to have another 
action initiating realm, of equal importance, the 
conditions of subjectivity (i.e., consciousness) cannot be 
solely responsible for the conditions for the acquisition 
of knowledge. In other words, the rational subject is not 
a complete master of his/her patterns of thought and 
action.
8 Ellie Ragland-Sul1ivan, Jacques Lacan and the 
Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Urbana, Illinois: University 
of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 3.
9 There are some general similarities between this 
treatment and Rousseau's.
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IThe second important point revealed in Freud's 
discussion of the case of Rat Man (and the most important 
for postmodern thought), points to the importance of signs 
and symbols in the manifestation of the unconscious. While 
all relations in the unconscious are not as straight 
forward as the one between "Dick" and Richard, the example 
of Rat Man does reveal how language is an important feature 
of the unconscious and the analysand's translation and 
interpretation of it.
This relationship between language and the unconscious 
was not systematically developed by Freud. Generally,
Freud employed nineteenth century biological metaphors in 
describing the unconscious and was unfamiliar with the 
formulations being developed in linguistics. With the work 
of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, we encounter one 
of the first systematic attempts to fuse the insights of 
Freudian psychology with Saussurian linguistics. The 
implications of this union of Freud and Saussure provided 
psychoanalysis with a dramatically different and 
controversial vision of the human subject. First of all, 
this union strengthened the Freudian inspired critique of 
the coherent, fixed, and foundational subject which had 
served as the basis for post-Cartesian Philosophy and much 
of modern psychology. Secondly, it undermined the Freudian 
view of the unconscious as a natural, universal, and 
essential human entity (i.e., the unconscious as a
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harbinger of truth).
Ironically, Lacan proclaimed his project as a "return 
to Freud." Lacan wanted to free Freud's ideas from "the 
litter of banalising glosses and explanations that later 
writers have heaped upon them.”10 Lacan's target in his 
return to Freud was the international psychoanalytic 
movement and American ego psychology. For Lacan, these 
movements were responsible for an erroneous, overly ego- 
oriented, and consequently one-dimensional treatment of 
Freud's work. Lacan believed that these movements 
represented an "effort to purge Freud's writings of 
elements that are accused of having no empirical basis" 
(i.e., the unconscious).11 As a fundamentalist Freudian 
(i.e., returning to Freud's original interpretation of the 
unconscious), Lacan wanted to revive the radical insights 
of Freud in relation to the unconscious and fuse them with 
some of the recent terminology and methodology of 
linguistics.
Lacan's contribution to psychoanalysis and philisophy 
revolved around three related propositions. First, the 
idea that the unconscious is structured like a language. 
Secondly, the notion that the unconscious is the discourse 
of the Other. And finally, the idea that language is the
10 Malcolm Bowie, Freud. Proust and Lacan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 101.
11 Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philisophv 
of the Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 5.
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condition (i.e., the cause) of the unconscious.12 Of 
these contributions, it is the latter one which is the most 
significant for our current discussion. In order to 
explore the importance of this last proposition we will 
begin with Lacan's discussion of the "mirror stage" of 
childhood.
In July of 1936, Lacan presented his first views on 
the mirror stage at the Fourteenth International Psycho- 
Analytical Congress in Marienbad, Czechoslovakia.13 
For Lacan, the first six months of human life is a pre­
linguist ic or "Imaginary period" where images are 
undifferentiated and "the infant experiences its body as 
fragmented parts and images."14 For Lacan, in the "pre­
mirror phase the child has a "lack of coordination of his 
own motility...intra-organic and relational 
discordance."15 The child does not have the linguistic 
capacity to perceive himself or herself as an autonomous 
individual. This is due to the fact that it is only
12 Cf. David Archard, Consciousness and the 
Unconscious. 1984, p. 60.
13 Lacan failed to submit a written text to the 
proceedings. The written portion discussed here is from 
John Muller and William Richardson's, Lacan and Language: A 
Reader's Guide to Ecrlts (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1982), pp. 26-41.
14 Ragland-Sullivan, Lacan and the Philosophy of 
Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 18.
15 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits; A Selection, trans. by Alan 
Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), pp. 18-19.
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through language that ve are provided with the
differentiations between self and other and self and world.
Beginning somewhere in the six to eighteenth month 
maturation period, the child is able or has the opportunity 
to view itself in a mirror or through a mirror-like 
reflection from a significant other. The image the child 
perceives is one of a connected whole. The experiential 
body which is fragmented and uncoordinated is counter­
transposed to a body that is whole and non-fragmented. The 
gap between the experiential body and the perceived body 
creates a sense of insufficiency and anticipation. The 
child develops a sense of desire for the unity reflected in 
the mirror or through the significant other. Through the 
other reflected in the mirror, the child desires the state 
when a fully coherent body will be possessed. The 
importance of this for Lacan is that in the mirror phase 
the child encounters and develops a desire for the "other" 
reflected in the mirror. The "child assumes itself to be 
the »other' it sees reflected, and models itself upon its 
image."16
By the time the mirror-stage has come to a close, 
somewhere around eighteen months, the child has passed from 
treating images as real to representing them in verbal 
signifiers. The mirror phenomenon is the mechanism which
16 Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism (La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court Press, 1986), p. 125, emphasis added.
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gives rise to language and the subsequent acquisition of
the symbolic order. Describing this transition, Ellie
Ragland-Sullivan has written,
Symbolic elements— the ability to name things—  
replace Imaginary ones in an identificatory reshaping 
of the subject. The imagistic and fantasmatic 
subject of identifications continues, nonetheless, to 
coexist with the subject of language and cultural codes 
throughout life.17
Through the mirror stage and resulting acquisition of
language, the child has become a social and cultural
being.18
One of the important aspects of the mirror stage is 
that it points to the beginnings of identity. The unity of 
the body "has been found outside and, accordingly, the 
destiny of humans is to (re-) experience themselves only in 
relationship to others."19 In other words, the "other" is 
the model upon which the subject is constructed. Another 
important point to be found in Lacan's formulation of the
17 Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy 
of Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 29.
18 Although theoretically distinct, this Lacanian 
insight parrells those made in symbolic interactionist 
social theory, specifically Cooley's notion of the 
"looking-glass self" and G.H. Mead's discussion of the 
development of the "self." Cf., Charles Horton Cooley, 
Human Nature and Social Order (New York: Scribner's, 1902) 
and George Herbert Mead, Mind. Self and Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1934).
19 Ibid., p. 27, emphasis added. As a point of 
contrast, it is noteworthy to add that the Kanji symbol in 
Japanese for the human being is "among people," that is, in 
Japanese society the person is a relational entity.
141
mirror phase is that it marks the child's entrance into the 
symbolic and linguistic order. With this entrance, the 
child replaces the imagistic with signification. The 
outcome of the acquisition of the symbolic order is that 
the child's imagistic world is relegated to a secondary 
realm. For Lacan, this secondary realm is the unconscious. 
The unconscious is that which is sacrificed or "murdered" 
t>Y signification. Essentially, the unconscious is the scar 
left bv language and the symbolic order.
The importance of Lacan's reformulation of Freud is 
that it reveals that the unconscious is not a biological or 
natural entity that is born into the subject, but is a 
condition that is acquired through the learning of 
language. The unconscious, a realm of the psyche which is 
partly responsible for behavior, is revealed to have its 
origins in the linguistic and symbolic order. Its source 
is society not biology. The implication of this is that 
there are not developmental or biological first principles: 
Development and "maturation" are always conditioned by the 
symbolic order. There are no essential human 
characteristics outside of language and culture, including 
that mysterious realm known as the unconscious.
In Freud and Lacan we encounter two ideas which call 
for a reformulation of the modern subject. First, Freud 
revealed that the unconscious is a unique, separate, and 
action causing realm. This means that the fully coherent,
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rational ego of Cartesianism coexists with a non-rational 
entity. In other words, the subject has a dual nature.
This duality makes the acquisition of complete rationality 
unobtainable. However, Freud felt that the unconscious was 
a biological entity, and as such could be mapped with 
precision. With Lacan, we encounter the idea that the 
unconscious is not an outcome of biological or genetic 
makeup. It is not an essential element that exists before 
culture, language, and society. Society and its linguistic 
order is responsible for the unconscious. For Lacan, the 
unconscious is what is left over after the immersion into 
signification. In Lacan's reformulation of Freud, there is 
no human essence, which awaits examination and 
classification. The "human essence" exists only as a 
result of society. The Freudian inspired search for the 
universal characteristic or first principle of human nature 
is shown to be in vain.
In the next section, we will explore another important 
attack on the modern all-knowing subject— the work of 
Michel Foucault.
Foucault and the Genealogy of the Subject
In an attempt to distance himself from the emphasis of 
traditional historiography on continuity and certainty, 
Foucault, in the Introduction to The Archeology of 
Knowledge. declares, "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me
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to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police to see that our papers are in order."20 Several 
years later in an interview conducted in the Fall of 1982 
at the University of Vermont, when asked to define his 
academic position and intellectual function at the College 
de France, Foucault responded, -I don't feel it is 
necessary to know exactly what I am."21 These seemingly 
innocuous remarks reveal more about Foucault and his 
position on the subject than would be first recognized. 
Foucault's entire intellectual goal was, in his words, "to 
create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects."22 For Foucault, 
like Nietzsche before him, the subject is not something 
given. The subject is a social construction.
Specifically, for Foucault, the subject is a historically- 
contingent product of power, discourse, and institutional 
practices. The subject is defined by, and enmeshed within, 
a complex network of power and discursive practices. This 
network is unstable and can never be fully coherent or
20 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
trans by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972), p. 17.
21 Michel Foucault in Technologies of the Self, ed. 
by L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton (Amherst, MA: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p.9, emphasis 
added.
22 Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject and 
Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucualt: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 208.
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visible to the individual subject. Consequently, for 
Foucault to engage in discussions where he provided a 
definitive declaration of his own subjectivity would have 
been a violation of his entire theoretical orientation 
towards the subject and its historical contingency.
Foucault divided his work into three "modes of 
inquiry," each of which took the historical construction of 
the subject as its central theme of investigation. These 
modes of inquiry do not represent a stage like evolution in 
Foucault's thinking, but point to certain themes which 
recur throughout the corpus of his work. Despite the 
changing nature of Foucault's work during his life course, 
each of the modes of inquiry sought to explore the "modes 
of objectification which transform human beings into 
subjects."23 The first theme in Foucault's work examined 
the "modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the 
status of sciences."24 Specifically, Foucault was 
concerned here with the ways in which the human sciences, 
which include biology, psychology, and the social sciences, 
create the subject as an object of classification and 
analysis, and hence, of social control. The second theme 
in Foucault's work explored "the objectivizing of the 
subject in...'dividing practices'.n2S Here, the focus is
23 Ibid., p. 208.
24 Ibid., p. 208.
25 Ibid., p. 208.
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on the ways the subject is divided "inside himself or 
divided from others."26 These dividing practices are part 
of institutional classification strategies in which the 
subject is divided between mad and sane, criminal and non­
criminal, normal and pathological, etc..27 Finally, 
Foucault, particularly in his late work, focused on "the 
way human beings turns him- or herself into a subject.”28 
The focus in this mode of inquiry is on the discursive 
practices in which human beings come to understand and 
enunciate their subjectivity. For Foucault, this 
discursive/power creation of a speaking subject (i.e., as a 
user of discourse) is best exemplified by various 
techniques associated with the religious or professional 
confessional. The first two processes are concerned with 
the different matrixes of power that produce a subject 
capable of being classified and manipulated. The third 
process is concerned with the historical creation of a 
speaking subject which is capable of creating, enunciating, 
and explaining his/her own "deep" subjectivity.
It is evident from Foucault's description of his work 
that his main object of examination is discourse. However, 
it is not discourse alone, but one which is enmeshed within
26 Ibid., p. 208.
27 In some ways this parrells Derrida's deconstruction 
of philosophical dicotomies in language, see Chapter 4 in 
this dissertation.
28 Foucault, "Afterword," 1983, p. 208.
146
complex power configurations or regimes. Like Levi- 
Strauss, who sought to explore "not how men think in myths, 
but how myths operate in men's minds," Foucault, despite 
important methodological differences from Levi-Strauss, 
sought to examine not how humans use discourse and power, 
but how discourse and power operate on humans.29 Foucault 
does not consider whether or not these discourse are true 
reflections of reality, rather he is concerned with how 
various discourses are used within specific power 
arrangements to create, classify, and transform humans into 
subjects. In the following discussion we will focus 
briefly on each of the three themes in Foucault's 
examination of the subject and how they contribute to 
Foucault's overall treatment of the subject.
In The Order of Things. Foucault tackles two related 
issues: the historical transformation of classification
schemas, schemata, and systems (epistemes) and the 
emergence of the human sciences.30 Specifically, Foucault 
is concerned with how these related issues produce a 
subject which can be the object of scientific 
classification and examination. In order to accomplish 
such an examination, Foucault employs one of his most
29 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. 
by John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), p. 12.
30 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. by (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1970).
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important early concepts, the episteme. Foucault defines
the episteme as,
...the total set of relations that unite, at a 
given period, the discursive practices that give 
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and 
possible formalized systems... its aim is not to 
reconstitute the system of postulates that governs 
all the branches of knowledge of a given period, but 
to cover an indefinite field of relations...the 
episteme makes it possible to grasp the set of 
constraints and limitations, which, at a given 
moment are imposed on discourse... 1
Epistemes mav be thought of as underlying codes of cultural
organization. These codes make certain types of knowledge
and cultural production possible.
Foucault argues that in the transformation from the
Renaissance, through the Classical Age, to Modernity we
have seen profound shifts in epistemes. The Classical
episteme (17th and 18th century) centered itself on
developing an "exhaustive ordering of the world."32 This
ordering worked towards "the discovery of simple elements
and their progressive combination..." At the "center they
form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system
contemporary with itself."33 The Classical age aimed at
the "project of constructing a universal method of analysis
which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering
representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the
31 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge. 1972, pp. 
191-92.
32 Foucault, The Order of Things. 1970, p. 74.
33 Ibid., p. 74.
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world... h34
However, Foucault's main concern is not with the
Classical episteme, but with the rise of the modern
episteme. According to Foucault, somewhere at the end of
the eighteenth century an important epistemic shift took
place. This epistemic shift began to order and classify
the world differently from the classical representational
episteme. The modern episteme removed representation from
the center of its system and replaced it with the human
being (man). It is at this point that "man becomes the
subject and the object of his own understanding."35
Foucault writes,
When natural history becomes biology, when the 
analysis of wealth becomes economics, when, above 
all, reflection upon language becomes philology, and 
Classical discourse...is eclipsed, then, in the 
profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, 
mem appears in his ambiguous position as an 
object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: 
enslaved sovereign, and object of knowledge...36
For Foucault, this "archeological mutation" marks the
beginning of modernity. Unlike the Classical episteme.
which ordered humans within a larger classification system.
the modern episteme depicted human beings as being the
center of knowledge. Humans become the core of knowledge.
The critical aspect of this epistemic upheaval was that
34 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 1982, p. 19.
35 Ibid., p. 28.
36 Foucault, Order of Things. 1970, p. 312.
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humans came to be viewed as being both a determined
empirical product and a knowing transcendental subject (cf.
the discussion of Condorcet in Chapter 2 and an earlier
discussion in this chapter). Foucault refers to this dual
ordering as the empirico-transcendental doublet:
Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange 
empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is 
a being such that knowledge will be attained in 
him of what renders all knowledge possible...
...The threshold of our modernity is situated not 
by the attempt to apply objective methods to the 
study of man, but rather by the constitution of an 
empirico-transcendental doublet which was called 
man.37
The empirico-transcendental doublet is the modern subject 
as we understand it today. He/she is seen as being an 
empirical outcome of structure but nevertheless capable of 
grasping his/her own true essence or nature within this 
structure.
According to Foucault, prior to the eighteenth-century 
"man did not exist."38 The human sciences could not have 
developed as they did without the construction of man-as- 
doublet. The framework provide by the modern episteme 
allowed the human sciences to emerge. Disciplines (and 
discourses) such as political economy, sociology, 
anthropology, psychoanalysis, criminology, and biology all 
emerged and operated within the framework provided by the 
modern order of things. Each discipline operating on the
37 Ibid., pp. 318-19.
38 Ibid., p. 344.
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dual view of the subject sought to create and establish a 
particular foundational view of humans. Each discipline 
sought to capture, describe, and explain what they felt was 
the true nature of being human. In doing so they each 
inscribed a certain definition of humans and created 
different variations on the modern empirical subject.
With the development of the modern episteme, the human 
sciences were given the idea of an empirical subject, which 
was capable of being understood by the transcendental 
subject. With the modern subject in place, the human 
sciences could begin the process of defining and labeling 
this newly acquired idea of man as object and subject. 
Paradoxicially, they located the subject within the 
empirical enviornment, yet preserve subjectivity as a 
priviledge means for access to this knowledge of the 
empirical.
Foucault saves some of his more critical remarks on 
the human sciences for his work, Discipline and 
Punishment.39 For Foucault, coercion and control go hand- 
in-hand with the rise and development of the objectifing 
human sciences. The human sciences provided the "serious 
discourse" which was used to coerce and transform the human 
being by new modalities of power. For Foucault, the birth 
of the human sciences are to be found in the "ignoble
39 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The 
Birth of the Prison, trans, by Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1977).
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archives, where the modern play of coercion over bodies,
gestures and behavior has its beginnings."40 The
institutions of power (hospitals, prisons, bureaucracies,
etc.) "needed new, more refined and operationalized
discourse and practices," which the human sciences were
capable of providing.41 Foucault writes,
I am not saying that the human sciences emerged 
from the prison. But, if they have been able to 
be formed and to produce so many profound changes 
in the episteme, it is because they have been 
conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: 
a certain policy of the body, a certain way of 
rendering the group of men docile and useful. This 
policy required the involvement of definite 
relations of knowledge in relations of power...42
Foucault is pointing out that the human sciences cannot
separate their generation of knowledge from the power
configurations of modern society. They are part of modern
technologies of discipline and control. Like Nietzsche,
Foucault would caution that "knowledge works as a tool of
power" therefore, "it increases with every increase of
power."43 The human sciences' schemes of classification
are completely involved in the various processes of
coercion and control. They operate within the space
provided by a certain thinking and policies about the body
40 Ibid., p. 191.
41 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 1983, p. 160.
42 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 305.
43 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. 1968, p. 266.
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and the mind.
Another aspect of Foucault's work on the subject, is 
presented in his works, Madness and Civilization and 
Discipline and Punishment.4* A substantial part of these 
works explore the "dividing practices" that have been 
employed in the social categorization and subsequent 
treatment of the subject. The dividing practices used by 
psychiatrists, social reformers, and policy and law makers, 
like the development of the human sciences, have extended 
and further refined the modern objectivization of the 
subj ect.
Foucault's work Discipline and Punishment is
subtitled, "the birth of the prison." However, the prison
is not Foucault's major concern. Foucault seeks to write,
a correlative history of the modern soul and of 
a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present 
scientifico-legal complex from which the power to 
punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, 
from which it extends its effects and by which it 
masks its exorbitant singularity.45
Foucault is concerned with the ways power and discourse
form configurations which produce what he calls "docile
bodies." These are bodies which are capable of being
molded by power (i.e., psychiatrists, social reformers,
44 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. by R. 
Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). Discipline and 
Punishment: The Birth of the Prison. 1977. Of these two 
works, we will discuss the latter as representative of 
Foucault's work of dividing practices.
45 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 23.
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police, etc.)* Here, Foucault is introducing or 
reintroducing a Nietzschian conception of the body. The 
Nietzschian body is not a biological entity. The 
Nietzschian body is a historical and social construction 
"embedded within a political field" and "subject to power 
relations which restrain it."46 It is a body capable of 
being altered, transformed, and reformed by power 
configurations. In Foucault's words, power relations 
"invest it (the body), mark it, train it, torture it, force 
it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit 
signs."47 Foucault refers to this relationship between 
power and the body as "bio-power." One of Foucault's 
primary missions is to show how the social control of the 
body or bio-power is made possible in modernity or within 
the modern episteme.
A crucial point must be made here. It is important to 
note that Foucault's examination of power and the body is a 
marked departure from traditional accounts (i.e., Marxist 
and Neo-Marxist). Those accounts rest on an understanding 
of sovereign power. Consequently, they generally see power 
as emanating from top levels of the stratification system, 
i.e., the state and bourgeoisie, and being used as a tool 
to control the masses. For Foucault, however, power is
46 Barry Smart, Foucault. Marxism and Critique 
(London: Unwin, 1983), p. 86.
47 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 25.
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omnipresent. It is a factor in every intellectual and 
policy consideration. Even the allegedly objective 
classification and treatment of the criminal conducted by 
experts and the legal system are shown to be in compliance 
with certain technologies of control (and also technologies 
of the self).
In addition to his concern for the creation of docile 
bodies, Foucault is concerned with the array of discourses 
and practices which make the modern control of the body 
possible. These discourses and practices serve as the 
underpinning for classification and exclusion of the 
"criminal" from the non-criminal. Foucault finds these 
origins in the modern forms of disciplinary technology 
(e.g., prisons, humanist reform, counseling, etc.). 
Disciplinary technologies operate directly on the body.
The body is open to power configurations. These 
configurations seek to forge a body "that may be subjected, 
used, transformed and improved....discipline makes 
individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that 
regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of 
its exercise."48 It is this disciplinary power which 
separates or organizes the criminal from the non-criminal 
and mandates different techniques to transform the criminal 
into the non-criminal.
48 Ibid., p. 136.
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Foucault argues in his late work, History of Sexuality, 
that our current understanding of sex and sexuality are 
modern inventions/9 According to Foucault, "We have had 
sexuality since the eighteenth century and sex since the 
nineteenth."50 Like, Foucault's conception of the 
historical body, this is a historically constituted 
sexuality. This is a modern sexuality which is capable of 
identification, classification, and control. In this 
instance, however, it is not simply the imposition of 
disciplinary technologies from "outside" but the willing, 
speaking subject who takes part, along with the expert, in 
the classification and control processes.
In this work on sex and sexuality, Foucault moves his 
focus away from what could be called the "external social 
forces" which create the subject to a different but related 
avenue of inquiry. This avenue explores the ways in which 
the individual sees his or herself as possessing 
subjectivity. In such related social practices as 
psychoanalysis and the confessional, it is the subject who 
must reach "deep within" and express some hidden deep truth 
about his or her own subjectivity— beyond the surface to 
the real. In the various confessional practices the
49 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 
I, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).
50 Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-77. ed. by C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 
p. 210-11.
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Iindividual learns to see himself or herself as a subject 
and cooperate in the enunciation of their subjectivity.
However, there are also important dynamics of power at
work in this creation of a speaking subject. Certain
institutions have induced the subject to create and speak
its subjectivity. It is within such an environment of
power that "Western man becomes a confessing animal."51
Foucault writes:
The confession has spread its effects far and wide.
It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, 
family relationships, and love relations...One 
confesses in public and in private, to one's parents, 
one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves; 
one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, 
things it would Le impossible to tell to anyone 
else, the things people write books about. One 
confesses— or is forced to confess. When it is not 
spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, 
the confession is wrung from a person by violence 
or threat.52
For Foucault, "the confession gives certain needs to the 
soul and renders it a specific nature."53 Church 
practitioners and various sex professionals have given the 
individual his or her essence, which must be apprehended by 
both the investigator and the individual.
For Foucault, the reasons for the insistence on 
individual confession is a recognition by the experts that
51 Foucault, History of Sexuality. 1980, p. 59.
52 Ibid., p. 59.
53 Paul Wapner, "What's Left: Marx, Foucualt, and 
Contemporary Problems of Social Change." Praxis 
International, 9, 1989, p. 97.
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the self is a protector of some "deep truth." Particularly
for Foucault, sex in the modern era has been seen as one of
the key sites of this deep truth. The subject, through the
aid of an expert, could gain access to this site of truth
and render it up for explication and examination. In
modernity sex became a matter of truth. Foucault writes,
The essential point is that sex was not only a 
matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and taboo, 
but also of truth and falsehood, that the truth of 
sex became something fundamental, useful, or dangerous, 
precious or formidable: in short, that sex was 
constituted as the problem of truth.54
The nineteenth century gave us the "interplay of truth and
sex."55 Beginning in this period the subject was seen as
the harbinger of a great secret which was the foundation of
his or her being. This great secret was capable of
rendering knowledge about the deep self and humanity if it
was "spoken in time to the proper party and by the person
who was both the hearer of it and the one responsible for
it..."56 The individual became at once the object of
expert discourse and the subject of his/her self-created
subjectivity. The ironic aspect of this treatment of
sexuality is in "having us believe that our liberation is
in the balance."57 Once the individual, through the help
54 Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 1980, p. 56.
55 Ibid., p. 57.
56 Ibid., p. 67.
57 Ibid., p. 159.
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of an expert interpreter, brought forth the hidden truth,
the door was open to enlightenment, self-understanding, and
in the end, self-improvement (and an endless array of T.V.
talkshows). However, for Foucault what this reveals is
more reliance upon mechanisms of social control or
expertization.
Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a 
thing one administered. It was in the nature of a 
public potential; it called for management procedures; 
it had to be taken charge of by analytic discourses.
In the eighteenth century, sex became a police 
matter...an ordered maximization of collective and 
individual forces...58
When "sex became a police matter," new forms of discursive
and practical controls were put in place to manage sex.
Government bureaucracies arose to deal with issues of
reproduction. Experts on sexuality emerged to translate
the deep truths and to develop appropriate social policy
which could regulate and channel it. Meanwhile, the
individual was given the narrative tools for the
classification and control of his or her body. The
individual had learned to see himself or herself as a
subject capable of being the harbinger of deep truths. The
subject became an accomplice in his or her own creation,
classification, and management.
What is the outcome of Foucault's examination of the 
modern subject? Perhaps it is best summarized by 
Foucault's observations that "man is an invention of recent
58 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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date. And one perhaps nearing its end."59 Foucault even 
went as far to "wager that nan would be erased, like a face 
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."60 Despite the 
apocalyptic anti-humanist tone of these statements,
Foucault is not forecasting the end of the human race. 
Rather, he is pointing to the subject as an unstable and 
contingent product of a specific cultural and historical 
episteme or an "order of things." For Foucault, the 
subject (man) is a historical creation. The subject, as a 
personality type and a social datum for examination, is a 
product of a particular episteme. More specifically and 
crucially, it is the outcome of a particular discursive 
strategy and power configuration. The empirico- 
transcendental subject of modernity is but part of 
particular "order of things." In the same way that the 
Classical episteme gave way to the Modern episteme, soon 
that latter system which placed man at its center will fade 
away and with it the idea of the subject.61
In chapter 2, we explored how modernity placed two 
conceptualization of the subject at its center: the
Cartesian and the Rousseauian. Like other counter-modern 
thinkers we have examined, Foucault seeks to show how both
59 Foucault, The Order of Things. 1970, p. 387.
60 Ibid., p. 387.
61 Although Foucault rarely uses the term postmodern, 
this seems to be what he has in mind as a replacement for 
the modern order of things.
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are illusions. However, he proceeds in a somewhat 
different manner. The Cartesian self, which sought to 
bring all objects before the investigating subject, is 
shown not to be ahistorical or universalistic but as part 
of a particular historically-constituted "order of things" 
which places man at its center. Likewise, the deep 
Rousseauian self is shown not to be a vital, untapped realm 
of knowledge, but something that is created and imposed by 
certain disciplinary power arrangements and technologies. 
Instead of history as a litany of humanistic progress or as 
the unfolding of the human spirit, Foucault gives us a 
historical journey wrapped in new forms of discipline. For 
Foucault, humanity does not walk from the darkness of 
traditional authority and oppression into the light of 
enlightenment and freedom, but is continuously surrounded 
by various new forms of coercion and social and self 
control. Western society continues to erect self-trapping 
illusions advanced as realities.
Pop Art. Authenticity, and the Subject 
So far, we have been primarily concerned with 
postmodernism as it is manifested in theory and philisophy. 
This may give the impression that what is labeled 
postmodern is merely an intellectual discursive activity 
occurring in the discipline of philosophy or academia in 
general. However, many of the ideas of postmodern thought
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can be found in other areas of contemporary cultural 
production. In this section, we will extend the discussion 
of postmodernism beyond academic discourse into the arena 
of cultural production. Here, we will address how the 
phenomenon of pop art, which has been part of the Western 
art scene since the 1960's, may be seen as part of the 
larger postmodern movement. Specifically, we are concerned 
with how pop art and so-called post-pop art approach the 
related issues of authenticity and authorship.62 Pop art, 
like the discourses in linguistics, post-structuralism, and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, contribute in unique ways to the 
postmodern project of decenterina the subject.
The pop art phenomenon can trace some of its roots to 
the Dadaist Movement of early twentieth-century culture. 
Part of the Dadaist artistic and theoretical project was to 
take everyday artifacts from industrial production and use 
them as items of art and artistic contemplation. Two 
outcomes of the Dadaist's artistic experiment, which were 
incorporated by pop art, were a blurring of the distinction 
between art and non-art and a questioning of the role of 
the artist in art production.
In the wake of World War II, a related artistic 
ideology and method to Dadaism resurfaced. During the 
1950's the term "pop art" was coined by the British critic
62 For a discussion of post-pop art see, Paul Taylor, 
Post-Poo Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989).
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ILawrence Alloway to refer to "a group of artists interested 
in redeeming popular culture."63 Artists such as Roy 
Lichtenstein, Robert Watts, Andy Warhol, and Claus 
Oldenburg began incorporating images and signs from popular 
culture into the realm of so-called "high" or "serious" 
art. In the most celebrated cases, Lichtenstein used comic 
strips while Warhol used soup cans and Marilyn Monroe silk 
screens as part of artistic creation. In the pop art of 
Lichtenstein and Warhol "images from mass culture, regarded 
as vulgar, unworthy of an aesthetic consecration, returned 
virtually unaltered as materials of the artist's 
activity."64 By treating commodities of capitalist 
production as items of art, the pop-artists began restating 
important questions concerning authenticity, authorship, 
and the nature of art itself.65 Within the pod scheme, 
the artist did not have to accept the romantic mythology of 
the isolated, alienated, creative genius to be classified 
as an artist. Nor did art have to be seen as the
63 Carol Anne Mahsun, Pod Art and the Critics (Ann 
Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1987), p. 5.
64 Roland Barthes in Paul Taylor's, Post-Pop Art.
1989, p. 22.
65 The commercial nature of Warhol's art led the 
Canadian government to impose a merchandise duty on some of 
his sculptures that were to be shown in a Toronto gallery. 
According to the Canadian National Review Act only original 
sculpture or replicas were to be imported duty free. Cf., 
Jay Walz, "Canada Rules Out Boxes as 'Art': Creations by 
Warhol Held as 'Merchandise' Subject to Duty," The New York 
Times, March 9th, 1965.
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Iproduction of something original and authentic to be viewed 
as art.66 The artists could take the role of the pop 
celebrity and art could be created with the aid of 
photographs, reprints, reproduced material, and copying 
procedures.
After a period of decline, the pop art movement began 
to resurface in the 1980's as "the most influential 
movement in the contemporary art world."67 Under the 
label, neo-pop, post-pop, or simply postmodern, artist 
began to incorporate more of the images and technological 
methods used in the pop art of the 1960's. With the 
introduction of new technologies, such as the copying 
machine and the personal computer, into society and art 
production, questions reemerged with regard to authorship 
and authenticity. Some artists, such as Barbara Kruger, 
have used the new technologies to challenge directly the 
traditional notions of authenticity, representation, and 
authorship. Kruger has described part of her artistic 
strategy as deconstructing "the notion of being a great
66 The style employed by the pop artists was not well 
received by those accustomed to traditional notions of art 
and the role of the artist. Writing in the early 1960's, 
the art critic Max Kozloff labeled pop artists as the "new 
vulgarians,” who share a "common concern with the problems 
of the commercial image, popular culture, and metaphysical 
disgust." Max Kozloff, "Pop Culture, Metaphysical Disgust, 
and the New Vulgarians," Art International 6, 1962, pp. 34- 
36.
67 Paul Taylor, Post-Pop Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1989), p. 11.
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artist."68 Like the first generation of pop artists,
Kruger seeks to call into question the modern reliance on 
the genius, self-mastering artist and his/her production of 
"original art." She attempts, in her words, "to ruin 
certain representations, to displace the subject and to 
welcome a female spectator into the audience of men.”69 
Kruger's artistic strategy is to use "images from published 
sources and to add texts to them."70 By using copies from 
existing sources and superimposing messages on them, Kruger 
confuses the notions of art-as-representation and 
undermines the idea of the creative, self-reflecting, and 
autonomous artist. If art can arrange and use already 
produced material, the idea of art cannot be viewed as an 
"original representation." Essentially, it is and can only 
be a representation of a representation, a point made in 
semiotics. Futhermore, if the artist can be simply an 
arranger of existing sources, the view of the artists as 
"creative genius" cannot be theoretically sustained. In 
terms of our discussion, it can be said that the 
Rousseauian inspired source of deep truth or creativity is 
replaced by a more postmodern conceptualization.
For pop-art and other forms of postmodern expression,
68 Barbara Kruger quoted in Margot Lovejoy, Postmodern 
Currents: Art and Artists in the Age of Electronic Media 
(Ann Arborm MI: UMI Press, 1989), p. 113.
69 Ibid., p. 111.
70 Ibid., p. 111.
165
the artist cannot have, or be perceived as having, a 
privileged position in the production of cultural 
artifacts. The postmodern artists is simply arranging 
previously produced images and signs in a particular 
manner. What emerges from this is an aesthetic of 
"simulated authorship, in which ideas of originality and 
repetition, authenticity and theft are teased out to their 
problematic limits."71
Walter Benjamin in his essay, "The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction" captured the importance of 
the relationship between technological change and art when 
he wrote,
...Mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of 
art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To 
an ever greater degree, the work of art reproduced 
becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. 
From a photographic negative, for example, one can 
make any number of prints; to ask for the *authentic' 
print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion 
of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic 
production, the total function of art is reversed. 
Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be 
based on another practice— politics.72
For Benjamin, changes in technology led to changes in the
productional rationale and organization of art. It would
make little sense to question postmodern artists such as
71 Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An 
Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary (New York: 
Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989), p. 95.
72 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed., by Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 224, emphasis 
added.
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Kruger, Lichtenstein, Warhol, and others on issues of the
authenticity and authorship of their art. These are
questions which only have meaning within the modern
organization of artistic production. As Benjamin noted,
"the presence of an original is the prerequisite to the
concept of authenticity."73 Postmodern artist's use of
previously produced material in the construction of art
makes the questions of authorship and authenticity
unanswerable or simply, meaningless. If art can be
produced by pushing a button on a copying machine or a
personal computer, it can no longer be perceived as being
an authentic outcome of a creative author. Art moves from
being a righteous ritual, which relies on prescribed
procedures, precedent, and codes of conduct, to a political
matter, where the emphasis is placed on the management of
artistic production, promotion, and consumption (cf. the
promotional personality of Warhol). In Benjamin's terms,
art loses its cult value and is replaced by an exhibition
value. Describing this process, David Roberts writes,
Technical reproduction destroys the unique aura of 
the art of the past by alienating the reproduced from 
its context, by breaking it from the matrix of
tradition The whole function of art is thereby
revolutionized. The liberation of the art of the past 
from the alienation function of magic and religious 
representation (cultic value) and aesthetic self- 
representation (authenticity) frees art for its
73 Ibid., p. 220.
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new function.74
This new function described by Roberts is determined to a 
great degree by the politics of mass production and 
consumption.
Benjamin's linking of art and technological change 
provides important insight into the sociological background 
of postmodern art. However, it does not provide us with a 
description of the affirmative and ironic attitude of many 
postmodern artists. Whereas Benjamin, as a critical 
theorist, laments the movement away from reliance upon 
authenticity and authorship, many postmodern artists 
welcome and celebrate the demise of this reliance. For the 
postmodern artist, the emphasis of modern art on 
authenticity and authorship are artistic representatives of 
erroneous and out-dated philosophical and artistic 
principles. To call or search for authenticity requires 
the artists to assume a privileged position in cultural 
production. Postmodernists deny this privileged position 
(or any privileged position, cf. the Derridean revolt 
against linguistically based conceputal hierachies) and the 
accompanying search for authenticity.
74 David Roberts, "The Museum and Montage," in Theory, 
Culture and Society, 5, 1988, p. 549-50, emphasis added.
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Summary
In this chapter, we have examined the process of the 
decentering of the subject. As we have seen the 
decentering process can take different forms. While each 
area discussed— psychoanalysis, genealogy, and pop-art— has 
certain idiosyncrasies in its appraisal of the modern 
subject, a thread of continuity can be glimpsed in 
comparison. The thread revealed is best summarized by the 
idea that the modern subject is a social and cultural 
construct. For Lacan and Foucault, there are no first 
principles of the subject which can serve as a basis for 
knowledge or as a foundation for human sciences.
The dual nature of the subject described by Freud, 
leads to the conclusion that the metaphysical subject of 
philosophy cannot be the sole condition for rationality and 
knowledge. In Lacan's writings, it is revealed how the 
Freudian inspired search for a foundational human nature is 
itself misplaced. In Foucault's writing, we see how the 
subject is a creation of discursive and power 
configurations. Finally, in pop art we see how the modern 
idea of the authenticity and artistic creativity are 
becoming outdated with changes in art, society, and 
technology. These propositions, taken together, reveal the 
postmodern ethos that the subject is a complex, socio­
culturally, constructed anthropomorphism. For 
postmodernists, this recognition may symbolize the final
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phase of the modern subject and the dethroning of the 
modern human being as the center of Western philosophy.
The decentering of the subject also provides a space for 
counter-modern social movements, such as feminism, to 
develop an ideology of liberation.
In the forthcomming chapter, we will take-up the 
relationship between rationality, historical change, and 
emancipation. This seemly inherent relationship is another 
central battle ground between modernists and 
postmodernists. Specifically, we will discuss how 




THE CRITIQUE OF RATIONALITY, PROGRESS, AND EMANCIPATION
In the previous chapter, we sought to illustrate how 
the critique of subjectivity is an important element of the 
postmodern framework. Here, we will explore a related 
topic: Some of the twentieth century's discontentments
with the Enlightenment's closely-related notions of 
rationality, progress, and emancipation. We will begin 
with an exploration of the twentieth-century disenchantment 
with both Enlightenment and Marxist theories of 
evolutionary change (i.e., liberalism and socialism). In 
that section, we will explore the works of Walter Benjamin, 
T. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. We will specifically focus 
on Adorno and Horkheimer's, Dialectic of Enlightenment as 
paradigmatic of the disenchantment with these views of 
emancipation. We will followed this with a discussion of 
the recent debate between Juergen Habermas and Jean- 
Francois Lyotard on the possibilities and limitations of 
rationality in contemporary epistemology and emancipatory 
politics. Finally, we will explore the attitude towards 
the past and historical change that is exemplified in so- 
called postmodern architecture. Here, we will examine how 
postmodern architecture attempts to break with the 
progressive style of modernism's International Style of 
Architecture through the use of an ironic historicism. We
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will conclude this chapter with a discussion of the 
political outcomes of the death of archetypical theories of 
human emancipation.
In a statement which captures part of the socio­
political rebellion against the Enlightenment's liking of 
rationality, progress, and emancipation, C. Wright Mills 
wrote in 1959,
Our major orientations— liberalism and socialism—  
have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations 
of the world and of ourselves. These two 
ideologies came out of The Enlightenment, and 
they have had in common many assumptions and 
values. In both, increased rationality is held 
to be the prime condition of increased freedom.
The liberating notion of progress by reason, the 
faith in science as an unmixed good, the demand 
for popular education and the faith in its 
political meaning for democracy— all these ideals 
of The Enlightenment have rested upon the happy 
assumption of the inherent relation of reason 
and freedom.1
For Mills, and other social and cultural theorists of the 
twentieth century, many of the Enlightenment's important 
doctrines have become indefensible, untenable, or simply 
exhausted. Central among these exhausted doctrines is the 
idea of teleological historical change or "progress" (cf. 
the discussion of Condorcet in Chapter 2). This doctrine 
was accompanied by an "evolutionary optimism" which 
enthusiastically embraced reason and rationality as the 
vehicles through which history moved and humanity obtained 
emancipation and freedom. In the aesthetic, political, and
1 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 166.
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scientific realms, reason was seen as the force that would 
shatter the irrational features of traditional society. 
With the destruction of tradition and its political and 
religious barbarism, emancipation would finally be 
realized.
As discussed earlier, for an Enlightenment 
philosopher, such as Condorcet, the capacity for "the 
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite."2 By employing 
the power of rationality and science, the emerging 
enlightened society could free itself both from the dogmas 
of traditional knowledge and the confines of traditional 
authority. With this cognitive and political emancipation 
would come moral development and ultimately the perfection 
of the individual and society. Subsequent historical 
developments (e.g., the proliferation of war, the 
environment crisis, etc.) have made the Enlightenment's 
conclusions about evolutionary progress and resulting 
emancipation untenable. They no longer seem to corespond 
with "socio-political reality." In the view of Robert 
Wallace,
*Progress' is no longer the watchword, the 
unquestionable beneficial goal and process that it 
once was in the United States and the West....
It is no longer only *counter-cultural' types 
who doubt the possibility or even the meaning of 
progress.... For many of us 'progress' has thus 
become another name for the steamroller of
2 Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical 
Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. by J. 
Barraclough (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 4.
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history— a steamroller which it now seems may 
only stop when it has obliterated its 'drivers' 
as well as everything else.3
As this statement indicates, today there is a tendency to
see progress and rationality as mutually exclusive
catagories. The "lessons of history" found in the World
Wars, National Socialism, the environmental crisis, and
countless other episodes and events of the twentieth
century, make Condorcet's and other similar optimistic
forecasts of moral perfectibility and emancipation through
rationality highly problematic.
The inherent relationship between rationality and 
progress is more than an idea fostered by the 
Enlightenment. It is a complex belief system that appears 
in many different forms throughout modern Western culture. 
For the sake of the discussion to follow, we will break 
this belief system into two types. These types, while 
closely related, may be differentiated on the basis of 
their locus of social change. First, are views of history 
that promote a supra-historical philosophy to explain 
socio-historical change. Often these views see social 
change in terms of transcendent factors, such as the 
manifestation of a subterranean rationality or human 
spirit, as in Hegelian philosophy. Generally, these 
philosophies relate change to some metaphysical or
3 Robert Wallace, "Progress, Secularization and 
Modernity: The Lowith-Blumenberg Debate." The New German 
Critique, 22, 1981, p. 63.
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Ispiritual unfolding of trapped human potentiality. In 
other words, humanity or history are thought to have an 
inherent logic waiting for release. Related to these 
supra-historical philosophies, are theories in the social 
sciences which see historical change as the evolution of 
society towards higher or more complex forms. These views 
have appeared in the form of Comtian and Parsonian 
evolutionary theory, Marxist accounts of social change, 
Neo-Marxist accounts, such as Habermasian communicative 
evolution, and various theories of socio-economic 
development. As a tendency, these theories argue that 
societal and technological complexity are becoming more 
finely tuned or advanced with the refinement of rationally 
constructed knowledge. Seen in terms of an evolutionary 
process, societies or historical periods can then be 
evaluated by the degree or level of scientific or societal 
rationality present.
What differentiates these sociological theories from 
their philosophical counterparts is where they place the 
locus of change. In the social sciences the locus is to be
found in the phylogenetic characteristics of the social,
while in the philosophical it is to be found in some
metaphysical potentiality. However, despite discrepancies,
both of the above versions of historical change have two 
things in common. First of all, both of these theories 
assume that modernity or civil society mark an important
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step in the eventual emancipation of humanity. Secondly, 
both accept the idea that history is a unified, linear, 
totality, with inherent meaning. These versions of change 
forge the events of history into a totality where stages 
follow one another in progressive succession, as in most 
traditional historiography.4
He will begin with a dicussion of Adorno and 
Horheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The Dialectic of Enlightenment
Marx's historical materialism attempted to temper 
bourgeois culture's unequivocal optimism in civil society 
as the fulfillment of an inherent historical logic.
However, Marxist theory did not completely distance itself 
from this doctrine and its framework. In place of 
bourgeois culture's reliance upon idealistic models of 
societal evolution, Marxism substituted a "materialistic 
conception of history."5 This, however, was done while 
retaining many of bourgeois theory's teleological features. 
Essentially, dialectical theory took "seriously the utopian 
promises of bourgeois philosophy, but shows that capitalist
4 There are of course exceptions to this linear 
historiography. Specifically, cyclical theories of social 
change, cf. Oswald Spengler, Today and Destiny: Excerpts 
from The Decline of the West of Oswald Soenqler. ed. by 
E.F.Daking (New York: Norton, 1940).
5 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, trans. by M. Dobb (London: International 
Publishers, 1970), p. 220.
176
class societies nust structurally fail to fulfill then."6 
For Marx, history was leading somewhere, but the ultimate 
manifestation was not to be found in capitalist society or 
bourgeois culture. Communism would mark the completion of 
the dialectical movement of history. It would be the final 
stage in historical development, not bourgeois civil 
society.
For many Marxist-inspired writers of the twentieth- 
century, the theory of a dialectical movement of history 
culminating in world communism, did not successfully 
distance itself from the "naive optimism" in rationality 
that was evident in bourgeois thought. For these writers, 
the Marxist philosophy of historical evolution, did not 
lead to an equitable society and emancipation, but to a 
Weberian iron cage administered by a technocratic 
instrumental rationality.
Walter Benjamin's 1940 essay, "Theses on the 
Philosophy of History," is representative of the growing 
disenchantment many twentieth century Marxists experienced 
with Marx's evolutionary theory and its political 
embodiment in various working class movements. The theses, 
written shortly before his suicide while attempting to flee 
Nazi occupied France, sought to analyze the problems
6 Stephan Fuchs, The Loalflcation of History: A 
Critique of Neoevolutionist Thought. Unpublished 
Manuscript, University of California at Riverside, March, 
1986, p. 186.
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inherent in Marxist and vulgar Marxist historical theory.7
For Benjamin,
nothing has corrupted the German working class so 
much as the notion that it was moving with the 
current. It regarded technological developments 
as the stream with which it thought it was moving.
From there it was but a step to the illusion that 
factory work which was supposed to tend toward 
technological progress constituted a political 
achievement.8
The German workers had been misled by the linking of the 
historical mission of the working class with bourgeois 
society's adherence to technological "progress." For many 
socialist groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, work was viewed as the "savior of modern 
times."9 Within this Marxist-inspired view, labor was 
seen as the primary mechanism of historical evolution.
Labor was also the force which would be eventually 
responsible for emancipation and socio-political 
fulfillment. Technological progress, made possible by 
labor, was seen as an irresistible force, propelling all of 
humankind towards historical perfection. While Marx did 
distinguish "necessary" from "free labor,” critics believed 
it, nevertheless, collapsed all meaningful human action 
under the label of "homo laborans." In other words, labor 
was seen as the true human quality. As a result of this
7 In Walter Benjamin's, Illuminations, trans. by 
Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969, pp. 253-264.
8 Ibid., p. 258.
9 Josef Dietzgen, quoted in Ibid, p. 259.
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overemphasis on labor as the center of meaning, Marxist 
theory and the labor movements associated with it had 
inadvertently leveled the distinctions between 
technological advancement and human emancipation. 
Technological development became the vehicle of personal 
and group emancipation.
The linking of the historical destiny of the working 
class with the logic of progress was made possible by what 
Benjamin believed was a fatal flaw in Marxist or "vulgar" 
Marxist theory. Marxist theory had failed to critique and 
successfully differentiate itself from bourgeois cultural 
rational mastery and domination of nature. Vulgar Marxist 
theory,
recognizes only the progress in the mastery of nature, 
not the retrogression of society; it already displays 
the technocratic features later encountered in 
Fascism. Among these is a conception of nature which 
differ ominously from the one in the Socialist utopias 
before the 1848 revolution. The new conception of 
labor amounts to the exploitation of nature, which 
with naive complacency is contrasted with exploitation 
of the proletariat.10
What the labor movement did not realize was that it was a
very short step from the Enlightenment's emphasis on the
mastery of nature to the mastery and control of workers, it
is an age of Weberian rationalization so-to-speak. The
Enlightenment's goal of bringing the mysteries of nature
under the control of rationality, science, and technology
were easily transferable to the human condition. For both
10 Ibid., p. 259.
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the bourgeoisie and the Marxists, the progress of 
rationality and science were "something boundless, in 
keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind."11 
This proved to be a fatal error for Marxism's theory of 
emancipation for it "bypasses the question of how its 
(capitalist society) products might benefit the workers 
while still not being at their disposal."12
Benjamin's pessimistic appraisal of Marxist historical 
theory and its practical embodiment provided part of the 
inspiration for the critique of the Enlightenment found in 
Adorno and Horkheimer's 1944 work, The Dialectic of 
Enliahtenment. In this work, Adorno and Horkheimer take up 
and expand Benjamin's reappraisal of the Enlightenment's 
and Marxism's happy relation of rationality and progress. 
With Fascism as a historical backdrop and Nietzsche and 
Weber as theoretical guides, Adorno and Horkheimer seek a 
total reevaluation of the legacy of Enlightenment 
rationality. Their self described goal was "the discovery 
of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human 
condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism."13
For Adorno and Horkheimer, like Benjamin before them, 
the regression so evident in contemporary society was but
11 Ibid., p. 260.
12 Ibid., p. 259.
13 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of 
Enliahtenment. trans. by J. Cumming (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1972), p. xi.
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Ithe working out of the very logic contained within 
bourgeois Enlightenment rationality. In the Enlightenment 
"the submission of everything natural to the autocratic 
subject finally culminates in the mastery of the blindly 
objective and natural.nU The submission of the natural 
to the all-knowing subject "condemns the spirit to 
increasing darkness" (cf. Weber's "iron cage").15 As a 
result, "the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster 
triumphant."16
The origins of the disaster of the Enlightenment was to
be 'found in its orientation towards knowledge and control
of the world. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Bacon's essay "In
Praise of Human Knowledge" was paradigmatic of the
Enlightenment's relation of knowledge and power.
Despite his lack of mathematics, Bacon's view was 
appropriate to the scientific attitude that prevailed 
after him. The concordance between the mind of man 
and the nature of things that he had in mind is 
patriarchal: the human mind, which overcomes 
superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted 
nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles; 
neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance 
with the world's rulers.17
As the rational human mind seeks to develop a concordance
between itself and nature, it eventually succeeds in
bringing the world under its autocratic gaze and control.
14 Ibid., p. xvi.
15 Ibid., p. xiv.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 4, emphasis added.
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Furthermore, as the rational mind seeks to overcome myth 
and superstition, its growing power permits an unrestricted 
domination, not only of nature, but ultimately of self and 
others. What began as the rational mastery and control of 
nature through science and technology eventually becomes an 
omnipresent rationality which reifies and dominates 
everything it encounters— it is extended to all human 
endeavors.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, a key aspect of the 
Enlightenment's paternalistic rationality is its 
manifestation in and control of technology (e.g., the 
merger of science and capatalistic production). Within the 
logic of the Enlightenment, technology becomes "the essence 
of knowledge."18 This technology progresses not "by 
concepts and images," but through the "exploitation of 
others."19 "What men want to learn from nature is how to 
use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men."20 
Technology makes this control of nature and humans 
possible. The violence of rationally constructed knowledge 
and its technological manifestation becomes the standard 
through which modernity measures societal advancement.
A further central aspect of the Enlightenment, which 
was an outgrowth of its ruthless appropriation of nature,
18 Ibid., P- 4.
19 Ibid., P- 4.
20 Ibid., P- 4.
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was its tendency to pull all outer or unknown realms into 
its analytic gaze and manipulative rationality. As a 
result, all that "does not conform to the rule of 
computation and utility is suspect."21 Like Odysseus' 
encounter with the Sirens, where self preservation is the 
only protection against the seduction of the mytho-poetic 
past, modern rationality has constructed a representational 
world which is as alienating as it is liberating. From the 
perspective of rationality, all unknown realms must first 
be represented in order to be repressed. For Adorno and 
Horkheimer,
Men have always had to choose between their 
subjection to nature or the subjection of nature 
to the Self. With the extension of the bourgeois 
commodity economy, the dark horizon of myth 
is illuminated by the sun of calculating reason, 
beneath whose cold rays the seed of the new 
barbarism grows to fruition. Under the pressure 
of domination human labor always led away from 
myth— but under domination always returns to the 
jurisdiction of myth.22
Bourgeois society, with its doctrine of instrumental
rational self-preservation and its belief in technological
progress, is the seed of a new barbarism which is harsher
than the allegedly mythical world it sought to overcome.
Human labor under domination leads away from traditional
myth, but domination must inevitably resort to mvth to
21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 32. As Dostoevsky has said, "man 
continues to be moved by myth, miracle, and authority"— and 
mostly in that order.
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support its appropriation of Dover. Under this system of 
power and domination, progress becomes regression and 
enlightenment becomes myth.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, this is not the story of 
how the Enlightenment went wrong, but the story of the 
unfolding of its intrinsic logic.23 In equating knowledge 
with the subject's domination of nature through technology, 
the Enlightenment "is as totalitarian as any system."24 
As such, "myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment 
reverts to mythology."25 The Enlightenment did not 
inadvertently veer from the course of reason and 
emancipation, these were but mythical constructs to cover 
its naked appropriation of power. These mythical 
constructs were the price humanity paid for a disenchanted, 
de-magicalized world stripped of meaning by an overly 
exuberant rationality.
In his late work, Negative Dialectics. Adorno 
declares, "No universal history leads from savagery to 
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb."26 This "retrogressive
23 As we shall see in our discussion of Habermas, this 
is the critical difference between the first and second 
generation of critical theorists.
24 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. 1972, p. 24.
25 Ibid., p. xvi.
26 Theodore Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by 
E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury, 1973), p. 320.
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anthropogenesis," as Paul Connerton has phrased it, is 
consistent with, and in many ways summarizes, the general 
outlook of the Dialectic of Enlightenment.27 What was 
triumphant modernity for the French Philosophes and Hegel, 
was tragic modernity for Adorno and Horkheimer. As such, 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment, along with Weber's 
discussion of the iron cage, can be included among the 
important works that was part of the reevaluation of what 
was generally the taken-for-granted association of 
rationality, progress, and emancipation. Today, this 
position is perhaps best summarized by Octavio Paz's 
statement,
We used to believe that revolution, transformed into 
universal science, was the key to history, the magical 
command which would open the doors of the prison 
to which humanity had been held from the very 
beginning. Now we know that the key does not open 
the doors: it closes them tight shut.28
In the next section, we will take-up Habermas' 
appraisal of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the 
Enlightenment and a similar orientation in post- 
structualist philosophy.
27 Paul Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment: an 
Essav on the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 114.
28 Octavio Paz quoted in Serge Moscovici, Questions 
for the Twenty-first Century," Theory, Culture and Society, 
1990, 7, p. 6,
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Communicative Rationality or Incommensurable 
Language Games; The Habermas/Lvotard Debate
Juergen Habermas has been called the "last great 
rationalist"— a title which is either negative or positive 
depending upon the position of the person doing the 
labeling. Habermas is either the last hope to preserve the 
Enlightenment's goals of reason and emancipation or the 
defender of an outdated mode of thinking and theorizing.
For many, Habermas' social theory holds the promise for a 
reconstruction of the Enlightenment's ideals of reason. 
progress, and emancipation. For those loyal to Habermas, 
what his theory provides is a socially constituted or 
normative basis for rendering social critique. Those who 
support his project believe that without such a basis for 
grounding and legitimizing critique, no vision of 
emancipation is possible.29 We are therefore doomed to 
face a world of incommensurablity, undecidability, and 
indefensible domination.
Habermas' attempts the reconstruction of the 
Enlightenment ideals of reason, progress, and emancipation 
through what he refers to as the "theory of communicative 
action."30 Habermas agrees with other contemporary
29 For a sympathetic reading of Habermas Cf. Richard 
J. Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism: Science. 
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
30 Cf. Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, 
trans. by Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972), and 
The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. l, trans. by T.
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critics of the Enlightenment that given the theoretical 
revelations of the twentieth century we can no longer 
accept a correspondence theory of truth and a denotative 
theory of language. In other words, we can no longer 
accept the traditional rationalist argument that theory 
captures and language reports unmediated reality. This 
being the case, we can no longer appeal to a foundational 
metaphysics or "first principle" to legitimate a discourse 
and its truth claims. However for Habermas, the demise of 
the correspondence theory of truth and foundational 
metaphysics does not mean we are foundationless. There 
remain certain everyday structures and rules embedded in 
linguistical practices and speech acts that define and 
legitimate all discursive activities. In other words, 
language and speech are not just mediums for the conveyance 
of ideas they have a normative function. This revelation 
makes the quest for a foundational critique possible.
For Habermas, the communicative rules of everyday 
validity claims always appeal to a normative rationality 
for legitimation (i.e., the stength of the better 
argument). Verbal utterances and discourses must appeal to 
this normative context to be socially legitimate. In 
drawing on this normative background, the individual 
speaker is evaluated in regard to his/her level of 
communicative competence. These rules embedded in
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
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communicative action make the quest for truth through
consensus a normative framework that guide all speech acts.
In Habermas' words,
actions regulated by norms, expressive self- 
presentations, and also evaluative expressions, 
supplement constative speech acts in constituting 
a communicative practice which, against the 
background of a lifeworld, is oriented to achieving, 
sustaining, and renewing consensus...The rationality 
inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that 
a communicatively achieved agreement must be based 
in the end on reasons.31
Essentially, communicative rationality serves as a "court
of appeal" for the settlement of validity claims. If the
discursive arena is free from the distortions of power,
self-interest, and ignorance, then open communication and
reason are possible. Under these "ideal speech"
conditions, truth claims can be settled by appealing to the
background of a particular discursive community. This
being the case, truth becomes what is agreed upon under
these conditions of "ideal speech." In other words, truth
is that which is obtained through consensus. Truth is a
conversationally dependent and normative principle. As a
consequence, truth does not have to be grounded in some
type of "first principle" or foundational metaphysics. The
affirmation of truth is already given in the potentiality
of communication.
In order for Habermas' theory of communicative action 
to be more than simply a sophisticated type of utopian
31 Habermas, Ibid., p. 17.
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idealism, it must, within the rationalist tradition, ground 
itself in a (scientific) theory of society. With this in 
mind, Habermas promotes his theory as a foundation for a 
neo-evolutionist theory of social change. For Habermas, 
preceding evolutionary theories, specifically Marx's,
Weber's, and Parson's, fail to draw a distinction between 
the systems (i.e., institutional) rationalization of the 
state and economy and the rationalization of lifeworlds.
Unlike systems rationalization, rationalization of the 
lifeworld does not entail the progressive application of 
instrumental rationality. Lifeworld rationalization is 
similar to the learning process that occurs in the 
development of the individual. Using Piaget, Kohlberg, and 
other developmental psychologists as models, Habermas 
argues that lifeworlds evolve on the basis of a "societal 
learning process."32 Central to this argument is the idea 
that "*organizational principles' 'institutionally embody' 
the structures of consciousness provided by world­
views."33 Just as an individual is able to learn from life 
experience and incorporate it into consciousness, a society 
can integrate cultural solutions to shared problems into 
social institutions (i.e., a society can "learn" and "mature").
32 Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of 
Society. trans. by T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1979). Habermas has altered this position somewhat in more 
recent works.
33 Fuchs, The Loaification of History. 1986, p. 96.
189
Habermas' communicatively informed evolutionary 
theory allows societies to be evaluated on the basis of 
their level of learning. Societies can "be rated and 
classified according to the extent to which they exemplify 
the higher forms of social integration and higher problem­
solving capacities."34 This allows Habermas to grant 
legitimacy to certain aspects of the modern age, 
specifically in regard to the level of social integration 
found in its legal problem solving institutions. Comparing 
traditional and modern societies' degree of social 
integration, Habermas writes,
Social integration accomplished via kinship relations 
and secured in cases of conflict by preconventional 
legal institutions belongs, from a developmental- 
logical point of view, to a lower stage than social 
integration accomplished via relations of domination 
and secured in cases of conflict by conventional legal 
institutions.35
This does not mean that modernity is legitimate-in-itself. 
Modernity is plagued by "problems of the superseded social 
formation" (e.g., class struggle).36 However, it does 
exhibit a more advanced form of social integration and 
therefore learning. In other words, Habermas concludes 
that it is possible to find alternatives to metaphysical
34 Michael Schmid, "Habermas's Theory of Social 
Evolution, " in J. Thompson and D. Held (eds.), Habermas: 
Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), p. 169.
35 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of
Society. 1979, p. 163,
36 Ibid., p. 163.
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notions of progress and to provide a new rationale for 
societal emancipation.
Habermas' theory of communicative action and social 
evolution is a marked departure from the views of the first 
generation of critical theorists. This discrepancy forces 
Habermas to come to terms with the critique of modernity 
rendered by the previous generation of critical theorists 
(e.g., Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer), as well as the 
related critique in poststructualist thought (e.g., 
Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, etc.). For Habermas, the 
critical theory of Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer exhibit 
a "totalizing critique" of modernity. By this he means 
that they see society as one all-encoumpasing totality. 
These writers, like those in traditional social science 
evolutionism, draw no distinction between systems 
rationalization and the rationalization of the lifeworld.
In failing to develop this differentiation, they exhibit, 
what he refers to as a "performative contradiction." In 
other words, as a result of "identifying reason with 
repression, they undermine the foundations of their own 
critique."37 Given the logic of their argument "it is no 
longer possible to place hope in the liberating force of
37 Nancy Love, "Epistemology and Exchange: Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Critical Theory," New German Critique, 41, 
1987, p. 71.
enlightenment."38 Consequently, it becomes impossible for 
Adorno and Horkheimer to legitimate their critical theory 
of society, since it is built upon the Enlightenment's 
separation of repression and reason— a position they 
undermine in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
For Habermas, the central problem with Adorno and
Horkheimer's critique of modernity is their over reliance
upon a philosophy of consciousness. This position, first
articulated in Cartesian philosophy, "conceives of human
action primarily in terms of individual speaking and acting
subjects.”39 Habermas seeks to show that Adorno and
Horkheimer's reliance on a philosophy of consciousness, as
opposed to a theory of inner subjectivity, is the fatal
flaw which results in the "totalizing critique" of modern
existence which levels all distinctions between
instrumental rationality (i.e., means and ends rationality)
and reason. Describing Adorno and Horkheimer's position in
the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Habermas writes,
Reason itself destroys the humanity it first made 
possible— this far reaching thesis, as we have seen, 
is grounded in the first excursus by the fact that 
from the very start the process of enlightenment is 
the result of a drive to self-preservation that 
mutilates reason, because it lays claim to it only 
in the form of purposive-rational mastery of 
nature and instinct— precisely as instrumental
38 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity, trans. by F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1987), p. 106.
39 Richard Hoiin, "Critical Theory and the Dialectic 
of Rationalism." New German Critique, 41, 1987, p. 23.
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reason.40
By equating Enlightenment reason with the rationality of 
self preservation, Adorno and Horkheimer are essentially 
identifying subjective reason with instrumental reason. In 
other words, Habermas believes that Adorno and Horkheimer 
do not reconize that there is a difference between 
intersubjective reason and individualistic instrumental 
rationality. For them, objectivizing thought (in the form 
of total reification) and purposive-rational action, which 
both accompany modern subjectivity, are the final outcomes 
of the Enlightenment's domination of nature through 
purposive-rational mastery. The result of Adorno's and 
Horkheimer's critique is the production of a "'life' that 
is characterized by the knowing and acting subject's 
devotion to a blind, self-directed, intransitive, self- 
preservation as his only 'end.'"41 There is no reconition 
of a intersubjective lifeworld that does not play by the 
same instrumental rational rules. Within the Adorno and 
Horkheimer position, "nothing more than instrumental reason 
is retained when we think through 'the basic processes of 
conscious life....' "4Z
40 Cf. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 
I, 1984, p. 388, emphasis in the original.
41 Ibid., p. 388.
42 Ibid., p. 396.
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IHabermas' purpose in discussing the Dialectic of
Enlightenment is to show how this critique and other
related arguments inevitably leads to a dead end as long as
the philosophy of consciousness serves as a guide. What is
needed, in Habermas' view, is the recognition of an
intersubjectivity informed by communicative reason.
A subjectivity that is characterized by communicative 
reason resists the denaturing of the self for the 
sake of self-preservation. Unlike instrumental reason, 
communicative reason cannot be subsumed without 
resistance under a blind self-preservation. It refers 
neither to a subject that preserves itself in 
relating to objects via representation and action, 
nor to a self-maintaining system that demarcates 
itself from an environment, but to a symbolically 
structured lifeworld that is constituted in the 
interpretive accomplishments of its members and 
only reproduced through communication.43
By "denaturing of the self" Habermas means that his
intersubjective constituted subject does not adhere to the
instrumental rationality occurring at the institutional
level or within Adorno's and Horkheimer's argument. The
intersubjective self operates under different guidelines.
Employing the idea of communicative reason enables 
critical theory to be grounded in "the conditions for the 
communicative sociation of individuals” rather than the 
atomistic philosophy of consciousness.44 With the 
recognition that "the utopian perspective of reconciliation 
and freedom...is built into the linguistic mechanism of the
43 Ibid., p. 398.
44 Ibid., p. 398.
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Ireproduction of the species," a new track for critical 
theory and emancipation can be followed.45 This track, by 
avoiding the errors of the philosophy of consciousness, can 
successfully steer clear of the totalizing perspective 
(i.e., the perspective which sees society as all- 
encoumpasing) and the resulting performative contradiction 
within which Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as the 
Nietzschian-inspired poststructualists, find themselves 
trapped.
Lvotard and the Incommensurablitv of Language Games
Jean-Francois Lyotard would agree with some of what 
Habermas has to say about contemporary philosophy and 
epistemology. Lyotard would accept the argument that the 
correspondence theory of truth is no longer valid. He 
would also agree that truth claims are explicated within 
and determined by linguistic and group boundaries.
However, for Lyotard what is at stake is not these post­
empiricist epistemological revelations, but the idea that 
they can be used to ground a new critical theory of 
society, to reestablish an evolutionary notion of society, 
and to promote a universal path for human emancipation.
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
Lyotard seeks to describe the new conditions of knowledge
45 Ibid., p. 398.
195
Iin postmodern culture and postindustrial society.46 For 
Lyotard, modern knowledge "legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse.”47 For Lyotard, these 
metadiscourses or metanarratives are undelying "first 
principles" or aprioris. They are metaphysical assumptions 
on which all modern discourses rest. The metadiscourse or 
grand narrative of modernity has taken the form of "the 
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the 
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the 
creation of wealth."48 Lyotard uses the term "postmodern" 
to refer to an "incredulity toward metanarratives.”49 
Postmodern knowledge does not rely upon a metadiscourse to 
legitimate its position. It accepts the Wittgensteinian 
notion that knowledge is guided by language games which are 
and can only be "internally legitimate." These language 
games therefore lack any universal or foundational standard 
for comparison. For Lyotard, various discourses and their 
truth claims are heteromorphous or radically different 
language games with "their own rules, structure and
46 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge, trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1979) 1984.
47 Ibid., p. xxiii.
48 Ibid., p. xxiii.
49 Ibid., p. xxiv.
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moves."50 What postmodern knowledge accomplishes is that 
"it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces 
our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle 
is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's 
paralogy."51 In other words, professional discourse 
cannot capture these language games in-themsleves. ."All we 
can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive 
species..."52 We do not need nor can we support a new 
archetypal theory which can unite or overcome these 
heterogeneous language games.
As the "last great rationalist," Habermas is one of
the primary targets in Lyotard's discussion of modern and
postmodern knowledge. As stated earlier, Lyotard is in
agreement with Habermas on the point that truth claims are
embedded within what Habermas calls "linguistic practice
and communicational interaction." The issue is if this
revelation can be used to reformulate Enlightenment reason
and emancipation. Lyotard thinks not.
There is no reason to think that it would be 
possible to determine metaprescriptives common 
to all of these language games or that a 
revisable consensus like the one in force 
at a given moment in the scientific community 
could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions 
regulating the totality of statements circulating
50 Douglas Kellner, "Postmodernism as Social Theory,” 
Theory, Culture and Society, 5, 1988, p. 250.
51 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. xxv.
52 Ibid., p. 26.
197
in the social collectivity.53 
In other words, Lyotard feels that language games are so 
incommensurable and consensus is so illusive that no theory 
can unite them into a coherent explanatory framework. From 
Lyotard's perspective, Habermas' communicative action 
theory with ideal speech as its means and consensus as its 
goal rests on "the validity of the narrative of 
emancipation."54 It is but another attempt to establish a 
metanarrative— a new first principle on which a all- 
encoumpasing theory can be constructed. However, in an age 
where the creation of knowledge is no longer dependent on 
metanarratives for legitimation, Habermas' theory can no 
longer lay claim to universal validation. Along with 
Richard Rorty, Lyotard would contend that the notions of 
communicative action and ideal speech "are simply moral 
virtues" and not epistemological guarantees.55
Essentially, Habermas' theory is an attempt to 
establish a metanarrative capable of uniting all language 
games with the thread of communicative reason. However, 
for Lyotard, communicative action theory makes two faulty 
assumptions about the contemporary production of knowledge. 
First, it fails to recognize that "language games are
53 Ibid., p. 65.
54 Ibid., p. 60.
55 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and 
Irrationalism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 1980, 53, p. 736.
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heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic
rules."56 Contemporary knowledge, even in science, works
within its own parameters and adheres to its own set of
internal rules of the game. These games are
incommensurable with the games played in other arenas of
knowledge production. Secondly, communicative action
theory fails to understand that "consensus is only a
particular state of discussion, not its end."57
"Consensus is a horizon that is never reached."58 In
Lyotard's view, the goal of discussion is not consensus but
paralogy (i.e., disagreement and dissent). Scientific
knowledge production is not guided by underlying norms of
consensus, but by an internal political struggle over
proper research. Scientific truth is forged under the
tension between varying and conflicting viewpoints. This
"double observation" against communicative action theory,
destroys a belief that still underlies Habermas' 
research, namely, that humanity as a collective 
(universal) subject seeks its common emancipation 
through the regularization of the 'moves' permitted 
in all language games and that the legitimacy of 
any statement resides in its contributing to that 
emancipation.59
In Lyotard's view, in Habermas' writings, "the cause is
56 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. 65.
57 Ibid., p. 65.
58 Ibid., p. 61.
59 Ibid., p. 66.
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Igood, but the argument is not."60
For Lyotard, the death of the metanarratives of 
modernity and the lack of consensus need not signal the 
onset of nihilism or the "decline of the West." Lyotard 
writes,
Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost 
narrative. It in no way follows that they are 
reduced to barbarity. What saves them from it is 
their knowledge that legitimation can only spring 
from their own linguistic practice and communicational 
interaction. Science 'smiling into its beard' at 
every other belief has taught them the harsh 
austerity of realism.61
This is the condition of knowledge in postmodern culture.
Knowledge can only be legitimate when it is local or within
the context of "the little narrative" (petit recit)
These "little narratives" of everyday life are cohesive
enough to provide local patterns of meaning, but are too
fragile to support a universal system of knowledge or an
emancipatory politics. Knowledge no longer requires the
creation of archetypical theories to provide meaning and
orient action— it does not seem to require transcendence or
unitary coherence. These "theories" already exist within
the practices and communication circuits of the lifeworld.
Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person 
is always located at 'nodal points' of specific 
communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or 
better: one is always located at a post through which
60 Ibid., p. 66.
61 Ibid., p. 41.
62 Ibid., p. 60.
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various kinds of messages pass. No one, not even the 
least privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless 
over the messages that traverse and position him at the 
post of sender, addressee, or referent.43
This statement sounds strangely Habermasian. However,
Lyotard does not think these communication circuits are
encompassing enough to transcend heterogeneous life forms.
They, therefore, provide no basis for the establishment of
a new critical theory of society nor can they serve as a
foundation for a universal politics of emancipation.
Communication circuits are simply part of the condition of
knowledge in the postmodern world and reflect the
incoherence and fractionalization of the world.
One of the central issue at stake in the 
Habermas/Lyotard Debate is whether or not we can have or 
need new notions of rationality, emancipation, and 
progress. Habermas seeks to develop a theory that is 
capable of both explaining historical progress and 
providing a rational foundation for social critique and 
emancipatory politics. Habermas is convinced that only a 
rationalistic account with universal significance can 
provide the foundations we need to conduct life, politics, 
and science. Without a foundation, we lack the ability to 
provide anything but opinion and speculation. For Lyotard, 
it is no longer possible to have such an archetypal theory 
as Habermas' in the postmodern condition with its
63 Ibid., p. 15.
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incommensurable language games and parological conditions. 
The independent language games of professional knowledge 
and the little narratives of everyday life are all that are 
necessary for legitimation. Simply put, for Lyotard the 
"mourning process (for the lost metanarrative) is 
over...there is no need to start all over again."64
The debate over the exhaustion of the Enlightenment's 
orientation towards rationality, progress, and emancipation 
can also be found in other discusive formation. In the 
section to follow, we will explore how this debate can also 
be found in the architectural debate over aesthetic style.
The Ironic Historicism of Postmodern Architecture
Seen through the eyes of postmodern architects, one of 
the central problems with modern architecture, which led to 
its figurative and literal collapse, was its negation of 
community and historicity. In the drive to create clean 
and pure space, modern architects, like the Enlightenment 
Philosophes, had viewed the past as something to overcome. 
History and tradition were seen as strangling the attempt 
to build a new, modern world. What was needed was a type 
of architectural social engineering which would provide 
people with rational space and thus produce enlightened 
lives. However, the results of the use of rationality to 
break and transcend historical continuity were not as
64 Ibid., p. 41.
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intended. Instead of contributing to the emancipation of 
the individual, modern architecture, in the view of 
Heinrich Koltz, left humanity "surrounded by a sea of 
endless monotony," filled with "the simplest 
functionalism."65 Modern architecture was thus 
representative of the bureaucratic confinement of modernity 
as a whole.
The "spirit" of modern architecture can be found in
the conclusion to a manifesto of the Bauhaus Movement
written in 1919, Halter Gropius proclaimed,
Together let us desire, conceive, and create the 
new structure of the future, which will embrace 
architecture and sculpture and painting in one 
unity and which will one day rise toward heaven 
from the hands of a million workers like the 
crystal symbol of a new faith.66
Modern architecture's vision was to employ both art and
science in the creation of a new universal form.
Traditional ornamental and irrational structures were to be
replaced by an architectural form which could accentuate
the rational human's inborn rationality by enhancing
individual choice and freedom. This vision of a new
rational architecture was to be made possible through the
use of the techniques of modern mass production. In the
65 Heinrich Koltz (ed), Postmodern Visions: Drawings. 
Paintings, and Models of Contemporary Architects (New York: 
Abbeville Press, 1985), p. 7.
66 Walter Gropius quoted in Ulrich Conrads (ed.), 
Programmes and Manifestoes on Twentieth-Century 
Architecture (London: Lund Humphries, 1970), p. 49.
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words of Le Corbusier, another important proponent of 
architectural modernism, "houses must go up all of a piece, 
made by machine tools in a factory, assembled as Ford 
assembles cars, on moving conveyor belts."67 Together, 
the new ahistorical form and mass production came to be the 
defining features of modern architecture. In the 
description of Robert Stern, modernism "proposed a break 
with history and a repudiations of traditional aesthetics 
in favor of self-referential, functionally and 
technologically determined form."68
On July 15, 1972 at 3:32pm the Pruitt-Igoe Housing 
Development in St. Louis was demolished. For the 
postmodern architect and modern critic, Charles Jencks, 
this date marks the end of Gropius', Le Corbusier's, and 
other modern architect's dream of providing clean, pure, 
and rational space.69 What began as an attempt to provide 
a new international style which was functional, universal, 
mass produced, and accessible had ended in the rubble of a 
St. Louis implosion. For Jencks, the Pruitt-Igoe housing 
development, which once was hailed as the future of housing
67 Le Corbusier quoted in Reyner Banham, "Progressive 
Building in Paris: 1918-1928," in Peter Serenyi, L£ 
Corbusier in Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, 1975), p. 38.
68 Robert A.M. Stern, Modern Classicism (New York: 
Rizzoli, 1988), p. 8.
69 Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern 
Architecture (London: Academy Editions, 1984), p. 9.
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for the poor, represented all that was wrong with both 
modern architecture and modern society. Pruitt-Igoe, built 
in the 1950's as part of the U.S. government's plan to 
provide subsidized housing for the poor, had proven to be a 
disaster in both design and function. Although less than 
twenty years old, the development had been deemed 
unlivable. For Jencks, this architectural disaster was not 
just representative of the failures of government housing, 
but of the failures of modernism's dream of rational, 
ahistorical form.70
It is within this climate of the perceived failure of
modernism where postmodern architecture emerges.
Postmodern architecture adopts a radically different
orientation toward the past. The past, becomes a source of
inspiration, rather than negation. Paolo Portoghesi
describes modernism's paranoia of the past,
The negation of the past, or rather the rigid 
morphological separation between present and past 
desired by the Modern Movement, was a typical 
defense mechanism, to use the Freudian term for 
negation. 'The cathartic illusion,' wrote 
Marcello Pignatelli, 'of freeing ourselves from 
all dross and obstacles, of cutting the knots of 
conditioning and guilt, of waking up different 
tomorrow, destroying yesterday's house full of 
unbearable memories, really means projecting the 
internal conflict onto a magical act, in the 
impossibility of elaborating on it.'71
As this quote indicates, modernism wanted to wipe the slate
70 Ibid.
71 Paolo Portoghesi, Postmodern: The Architecture of 
Postindustrial Society (New York: Rizzoli), p. 20.
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clean. It wanted an architecture and a society which was 
free from the confines, "dross, and obstacles" associated 
with tradition. However, for Portoghesi and other 
postmodern architects the "end of prohibition" has arrived. 
The past is no longer taboo: Architects are now free to
incorporate modes of expression and design from the past. 
For Portoghesi, architectural postmodernism can then be 
used to describe "any building that breaks the modern 
prohibition against historical reference, whether with iron 
self-commentary or with vernacular earnestness."72
If postmodernism was merely a type of aesthetic return 
to the past, it could easily be labeled as part of a 
romantic anti-modernism that is as old as modernity itself. 
However, there is an added element which distinguishes 
postmodernists from the anti-modernists. Many postmodern 
architectural works blend the so-called return to the past 
or classicism with an ironic presentation. It is, in 
Jencks words, "a classicism without tears.”73 In blending 
the styles of the past with a type of parody, it seeks to 
call into question issues of historical progress, 
continuity and even the coherent meaning of history itself. 
As Brent Brolin comments, "while postmodernists acknowledge
72 David Kolb, Postmodern Sophistications: Philosophy. 
Architecture, and Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), p. 89.
73 Charles Jencks (ed.), Postmodern Classicism 
(London: Architectural Design, 1980), p. 5.
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history, many seem compelled to torture it until an
'original' contribution to artistic Progress has been 
made... "74
This type of ironic historicism was given a polemical
voice with the writings, drawings, and works of Robert
Venturi. Venturi wanted more than a return to the past.
Architectural works must incorporate irony into its
reappropriation of the past.
The architect who would accept his role as a 
combiner of significant old cliches— valid 
banalities— in new contexts as his condition 
within a society that directs its best efforts, 
its big money, and its elegant technologies 
elsewhere, can ironically express in this indirect 
way a true concern for society's inverted scale 
of values.75
Thus architecture becomes a means for calling into question
the value system of modern society. It becomes a political
statement in the form of an ironic historicistic 
architecture.
One of the most representative works of the 
architectural irony outlined by Venturi is Charles Moore's 
Plaza d'Italia in New Orleans. The Plaza employs 
traditional Italian historical references, however it 
rearranges and presents them in parodic style. Linda
74 Brent Brolin, Flight of Fancy (New York: St. Martin 
Press, 1985), p. 309.
75 Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in 
Architecture (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), p. 44. 
Also cf. Robert Venturi et al., Learning from Las Vegas 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
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Hutcheon describes Moore's Plaza:
Moore encodes signs of local Italian ethnic 
identity— from Latin inscriptions to a parody of 
the Trevi fountain. That particular corner of 
Rome is a complex mix of theatrical stage, palace, 
sculpture, and nature. In Moore's parodic 
rendition, the same elements are retained, but are 
now executed in a new media. Sometimes even 
structures are refashioned and *refunctioned': a 
Tuscan column becomes a fountain, with water running 
down it.76
Within Hutcheon's reading, postmodern architecture's ironic 
presentation, as represented by Moore, "shows both its 
critical awareness and its love of history by giving new 
meaning to old forms..."77 Past styles are not just 
incorporated as literal, they are mixed with an ironic 
presentation to produce a new nonliteral and perhaps 
critical meaning.
What does the attitude of postmodern architecture, in 
either its ironic or earnest form, tell us about the issues 
of rationality, progress, and emancipation? in part, it 
can be read as a cultural representation of what Adorno and 
Horkheimer described in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
Like Enlightenment rationality, the modern architect's 
dream of providing rational space, free from the ornamental 
trappings of the past, is reducible to an exercise of
76 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism:
History. Theory. Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 
32.
77 Ibid., p. 31. This has been interpreted as a new 
extension of modernism's elitism. As Lebbeus Woods notes, 
the Plaza reads like "a sequence of one line jokes..." 
quoted in Stern, Modern Classicism. 1988, p. 78.
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power. While modern architecture ideologically presented
itself as enhancing personal freedom, it, like
Enlightenment rationality, actually produced alienation and
contributed to the process of total reification. Nowhere
is this point more evident than in modernism's ideas about
worker housing. As Hutcheon points out,
Although Gropius and Le Corbusier both designed 
workers' housing, neither seems to have felt the 
need to consult those who would live there: it must 
have been tacitly assumed that the intellectually 
underdeveloped would allow the architects to arrange 
their lives for them.78
Like Enlightenment rationality which assumed the role of
legislator to the "uneducated masses," modern architecture
wanted to provide rational space, in order to create a new
type of humanity— to influence the unenlightened
However, it is not just a critical theory of modernity
nor an unproblematic return to the past which most of
postmodern architecture espouses. The past is not, as it
is for conservative anti-modernists, a model to correct the
banality of contemporary life. Postmodern architects also
question the past. Essentially, they argue that there is
no unified, totalizing past from which we can draw on. The
past is discontinuous and fragmented. Furthermore, it is
always interpreted with the confines of the contemporary.
History is always constructed rather than being simply
there. And like contemporary life, the past is viewed as
78 Ibid., p. 27.
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consisting of multiple and incommensurable or unconnected 
life forms. Thus, the only means of expressing history is 
with a type of tongue-in-cheek approach which is "both a 
homage and a kind of ironic thumbed nose to the past."79
Conclusion: Post-Metanarrative Politics
The postmodern perspective, despite its theoretical 
and practical diversity, emphasizes the point that history 
has no inherent logic. It, therefore dismisses those 
approaches which have sought to impart an overarching logic 
to social change (e.g. Hegel, Condorcet, Marx, etc.). This 
being the case, any theory which seeks to connect history 
and emancipation within a rational, economic, or 
communicative metanarrative (i.e., an essence or implied 
standard of judgement) is suspect. Thus, the postmodern 
position is distrustful of both philosophical and social 
science accounts of socio-cultural evolution. Both 
accounts have tried to grant history a teleology. And, 
both have used various strategies to link emancipation with 
some apriority (e.g., rationality, communicative action, 
etc.).
Within the intellectual climate created by the demise 
of the traditional metanarratives of emancipation, 
contemporary politics is left with two possibilities. 
Either, (a) it can become an ironical critical theory— as
79 Ibid., p. 31.
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manifested in certain works of postmodern architecture, 
or, (b) it retreats from conventional philosophy into the 
lifeworld to find meaning and/or emancipatory potential.
The former position recognizes the historicity of all 
statements and often blends this realization with an ad hoc 
socio-political critique. However, because this position 
lacks a foundation for critique, it is unable to articulate 
criticism in a coherent, universal form. Its only option, 
then is parody. In the latter position, where the life­
world is embraced as a potential site of emancipatory 
politics, we can find two divergent reactions, represented 
by Habermas and Lyotard. Habermas seeks to use the 
potentiality of the lifeworld as material for an all 
encompassing emancipatory politics. Lyotard too looks to 
the lifeworld. However, for him the lifeworld is too 
fragmented to employ successfully an overarching formula 
for emancipation. Thus, Habermas' approach is merely 
repeating the mistakes of the past. For Lyotard, we must 
accept the inevitability of incommensurable language games 
and life forms. Localized emanciapation and conceptions of 
justice are all we can have (if any).
In this chapter and in the previous two, we sought to 
outline some of the central postions of the postmodern 
framework. Essentially, we argued that postmodernism can 
be seen as rebellion against lingustic correspondence, 
modern subjectivity, and the Enlightenment's linkage of
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Irationality, progress, and emanciaption. In the following 
chapter, we will begin to shift the focus towards a 
sociology of postmodernism. We will attempt to show how a 
social epistemology can avoid postmodernism's collapse or 
leveling of all meaning.
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CHAPTER VII
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICALLY-INFORMED POSTMODERNISM
We have been concerned with the various theoretical 
and cultural positions of postmodernism, trying to show how 
postmodern thought forces a reevaluation of the 
conventional modern understanding of such issues as 
referentiality, subjectivity, and historical continuity. 
Obviously, there are important theoretical and practical 
differences between cultural postmodernism and postmodern 
philosophy, Adorno/Horkheimer and Lyotard, Foucault and 
Derrida, for example: We have, however, sought to
deemphasize these differences in favor of developing a 
general postmodern framework or position.
In this and subsequent chapters, we will begin 
shifting the focus away from explication and towards 
explanation. We will now be concerned with providing a 
sociological account of postmodernism. Obviously, this is 
not a straightforward or an easy task. The arguments of 
postmodernism pose a formidable challenge to conventional 
sociology's epistemological position and many of its 
cherished concepts and theories. In this section, we will, 
nevertheless, begin the process of describing what a 
"sociological account of postmodernism" might look like and 
what it might seek to accomplish through the introduction 
of a social epistemological framework.
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The central task of this chapter is to examine the 
complex relationship between sociology and postmodern 
thought. The principal argument of this chapter is that 
postmodernism can use certain sociological insights to 
escape its idealistic, relativistic, and often nihilistic 
conclusions. This encounter between sociology and 
postmodernism is viewed as a reciprocal exchange: What we
will refer to in this chapter as "conventional sociology" 
can also benefit from the postmodern position, e.g., from 
the postmodern critique of objectivism and correspondence 
referentiality. What follows is not a standard 
sociological critique of a philosophical or knowledge 
system, but an attempt to develop both a sociologically 
informed postmodernism and a postmodernist informed 
sociology. We will draw upon the writings of Baudrillard, 
Durkheim, and others to develop our argument.
One of the apparent ironies of this encounter between 
sociology and postmodernism is that much of postmodern 
theory already shares the general orientation of certain 
schools of sociological thought, specifically the outlook 
found in certain variants of the sociology of knowledge. 
Both postmodernism and elements of sociology exhibit what 
could be termed a "de-ontologized" or "de-naturalized" 
orientation towards many of the metaphysical, 
philosophical, or ideational issues of Occidental culture 
and its modern expression (e.g., natural essences, the
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conditions of subjectivity, theory/reality correspondence, 
innate rationality, etc.)* In this regard, sociology and 
postmodernism can be seen as sharing a related view of the 
mechanism which produce knowledge of the world. However, 
this is where the similarity ends. There appears to be 
little interest in incorporating a sociological position 
into the postmodern framework. As Randall Collins has 
noted:
It is widely accepted that questions of knowledge, 
of science, of intellectual discourse in general, are 
grounded in a social context. Yet philosophy has not 
made the transition from the social to the 
sociological. Philosophers invoke the social in a 
general way and taken-for-granted way, while their use 
of actual sociology is meager and often uninformed.1
The reason postmodernism has not relied on sociological
insights is perhaps due to sociology's image as an
exclusively positivistic or realistic endeavour or, as
Collins points out, it may be an "anti-positivist ploy" to
"deny the objective or at least demonstrable nature of
knowledge in general."2 In either case, sociology, it will
be argued, has the intellectual tools for the construction
of a sociologically-informed postmodernism and the material
for an alternative way of thinking about some of the
philosophical quagmires within which postmodern theory
finds itself embedded.
1 Randall Collins, "For a Sociological Philosophy," 
Theory and Society, 17, 1988, p. 669.
2 Ibid., p. 669-70.
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IIn order to unravel the relationship between sociology 
and postmodernism, we will begin our discussion with an 
overview of the postmodern theoretical position. This is 
an attempt to summarize and condense the labyrinthine 
positions discussed in the previous chapters. This will be 
followed by an examination of conventional sociology's 
understanding of its object of analysis and disciplinary 
goals. Specifically, we will focus on sociology's 
understanding of the issues of objectivity and social 
reality. Afterward, we will discuss Jean Baudrillard's 
critique of that conventional sociological perspective. 
Baudrillard, with his declared objective of putting an end 
to the social, provides an important postmodern challenge 
to conventional sociology's understanding of itself and its 
stance on objectivity and correspondence referentiality 
(cf. our discussion of language in Chapter 4). In this 
section, we will evaluate the successes and failures of 
Baudrillard's and the general postmodern analysis of the 
possibilities of reliable knowledge of the social world.
In the succeeding section, we will begin the discussion of 
how to merge certain insights of both postmodernism and 
sociology— without falling into either the objectivism of 
conventional sociology or the relativistic "unknowablity" 
of postmodernism. Here, we will examine Durkheim's 
pragmatism lectures given at the Sorbonne in the 1913-14 
academic year. These lectures, it will be argued, provide
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the epistemological roots for rethinking postmodernism's 
leveling of all meaning and theoretical expressions. 
Finally, we will conclude with a brief discussion of some 
important questions raised by our sociological assessment 
of postmodern thought.
It is quite possible to become lost in the 
labyrinthine lexicon of postmodern thought and practice. 
Consequently, it is important before discussing the 
relationship between sociology and postmodernism to 
reexamine the epistemological and general theoretical 
position of postmodernism. The following catagories 
provide some of the basic "ideal type" differences between 
modern and postmodern thought and their respective cultural 
orientations. Most of these points overlap in some way; 
they have been, however, differentiated for the sake of 
continuity and simplicity. Within this admittedly 
simplified schemata, postmodernism and modernism are seen 
as sets of binary oppositions.




















In this section we will briefly discuss each one of these 
binary distinctions for purposes of further clarification.
First of all, in place of modern thought's reliance 
upon universal conditions or essences, postmodernism 
emphasizes multiple voicing and the incommensurability of 
various life forms (i.e., group cultures) or language 
games. For the postmodernists, there are no universal 
essences or laws which transcend the locality of culture, 
language, history, or the organization of knowledge. These 
localities mark the boundary between radically different 
life worlds or forms of life. From the postmodern 
position, there is no need to search for an underlying 
element which unites all life worlds. Any such strategy 
would simply be an hegemonic attempt to establish and 
affirm the superiority of one classification system and one 
truth claim over another. Thus, for the postmodernists, 
determining who is "telling the truth" and who is engaged 
in rhetorical pontification is an impossible theoretical 
task.
Secondly, since life forms are incommensurable, it 
becomes impossible to have firm foundations for making 
truth claims. In postmodernism, truth is a philosophical
3 Some of these categories are adapted from Thomas 
McCarthy's Introduction of Habermas', The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 
ix.
218
ideal which has very little relevance in the actual 
establishment of knowledge. In this regard, postmodernists 
are strongly influenced by Nietzsche's linking of power and 
knowledge. For the postmodernists, truth is more an issue 
of power/knowledge legitimation than an empirically- 
discovered or rationally-constructed foundational 
principle. Therefore, postmodernists emphasize the local 
character and indeterminacy of truth. When a "truth event" 
occurs it is a local event and ultimately a matter of the 
power and knowledge matrix at work within a 
knowledge/culture producing community or organization. 
Consequently, the scientific discovery or isolation of a 
causal or first principle or the identification of law-like 
patterns is merely a mythical construct to cover what is 
actually a very haphazard and power-laden endeavor.
Thirdly, postmodernists emphasize the pragmatic over 
the apriori. The pragmatist approach views truth, in part, 
as nothing more than a convenient instrument for the 
conduct of daily life or knowledge production.4 Within 
this view, foundational truths are impossible to obtain. 
Consequently, if truth is to remain it must be stripped of 
its metaphysical illusions and viewed as merely an 
instrumental means for organizing our experience of the
4 For a discussion of pragmatism and social theory, 
cf. Eugene Rochberg-Halton, Meaning and Modernity: Social 
Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), specifically, pp. 1-23.
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world (e.g., Rorty).
Fourthly, in place of the modern attempt to ascertain 
and establish the certainty of competing truth claims, 
postmodernists emphasize the infinite fallibility of such 
an enterprise. For the postmodernists, the world can never 
be captured as-it-is. Knowledge of the world is always 
mediated bv pre-existing intellectual cataaories. social 
factors. or language. The best we can do is engage in a 
poetic interpretation of the world. However, the goal of 
this interpretation cannot be the recovery of some hidden 
dimension or underlying structure, as in depth hermeneutics 
(cf. Foucault's critique of hermeneutics). Such a strategy 
would merely be another form of Occidental culture's 
endless search for absolute certainty (cf. Derrida's 
discussion of "presence"). Instead, the goal of discourse 
(if indeed it is a goal) is one marked by a ceaseless 
interpretative strategy, where the individual merely writes 
for the sake of writing.
This move brings us to the fifth set of catagories.
The postmodernists see themselves engaged in literature or 
textual analysis rather than traditional science. For 
them, the intellectual superiority of scientific discourse 
over literary discourse cannot be sustained. Science is 
merely one form of writing which differs from literature 
only in regard to the level of sophisticated rhetorical 
strategies it employs in making and protecting truth
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claims. Essentially, all knowledge is merely the product 
of writing or a text of the world. Consequently, all that 
we can do as intellectuals or scientists is engage in 
textual analysis like the literary critic.
Sixthly, in the place of modernity's emphasis on unity 
and consensus, postmodernism points to fragmentation and 
parology (i.e., conflict). The postmodernists dismiss as 
useless the attempt to construct a unitary framework of 
knowledge. For the postmodernists, knowledge and cultural 
production is non-cumulative and non-unified.5 Consensus 
is seen as being both a myth and a hazard for contemporary 
knowledge production. It has been and will continue to be 
philosophically impossible for scientists or other 
knowledge producer to reach a consensus on what counts as 
reliable knowledge and successfully to exclude that which 
is not appropriate. Furthermore, the lack of consensus is 
not viewed in a negative light. For the postmodernists, a 
pluralistic multiple voicing is the best protection we have 
from theoretical hegemony.
Seventhly, modernists generally accept (at least in 
some form) a correspondence between word and world (i.e., 
correspondence referentiality). Words, concepts, and 
theories are seen as enabling the investigator to bring a
5 For a discussion of this in science see, Thomas S. 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), and Paul Feyerabend, 
Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975).
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social or natural object into the direct light of analysis. 
The object is seen as having presence (Derrida), which 
means that the object can be immediately brought before the 
investigating subject. This enables the object to be open 
to examination and classification. However, the 
postmodernists contend that correspondence referentiality 
is an extremely naive perspective. Like the idealists and 
nominalists, postmodernists see words, concepts, and 
theories as human constructs without immediate (or 
postponed) presence. When we refer to something in the 
world we are employing a differentiated linguistical system 
(Saussure) that is a human or cultural creation. As such, 
its bearing on reality-in-itself is non-direct or absent.
Eighthly, postmodernists point to non-linearity over 
linearity. In regard to historical change, postmodernists 
emphasize how history is void of any transhistorical logic. 
History has no inherent rationality which unfolds into a 
preplanned form. Rather than the modernist emphasis on 
evolutionary and temporal linearity, postmodernists stress 
historical and temporal relativity. This historicistic 
move enables postmodernism to attack such cherished ideas 
as progress, emancipation, and societal evolution.6 There
6 Historically, these terms were used as Euro-American 
slogans or ideologies for subjugating the "Third Word." 
Recently, various Southern Hemisphere intellectuals have 
pointed out the relationship between these concepts and 
periphery exploitation. For a discussion of this in 
relation to Marx, see Tsenay Serequeberhan, "Karl Marx and 
African Emancipatory Thought: A Critique of Euro-Centric
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historicistic stance is another means for calling into 
question the overall modernistic agenda of providing 
certain and secure knowledge of the world.
Finally, in place of modernistic optimism, 
postmodernism tends to be nihilistic. Since all knowledge 
is a contingent outcome of power, cultural hierarchies, or 
rhetoric, there appears to be little hope of establishing 
meaning and firm knowledge of the world. As we shall see 
in the next few chapters, these nihilistic conclusions are 
one of the central differences between postmodernism and 
the sociological position to be presented.
The classification system employed above is very 
general. It is intended merely as a overview— a means for 
placing postmodernism in perspective. In the next section, 
we will be concerned with examining the epistemological 
orientation of conventional sociology. As will be shown, 
the perspective of conventional sociology is generally 
modern in its orientation. The discussion to follow is 
intended as further means for setting the stage for our 
view of the theoretical encounter between sociology and 
postmodern i sm.
Modern Sociology: Between Positivism and Realism
Ernest Gellner has said that "every philosophical baby 
that is born alive is either a little positivist or a
Metaphysics," Praxis International, 10, 1990, pp. 161-179.
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little Hegelian."7 This statement also applies to 
"sociological babies." The history of sociology is closely 
linked with the larger modern philosophical and scientific 
effort to establish firm and reliable knowledge of the 
world. Since Comte's establishment of a "social physics" 
in the early nineteenth century, sociologists have sought 
to either develop social laws from patterns of sensory 
experience (positivism) or provide accurate, rational 
interpretations of social phenomena (realism), at least in 
theory. While sociologists may differ over the proper 
means for achieving understanding of the social, most are 
in agreement over their general intellectual mission, or at 
least, seek to give the impression of unity.8
Historically, what has united most conventional 
sociologists, regardless of their focus, method, or 
theoretical position, is the belief in a real social realm 
beyond the subject's definition of the situation and beyond 
linguistic signification. Sociologist may bicker over the 
definition of concepts or theoretical interpretations (i.e, 
positivist vs interpretive, macro vs micro, or conflict vs 
symbolic interactionism), but they are virtually united in 
the belief that material conditions, social organization, 
interactional networks, or some societal region are sites
7 Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4.
8 This is perhaps more of a professional ideology than 
an indication of "sociology in action."
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of intrinsic meaning or causality. Philosophers may ponder 
the meaning of referentiality and theory/reality 
correspondence, but most sociologists take the social to be 
real, actual, and determining. As an anti-nominalist and 
anti-idealist enterprise, sociology sees itself as going 
beyond the unanswerable and paradoxical questions of 
philosophy into something that is pragmatic and empirically 
or rationally verifiable. Sociology sees this move away 
from philosophy and metaphysics as allowing it to make 
definitive statements on the overall nature of society or 
some societal element.
While sociologists are virtually united in their 
intellectual mission to uncover the social, they are often 
methodologically divided on how to achieve it.9 Since its 
inception, conventional sociology has been caught between 
two combative epistemologies— positivism and realism.
These divergent epistemologies agree that any type of 
science should be an empirical, objective, and rational 
activity which produces reliable explanations of the social 
or natural world.10 Their disagreement arises over how 
these objectives should be achieved. For the "ideal type" 
positivist, the only source of true and reliable knowledge
9 Cf. Everett C. Hughes, The Sociological Eve. Vol. II 
(New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 431-477.
10 Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as 
Science. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 
p. 5.
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is sensory experience. The point of any scientific 
endeavor is to establish lavs from the patterned 
regularities of the domain of direct (or systematically 
refined) experience. Knowledge gained through other means 
(e.g., deduction, interpretation, metaphysics) is 
unreliable since it results in the production of 
unverifiable truth claims (i.e., it cannot be tested).
On the other hand, realists argue that any science 
should concern itself with uncovering the hidden structures 
that produce patterned regularities or outward appearances. 
For the realists, truth and reality are hidden below the 
surface of visible "events." The unearthing of meaning 
requires some form of indepth analytics to reach this 
hidden reality below the surface of appearance. 
Consequently, the realist see sociology, in part, as a 
constructivist activity, which searches for underlying 
structures. Within this view, the rational mind is seen as 
playing a key role in the uncovering and construction of 
accurate and reliable knowledge of the social world.
These two conceptualizations of the proper orientation
for doing science have produced two intellectual (and
political) camps, two styles of intellectual work, and two
types of sociologists. One follows the dictates of
positivistic epistemology by seeking to locate patterned
laws of the social; the other is concerned with uncovering
a deep reality. Like their epistemological counterparts,
<1
226
both are in agreement that sociological methods should 
capture, and sociological knowledge report, the social 
world-as-it-is. Their differences are centered around the 
issues of the appropriate methodology to employ to reach 
and recover the social (i.e., scientific or interpretative, 
cf. the methodenstreit debate in late nineteenth-century 
social theory) and the proper level at which to find social 
reality.11
Positivistic sociologists believe in the existence of 
a social world beyond individual experience and 
signification. They claim that the social "exists prior to 
and independently of such (sociological) knowledge."12 
The social world and its elements can be recovered through 
the use of methods which exact and refine sensory 
experience (i.e., scientific method, often of a 
quantitative variety). This position is best exemplified 
by Durkheim*s attempt to establish the existence of "social 
facts." Durkheim defined social facts as a constraint which 
is "general throughout a given society, while at the same 
time existing in its own right independent of its
11 For a discussion of this see Anthony Giddens (ed.), 
"Introduction" in Positivism and Sociology (London: 
Heinemann, 1974), pp. 1-22.
12 Derek Layder, "Beyond Empiricism? The Promise of 
Realism," Philosophy of Social Science 15, 1988, p. 255.
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individual manifestations."13 For the positivist camp, 
Durkheim*s classic study of suicide, with its statistical 
revelation of social facts, is a model of what the science 
of society should be doing.14
The sociological realist questions the appropriate 
methodology and "unit of analysis" for the reappropriation 
of the socially real. In other words, the realist position 
does not agree with the positivist description and 
presentation of the social. Since the human sciences are 
inevitably linked with, and caught within, the social 
world, it is impossible to utilize the same positivistic 
methodology as the physical sciences which deal exclusively 
with inert matter. What is needed are rational methods of 
interpretation which uncover deep or hidden meaning.
Meaning for the hermeneutically inclined realists does not 
lay at the surface. Therefore, meaning can not be obtained 
through sensory experience alone, as it is for the 
positivists. A proper methodology requires some 
combination of sensory data and rational interpretation to 
establish a conjunction of events.
The realist way of seeing the social is perhaps best 
represented in Marx's "materialist conception of history."
13 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, 
trans. by S. Solovay and J. Mueller (New York: The Free 
Press, 1966), p. 13.
14 Emile Durkheim, Suicide, trans. by J.A. Spaulding 
and G. Simpson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
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Marx wanted to distance his work methodologically from both
the idealism of Hegelian philosophy and the positivism of
"vulgar economics." In the German Ideology. Marx and
Engels tackle the problems of idealism. In one of their
most powerful and sarcastic critiques of the implications
of idealism they write: "once upon a time an honest fellow
had the idea that men were drowned in water only because
they were possessed of the idea of gravity."15 Later, in
a more analytical statement, Marx concluded:
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, 
i.e., the process of thinking, which under the 
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an 
independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real 
world, and the real world is only the external, 
phenomenal for "the Idea." With me, on the 
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and 
translated into forms of thought.16
However, this rejection of Hegel did not lead Marx to
abandon the rationalism of idealism in favor of the pure
sensory inclination of positivism. Marx was also skeptical
of the positivistic perspective, which only analyzes "the
superficial, phenomenal or apparent features of social and
economic life."17 In this sense, the Marxist view of
social reality serves as a model for the realistically
15 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology 
(New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 2.
16 Karl Marx, Capital. Vol I.(Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 19.
17 Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science. 1982, p.
99.
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Iinclined sociologist. Sociologists should employ both 
observation and logic in their construction of the true 
causal structure of events or phenomena.
The sociological orientation towards the social world, 
in either its positivistic or realistic vein, certainly has 
its advantages, at least in an instrumental sense. The 
taken-for-granted existence of the social, backed by the 
objective or rational measurements of quantitative or 
qualitative methodology, allows sociologists to make what 
they believe to be absolute pronouncements on a range of 
social principles, issues, and problems. However, in doing 
so both schools of sociology open themselves up to a series 
of philosophical attacks and a general intellectual 
skepticism (cf. Foucault's discussion of the human sciences 
in an Chapter 5). First of all, from a postmodern 
position, conventional sociology is unable to explain how 
the sociologist can be removed from the cultural and 
linguistic scene to give an objectivistic account of social 
reality. Nor is conventional sociology able definitively 
to state or explain how it is that its concepts, measures, 
or interpretations come to capture accurately and report 
unmediated social reality (i.e., the problem of 
reflexivity). Seen from the vantage point of post- 
positivistic postmodernism, the failure of modernistic 
sociology to address adequately these issues makes it an 
extremely problematic discipline and its knowledge content
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suspect.
In the section to follow, we will explore Jean 
Baudrillard's postmodern critique of conventional 
sociological positivism and realism. In this encounter we 
can better see the theoretical positions at work in both 
sociology and postmodernism and postmodernism's important 
challenge to the conventional sociological framework.
Baudrillard and the End of the Social-as-Real
The early work of Jean Baudrillard in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's sought to supplement traditional Marxist 
theory with insights from structural linguistics and 
semiotics.18 Baudrillard was then concerned with 
understanding political economy as a semiological system of 
sign consumption rather than as a specific mode of economic 
production. For Baudrillard, contemporary society is a 
post-industrial one— marked by mass consumption. As such, 
the logic of its dynamics are to found at a different level 
than a production-oriented society. Baudrillard envisions 
consumption, not in the traditional Marxist terms of an 
usurping of use value by exchange value with the 
development of the capitalist mode of production, but as "a 
system which assures the regulations of signs and
18 Cf. Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the 
Political Economy of the Sion, trans. by Charles Levin (St. 
Louis: Telos Press, (1972) 1981.
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integration of the group."19 This means that a consumer
society "substitutes a social order of values and
classification for a contingent world of needs and
pleasures, the natural and biological order."20
Consequently, in consumer society:
Marketing, purchasing, sales, the acquisition of 
differentiated commodities and object/signs— all 
of these presently constitute our language, a code 
with which our entire society communicates and 
speaks of and to itself. Such is the present 
structure of communication...21
The underlying code or language of consumer society is
distinct from the underlying code of an industrial or
production oriented society. The code of consumer society
is marked, not bv the underlying dynamics of class conflict
and exchange rationale, but bv a proliferation of
consumption inducing signs.
By the late 1970's the language or code of consumer 
society had become all-pervasive for Baudrillard. The 
proliferation of the commodity sign, made possible by the 
simulational world of television and other informational 
technologies, had completely permeated the sphere of 
language, communication, and as a consequence, society. As 
William Bogard has described it:
19 Jean Baudrillard, "Consumer Society" in Mark Poster 
(ed.), Selected Writings (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), p. 46.
20 Ibid., p. 47.
21 Ibid., p. 48.
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What fascinates modern man, and what finds its 
support in the hi-tech, digitalized world of 
post-industrial consumer society, is electronic 
simulation (television, which for us has become 
more true than true; computer models, more real 
than real), fashion (more beautiful than beautiful), 
catastrophe (more eventful than the event)...22
Essentially, post-industrial consumer society is so
"entangled in illusion that the distinction between true
and false. TV and reality, cannot legitimately be made."23
With this proliferation and blurring of original notions of
direct signification caused by the various informational
technologies, the real has become the hyperreal. "We have
become completely absorbed by models, completely absorbed
by fashion, completely absorbed by simulation."24 As a
result, traditional notions of referentiality have
collapsed. The "precession of the model...puts an end to
the real."25 It becomes impossible to establish
correspondence referentiality in a climate where the sign
replaces and obliterates the object it originally
22 William Bogard, "Closing Down the Social: 
Baudrillard's Challenge to Contemporary Sociology," 
Sociological Theory, 8, 1990, p. 4.
23 Steven Best, "The Commodification of Reality and 
the Reality of Commodification: Jean Baudrillard and Post- 
Modernism, " in Current Perspectives in Social Theory, ed. 
by John Wilson (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1989), p. 38, 
emphasis added.
24 Jean Baudrillard, "Fatal Strategies," in Selected 
Writjpgs, 1988, p. 187.
25 Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent 
Majorities (New York: Jean Baudrillard and Semiotext(e), 
1983), p. 98-99.
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represented (e.g., "is it real...or is it memorex").
Reality has been replaced by appearance. It becomes
impossible to distinguish between the real and simulacrum.
One important result of the collapse of referentialitv
is that what we once called society has become an
indistinguishable "mass." Cultural, ethnic, and class
differences are becoming leveled by the homogeneous (and
homogenizing) hum of the television and related
simulational technologies.26 In Baudrillard's words, "the
masses are no longer a referent because they no longer
belong to the order of representation."27 The masses as a
signifier no longer corresponds to an object-in-the-world.
The masses no longer can be referred to as a civil society,
culture, "the people," class, or a repository for
revolution or social action. All referentiality and with
it all attached meanings have been leveled. With this
leveling comes the "implosion" of the social-as-signifier.
The social has become empty.28 Baudrillard writes:
....If the social is both destroyed by what produces 
it (the media, information) and reabsorbed by what it 
produces (the masses), it follows that its definition
26 The leveling of ethnic and class differences has 
also been pointed out by North American mass media critics, 
cf. George Gerbner, "Television: A New State Religion?" Et 
Cetera, 34, 1977.
27 Baurdillard, In the Shadow of the Silent 
Majorities. 1983, p. 20.
28 Baudrillard is not only saying that the social has 
disappeared, he is also arguing that the social has never 
existed, cf. Ibid., pp. 71-72
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is empty, and that this term which serves as universal 
alibi for every discourse, no longer analyses anything, 
no longer designates anything. Not only is it 
superfluous and useless...it conceals that it is 
only abstraction and residue, or even simply 
an effect of the social, a simulation and an 
illusion.29
The social as a "universal alibi" for politicians and
social scientists has ceased to exist. The social as a
grand concept or reality principle has been destroyed by
information technologies and redeployed in an
undifferentiated or undifferentiatiable mass. Here, the
social ceases to have hermeneutical meaning or critical
potentiality.
(The masses) don't express themselves, they are 
surveyed. They don't reflect upon themselves, they 
are tested. The referendum (and the media are a 
constant referendum of directed questions and 
answers) has been substituted for the 
political referent. Now polls, tests, the 
referendum, media are devices which no longer 
belong to a dimension of representation, but to 
one of simulation.30
As further evidence of the collapse of the social,
Baudrillard cites the refusal of the French to protest the
extradition of a German lawyer (Klaus Croissant) while a
soccer match was on television.31 A sociality (i.e., a
sense of social identity) with any inherent meaning has
ceased to exists. He asks, "where is sociality in Los
29 Ibid., p. 66.
30 Ibid., p. 20.
31 Ibid., p. 12.
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Angeles?"32
For Baudrillard, the rise of the undifferentiated mass 
marks, not only the end or implosion of the social, but 
also the end of that positivistic or realistic discourse 
which developed and sought to capture it— sociology. 
Sociology, as the master discourse on the social, no longer 
has an object— a point of reference— a signified.
Therefore, it dies alongside the social. Baudrillard 
writes:
Sociology can only depict the expansion of the social 
and its vicissitudes. It survives only on the positive 
and definitive hypothesis of the social. The 
reabsorption, the implosion of the social escapes it. 
The hypothesis of the death of the social is also 
that of its own death.33
The social and sociology have been swallowed up by a new
version of society. In this version all transcendence and
referentialitv are impossible. In other words, it is no
longer possible for the "all-knowing sociologist" to
utilize the term "society" to capture the social. Speaking
as sociologist (or more accurately as an ex-sociologist),
Baudrillard writes:
The situation no longer permits us to isolate reality 
or human nature as a fundamental variable. The result 
is therefore not to provide any additional information 
or to shed any light on reality, but on the contrary, 
because we will never in the future be able to separate 
reality from its statistical, simulative projection 
in the media, a state of suspense and definitive
32 Ibid., p. 83.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
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uncertainty about reality.34 
Sociology then dissolves into a form of literature, 
poetics, or science fiction— although the "gibberish of the 
'social sciences' will still echo it, i.e., the social, 
long after its disappearance."35 It no longer can claim a 
privileged epistemological position from which to express 
and defend its truth claims. Sociology's epistemological 
position was based on the ability of its perspective and 
concepts to extract meaning from (or impart meaning to) the 
social. These meaning-extracting and granting functions of 
sociology are no longer possible in an era marked by the 
social's disappearance. The traditional type of social, 
that is the actively-constructed, community based culture, 
has been upsurbed by a simulational mass society.
Ironically, Baudrillard's argument is a social theory 
of the death of social theory. It is meant to be a type of 
final word on the irrelevance of sociology in the 
contemporary world.36 Henceforth, Baudrillard commits 
himself to writing something akin to science fiction or an
34 Jean Baudrillard, "The Masses," in Mark Poster 
(ed.), Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 210.
35 Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent 
Majorities. 1983, p. 68.
36 In this regard, cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming 
Crisis in Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
237
"absurdist pataphysics" (i.e., emotionally based 
comments).37 This science fiction may have "flashes of 
insights," but it is literature or poetics rather than 
traditional critique, analysis, or theory. The goal of 
analysis is to become excessive and exuberant. Baudrillard 
writes:
(Theory) must become excessive and sacrificial 
to speak about excess and sacrifice. It must 
become simulation if it speaks about simulation, 
and deploy the same strategy as its object. If 
it speaks about seduction, theory must become the 
seducer, and deploy the same stratagems...38
Sociology's only option is to become hyper-conformist. It
must, in a Nietzschian way, recognize the mass "as the
repository of a finally delusive, illusive, and allusive
strategy, the correlative of an ironic, joyful, and
seductive conscious."39
In many ways, Baudrillard can be seen as bringing 
postmodern problematics into sociology. What was once 
merely an obscure and arcane debate in philosophy, 
architecture, and literary criticism has now infiltrated 
the "serious discourse" of the social sciences. For 
Baudrillard. not only is the individual decentered, but 
also the social. It seems that the social is as unstable
37 Cf. Best, "The Commodification of Reality," 1989,
p. 36. One of the most illustrative examples of this style 
of writing is Baudrillard's, America (London: Verso, 1988).
38 Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication (New 
York: Semiotext(e), 1988), p. 27.
39 Baudrillard, "The Masses," 1988, p. 217.
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as modernist "man." The social, it turns out is not able 
to take the place of the subject, as the structuralist 
seemed to argue. Baudrillard's "critique" of sociology is 
a clever and ironical attack upon the epistemological 
position and cherished principles of the discipline. For 
Baudrillard, the social is a text without depth. It is 
nothing (and never has been anything) but a system of 
signification. When this signification becomes confused or 
blurred, the social simply ceases to exist— it dies or 
implodes.
Baudrillard, as with most postmodernists, generally 
offers us a nominalistic view of the social. Within this 
framework, when sociologists speak of the social or any of 
its elements or characteristics (e.g., social class, 
status, anomie, alienation, etc.), they are not talking 
about a real realm or real phenomena. Essentially, 
sociologists are giving an artificial and arbitrary 
signifier, which could easily be represented in another way 
or not represented at all. Consequently, sociology is 
trying to create meaning and causality in a realm which 
lacks independent substance. There is no correspondence 
between the sociological word and the social world. Within 
the Baudrillardian and the nominalistically-influenced 
postmodern framework, if referentiality is no longer 
possible, then all hopes of finding fixed, determinate 
meaning (such as in the social) ceases to be possible. The
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only courses of action which remains are nihilistic 
surrender or endless and meaningless literary 
pontification— a rather necessary, but not sufficient, 
aspect of the transition to a different intellectual 
culture.
Despite his playful idiosyncrasies, Baudrillard is 
offering an important critique of the modern, conventional 
sociology discussed earlier. Both the positivists and 
realists rest their truth claims on grasping the social as 
it exists: If we accept Baudrillard's argument, this task
is no longer possible. In the context of his views, 
sociologists are at best bad poets or at worst 
unsophisticated con artists1
Baudrillard's vision of the social is as unacceptable 
as the objectivistic positivism and realism of conventional 
sociology. We can no more accept the idea that our
sociological concepts capture and illuminate the social-in-
itself, than we can accept Baudrillard's postmodern 
position that the social is merely signification-without- 
reference. Both perspectives represent the extremes of 
objectivism and nominalism. They either promote their 
knowledge as completely accurate or they argue that 
concepts are relative and have no validity. Both
perspectives need new ways of conceiving the social which
avoids both all-knowing objectivism and the total collapse 
of meaning in postmodernist relativism and nihilism.
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In the next section, we take up this issue of how we 
can develop a view of the social which avoids (not solves) 
the problems of both conventional sociology and 
postmodernism. This does not involve a fateful strategy of 
out-manoeuvreing one's opponent. This is philosophically 
impossible. It is more along the lines of thinking of the 
social and social investigations in different terms. 
Fortunately, the material for this construction is already 
in place. The late work of Durkheim provides a means for 
examining the postmodern position and for providing an 
alternative vision of epistemology.
Rethinking Durkheim; The Encounter with Pragmatism 
Durkheim is generally recognized to be the individual 
responsible for the establishment of sociology as an 
objectivistic and positivistic endeavor. As such, he is 
generally considered by critics to be one of the most 
extreme advocates of the conventional sociology discussed 
earlier. There is certainly enough evidence to support 
this position. In The Rules of Sociological Method. 
Durkheim proclaimed sociology's intellectual mission as the 
search for "social facts."40 Sociology is to be an 
objective discipline "dominated entirely by the idea that
40 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. 1966, 
pp 1-13.
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social facts are things and must be treated as such."41 
However, in this section, and in the next chapter, we would 
like to go beyond the objectivism and facticity of 
Durkheim's social facts into a Durkheimian-based sociology 
of knowledge. This sociology of knowledge was introduced 
in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, however, it 
seems to come to its fruition in his encounter with 
American pragmatism. It is this encounter we wish to 
explore, for it seems to provide an important means for 
evaluating the total collapse of meaning in postmodernism. 
First, however, a brief caveat on two very unlikely 
compatriots, Nietzsche and Durkheim.
Nietzsche and Durkheim
Two important declarations on God were made in the 
late nineteenth century. The most notorious of these 
statements was Nietzsche's affirmative proclamation, "God 
is dead." The other, by Durkheim, declared that "God and 
society are one."42 At first glance, it would appear that 
these statements have little in common beyond their point 
of reference. The former statement was made to signal the 
end of moral and philosophical foundationalism and the 
dawning of a postmodern age of nihilism and unverifiable
41 Ibid., p. 143.
42 Emile Durkheim, The, Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life, trans. by J.H. Swain (London: Allen & Unwin), p. 206.
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truth claims. The latter statement was made as part of an 
effort to establish a science of society and allow for 
definitive truth declarations. Generally, Durkheim's 
statement is seen as affirming and extending the 
explanatory power of modern notions of rationality and 
science. However, from a sociology of knowledge 
perspective these statements can be read as complementary 
theoretical visions.
When Nietzsche argued that God was dead he was not 
simply making a statement about the secularization of 
Occidental culture. He was also saying that all efforts at 
establishing transcendental or extra-human knowledge are in 
vain. Essentially, Nietzsche was using the death of "God" 
as a metaphor for the inevitable demise of modern science's 
epistemological myth of transcendental or objectivistic 
knowledge. At a certain level, this argument is parallel 
to what Durkheim is arguing about the relationship between 
God and society. In arguing that explanations of God must 
be found in the collective organization of the social, 
Durkheim is too saying that the transcendental and 
metaphysical explanations of God and truth are 
unacceptable. Both Nietzsche and Durkheim seek to replace 
philosophically-based truth claims, with a different 
version of belief/knowledge production. For both Nietzsche 
and Durkheim, all phenomena are "human, all-too-human." 
However, it is at this point that these two related visions
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of the exhaustion of traditional philosophy part company.
We have traced the Nietzschian-inspired postmodern path 
into nihilism. Now we will explore the sociological path.
Durkheim's Pragmatism Lectures
During the 1913-14 academic year, Durkheim gave a 
series of lectures on pragmatism at the Sorbonne. Marcel 
Mauss refer to these lectures as "the crowning achievement 
of Durkheim's philosophical work."43 The verbatim content 
of the lectures were never published and were subsequently 
lost. However, under the guidance of Mauss, the lectures 
were compiled and later published using student lecture 
notes.44 The content of these lectures reveal a different 
and more complex Durkheim than the one given by and adapted 
into conventional sociology. As Armand Cuvillier remarks 
in the Preface to the French edition, in these lectures 
"Durkheim's sociological realism finally resolves itself 
into a theory of knowledge which is at the same time 
idealistic and realistic."45 These lectures serve as a 
platform for Durkheim to explore "the nature and function
43 Quoted in Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim; His Life 
and Work (London: Allen Lange, 1973), p. 485.
44 Originally published as Praomatisme et socioloaie 
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955). Translated 
by J.C. Whitehouse as, Pragmatism and Sociology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
45 Ibid., p. xv.
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of concepts, and the role of speculative thought.H*4 
Through a disucssion of Durkheim's encounter with 
pragmatism, we will perhaps find a way of rethinking the 
total collapse or leveling of all meaning in postmodernism.
As the title of the lectures suggests, Durkheim seeks
to come to grips with the American pragmatist movement. He
is sympathetic to the general attempt of pragmatism "to
soften truth."47 However, Durkheim has serious
reservations about pragmatism's amorphous conclusions
(i.e., its formlessness and relativism). Durkheim
appreciates pragmatism's "heightened sense of human
reality, the feeling for the extreme variability of
everything human."40 Specifically, he accepts the
pragmatists arguments that reality is unstable and that
truth is a human product. On these points, pragmatism and
sociology are in agreement. Durkheim writes:
History begins nowhere and it ends nowhere.
Everything in man has been made by mankind in 
the course of time. Consequently, if truth is human, 
it too is a human product. Sociology applies the 
same conception to reason. All that constitutes 
reason, its principles and categories, has been 
made in the course of history.49
However, the pragmatists take this revelation about the
human construction of truth to mean that the only
46 Ibid., p. xl
47 Ibid., p. 67.
48 Ibid., p. 71.
49 Ibid., p. 67.
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conceptualization of truth that is possible is one where it 
is conceived as a convenient instrument for the attainment 
of individual goals. For the pragmatists, truth has only a 
practical or utilitarian value. Truth is nothing more than 
a helpful means for the organization of individual 
experience and for the conduct of daily life.50 This 
being the case, the pragmatist conclude that there is no 
need for any broader, cumulative, or speculative 
philosophy.
It is on this point that Durkheim and the pragmatists 
part company. For Durkheim the revelations of the human 
character and instability of truth does not mean that it 
has ceased to serve as a guiding principle of a society or 
group. For Durkheim, truth is best conceived of as a 
"collective representation." As such, truth, like 
morality, has an "obligatory nature," rather than merely a 
philosophical or epistemological one.51 "Truth is a norm
50 Durkheim seems to be refering more to the 
pragmatism of James than that of Dewey or Pierce. For 
example, Pierce once wrote, "...the real is the idea in 
which the community ultimately settles down..." quoted in, 
C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p. 202. Pierce's social theory of 
reality seems close to Durkheim's conceptualization. 
However, Pierce does not believe that the community 
actually constitutes the truth. The community will 
eventually appropriate the nature of reality. Dewey 
promotes a consensus theory of truth, similar to 
Durkheim's, yet it relies on a much more individualistic 
version of society. Undoubtedly, Durkheim presents a 
simplified view of pragmatism.
51 Durkheim, Pragmatism and Sociology. 1983, p. 98.
for thought in the same way that the moral ideal is a norm
for conduct. "52 Hence:
We are not free in a state of certainty. We feel 
obliged to adhere to truth. We see our certainty 
as something that is not personal to us, and that is 
to be shared by all men. Whether this is an illusion 
or not, we have that belief.53
Truth, then, is something beyond individual experience and
individual utility. It cannot be adequately understood in
the subjectivistic terms described by the pragmatists. A
better understanding is provided from a sociology of
knowledge perspective.
While Durkheim agreed with the pragmatists that truth
has no ultimate metaphysical foundation and we can
therefore "no longer accept a single, invariable system of
catagories or intellectual frameworks," its sacred nature
does serve as a means to orient life and for the social
production of knowledge.54
It could well be that certainty is essentially
something collective. We are onlv certain when we
are certain that we are not the only ones who are 
certain. Even when we have worked out a personal 
belief, we need to communicate it, in order to 
to be certain that we are not mistaken. The authority 
of tradition and opinion is not, of course, exempt 
from criticism. When we criticize them, however, 
it is always in their*own name. When, for example, 
we criticize popular prejudices in the name of science, 
we are using the authority which opinion accords to
52 Ibid., p. 98.
53 Ibid., p. 101.
54 Ibid., p. 71.
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Iscience.55
Both pragmatism and the Durkheimian sociology of knowledge 
agree that certainty and truth are not absolute catagories 
derived from the real world. However, unlike the 
subjectivistic implications drawn by pragmatism, sociology 
emphasizes that certainty and truth are socially contingent 
issues that are worked-out and negotiated through 
interaction with others. Furthermore, if there are 
disagreements on truth, there is an appeal to legitimate 
authority/knowledge structures to determine the outcome of 
competing claims.56 Durkheim concludes that "if there are 
ways of acting which impose themselves on us through 
collective authority, why should there not be ways of 
thinking that would impose themselves on us in the same 
way, through the authority of the collective 
consciousness. "57
Durkheim further concludes that "the concepts worked 
out by the masses and those worked out by scientists are 
not essentially different in nature."58 Both are products 
of the confines of particular knowledge producing
55 Ibid., p. 102, emphasis added. Cf. Baudrillard's 
vision of the "social," discussed earlier in this chapter.
56 This is similar to Habermas' position described 
earlier, however, Durkheim does not wish to use this 
insight to develop a larger emancipatory model. In this 
regard, it is perhaps closer to Nietzsche's power/knowledge 
perspective.
57 Durkheim, Pragmatism and Sociology. 1983, p. 101.
58 Ibid., p. 105.
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r:ninmunifci«». Durkheim writes:
Concepts which are collective in origin (as all 
concepts really are) take on in our eyes, even when 
their object in not a real one, such a strength that 
it appears to be real. That is why concepts acquire 
the vividness and force of action, of sensations.59
Durkheim acknowledges the arbitrary nature of concepts, but
this does not mean that they are socially or heuristically
meaningless. Within the confines of a community or
society, these concepts have a collective representation
(collective symbolism) that extends their meaning beyond
the dictates of the philosophical community and its
arguments about referentiality or correspondence. These
concepts serve to orient the conduct of social life.
In these lectures (and throughout his work) one could 
certainly raise objections to Durkheim's hegemonic and 
totalizing use (to borrow some terms from Foucault) of 
collective consciousness and collective representation, but 
conclude that Durkheim's basic point is still valid.60 
From a Durkheimian sociology of knowledge perspective, even 
if we dispense with the traditional philosophical notions 
of truth and concept/reality correspondence, meaning does 
not become disintegrated and scattered. There remain
59 Ibid., p. 101.
60 This totalizing of collective consciousness led to 
the development of the control position in theoretical 
sociology. To avoid this, it would seen more appropriate 
to break Durkheim's totalizing collective representation 
into smaller sub-fields which compete in knowledge 
production and vie for legitimation.
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Iinteractional networks and authority hierarchies which 
organize and utilize the notion (or ideology) of truth. 
Granted this is not the idea of truth sought after by the 
majority of Western philosophy, we can say that it is still 
a guiding pragmatic principle of the organization of 
society.
One of Durkheim's central arguments in these lectures 
is that issues of truth and reality cannot be adeguately 
dealt with through a traditional philosophical or 
epistemological reading. An adequate accounting requires a 
sociology of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge is not 
concerned with drawing distinctions between true and false 
forms of knowledge. Rather, it is concerned with 
accounting for the how and why of knowledge production. It 
is this point that is most crucial for our discussion and 
requires further elaboration.
There are some important parallels between 
postmodernism and pragmatism which make Durkheim's lectures 
most poignant for our considerations. Both pragmatism and 
postmodernism seek to move away from traditional philosophy 
and both tend to level the distinctions between fact and 
fiction, science and literature, and professional and lay 
interpretations. However, the critical point that can be 
extracted from Durkheim is that while this move is 
"philosophically logical," at least within the defined 
goals of classical philosophy, it is not "sociologically
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Ilogical." In making this move, both the postmodernists and 
pragmatists end up denying the socially (or group) 
constituted performative nature of truth. Within the 
intellectual framework of philosophy, it indeed may be no 
longer possible firmly to establish foundational truth by 
capturing the world-as-it-is. However, sociologically, the 
ideal of truth still has meaning.
One of the central reasons that the social version of 
truth still has meaning is due to the absence of a 
correspondence between the social version and nature of 
truth and the philosophical version. Essentially, the two 
versions were never connected or compatible— they are 
incommensurable. From the sociology of knowledge 
perspective, we can say that revealing that philosophy can 
no longer distinguish between fact and fantasy does not 
require that people begin marching in the streets demanding 
a restoration of correspondence referentiality or that 
scientists stop working because their concepts no longer 
enable them to construct a computer or engage in bio­
technology research. Concepts such as truth and reality 
have a certain social facticity beyond the idiosyncratic 
idealistic debates of philosophical discourse (or any 
discourse). Hence, the collapse of meaning in pragmatism 
and postmodernism does not tell us anything about the 
collapse or non-collapse of the organization and production 
of reality and truth. It only tells us why one particular
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productional rationale of truth and one version of reality
are no longer ideationally possible. Commenting on the
pragmatic leveling of truth, Durkheim writes:
(For the pragmatists) reason is placed on the 
same plane as sensitivity; truth on the same plane 
as sensations and instincts. But men have always 
recognized in truth something that in certain respects 
imposes itself on us, something that is independent 
of the facts of sensitivity and individual impulses... 
It is one thing to cast doubt on the correspondence 
between symbols and reality: but it is quite another 
to reject the thing symbolized along with the 
symbol.61
Essentially, this is an ironic vindication of 
transcendence; it can be considered the outcome of both 
pragmatic and postmodern thought. In postmodernism's 
idealistic and pragmatism's subjectivistic collapse or 
leveling of all meaning, they inevitably throw out the 
object with the symbol. The symbol or the idea is seen as 
being more concrete, real, and confining than the actual 
object. Objects only exist as mental representations.
Once these representations have been "deconstructed," the 
object ceases to be "real" and produce "real" consequences. 
Again, this may make philosophical sense, but it does not 
make sociological sense. Indeed, the relationship between 
signifier and signified may be ideationally arbitrary and a 
correspondence between word and world may not exist, but 
this does not mean that these distinctions are socially 
meaningless or cease to have social or group importance.
61 Ibid., p. 68.
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For Durkheim and the sociology of knowledge, the "pressure
that truth is seen as exercising on minds is itself a
symbol that must be interpreted, even if we refuse to make
of truth something absolute and extra-human.w62 On this
point, Durkheim writes:
Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself 
of the means of making this interpretation by failing 
to recognize the duality that exists between the 
mentality which results from individual experiences and 
that which results from collective experiences. 
Sociology, however, reminds us that what is social 
always possesses a higher dignity than what is 
individual. The sociological point of view has the 
advantage of enabling us to analyze even that august 
thing, truth.63
Unlike pragmatism, postmodernism does make a distinction
between individual experience and the socio-historical
constitution of the individual. However, there is no
distinction between the philosophical view of the world and
the social world. Despite arguments to the contrary,
postmodernism essentially is still caught up in a realistic
correspondence model of word and world referentiality.
Only within such a model would it be possible to claim that
Occidental reason is logocentric (Derrida), or that the
metanarratives of modernity have collapsed (Lyotard), or
that the social has imploded (Baudrillard). Giving up this
model requires more than a new philosophical position
(modern— postmodern, pos itivism— postpos itivism,
62 Ibid., p. 68.
63 Ibid., p. 68.
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constructionism— deconstructionism). It requires a 
sociologically based model which dispenses with determining 
who has a better representation of reality or who is 
providing us with a true account of a given phenomenon and 
turns to the issue of the social production of reality, 
truth, and knowledge. This of course does require some 
degree of realism— perhaps a cautious or constructivist 
realism (We will discuss this further in the next chapter). 
But perhaps this is a necessity in all linguistically or 
symbolically based statements or programs.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have sought to sketch out what an 
encounter between postmodernism and sociology might look 
like. As stated earlier, this encounter was not intended 
as a sociological critique of postmodernism or as a 
postmodern critique of sociology. We have tried to show 
that postmodernism, as an essentially philosophically based 
perspective, is somewhat sociologically naive, particularly 
in regard to its total collapse of meaning. Yet, the same 
can be said of the objectivistic position of conventional 
sociology.
The proceeding exposition raises three important and 
related questions for the sociology of knowledge position 
presented herein. First of all, does the outcome of this 
encounter mean that sociology has to give up its privileged
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epistemological position on the social? Secondly, can we 
assume that sociology is a form of literature or poetics? 
And, finally, how can such an analysis given in this 
chapter avoid the problem of reflexivity (i.e., why should 
we believe this position's truth claims)? We can only 
answer these questions in a provisional way here. We will 
take up these questions throughout the remainder of this 
work.
In regard to the first point, if we see sociology in 
the traditional way, the answer has to be, yes. Sociology 
can not defend the position that it has a privileged or 
superior access to truth. However, this does not mean that 
sociology has nothing to say or that its intellectual 
products are meaningless. Questions of this nature can 
always be seen from either a philosophical or sociological 
perspective. Nor does it mean that sociology is literature 
or poetics. If indeed sociology is merely literature, we 
must insert the sociological point that all literature is 
not socially the same. Hence, we can always sidestep the 
philosophical position with a sociological one and vice 
versa.
Finally, in regard to the problem of reflexivity, it 
has been said that philosophers never solve problems, they 
only become bored with them. Perhaps the same is true for 
postmodernly inclined philosophers and practitioners of the 
sociology of knowledge. There is really no clear way out
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Iof the problem of reflexivity. It is a spiralin? and
ironic intellectual trap. As Hilary Lawson has written:
For to recognize the importance of language is to do 
so within the language. To argue that the character of 
the world is in part due to the concepts employed, is 
to employ those concepts. To insist that we are 
confined by the limitations of our own problematic 
is to be confined within those very limits.64
While this may not mean "business as usual" within
sociology or any other field, it can be said that if we
simply refuse to reflect on such isssues, we still are
confronted by the need to end the metatheoretical spiral
somewhere. Thus, perhaps it is not a matter of selecting
one strategy which forever avoids the problem of
reflexivity, but a matter of deciding on a pragmatically
cautious or constructivist version of reality. Within the
logical of this position, reality can be used if it
reconized to be a socially constructed heuristic device— a
way of making statments and not an objectivistic
foundation.
In the next two chapters we will take up the specific 
ways in which both reality and truth can be perceived in 
sociological, rather than traditional philosophical, terms.
64 Hilary Lawson, Reflexivity: The Post-Modern 
Predicament (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1985.), p. 9.
Cf. the Goedel Theorem in Mathematics, which maintains that 
no logical argument can be made merely by an appeal to 
concepts and notions within a given arithematic system; 
consistency has to come from another system with stronger 
resources. It is also worth noting that there may be some 
parallels between postmodern philosophy and chaos theory in 




FROM A PHILOSOPHY TO A SOCIOLOGY OF TRUTH:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF KNOWLEDGE
In the preceding chapter, ve began the process of 
rethinking postmodernism's frontal attack on all aspects of 
meaning through the introduction of a Durkheimian- 
influenced sociology of knowledge. It was argued that 
postmodernism is perhaps philosophically correct, yet 
sociologically naive, when it dispenses with the concept of 
reality and levels down all truth and validity claims. In 
fact, it can be argued that this leveling represents the 
type of totalizing thinking (cf. Foucault's discussion of 
totalizing discourse) which postmodernism itself seems to 
deplore in modern discursive formations. We concluded that 
the postmodern position, despite its argument of being 
"post-philosophical," is still deeply enveloped within a 
philosophical or epistemological way of seeing and 
explaining the world. Essentially, it may be said that 
certain forms of postmodernism remain caught within the 
"idealist fallacy," that is, "the belief that all 
significant forms of order may be reduced to language like 
processes."1 As a consequence of this position, when
1 Timothy J. Reiss, The Uncertainty of Analysis: 
Problems in Truth. Meaning, and Culture (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), p. 4.
257
language or theory "orders" are seen as being no longer 
capable of capturing unmediated reality, all discursive 
meaning effectively implodes or ends and all "orders" 
effectively collapse. As a result of this philosophical or 
idealistic way of perceiving the world, contemporary theory 
has a tendency to either become a referentless poetics 
(i.e., a form of fiction) or entangled in an inescapable 
and hopeless nihilism.
In this chapter, we will continue our search for a 
sociological means for reconsidering the issues of reality 
and truth. Specifically, we will discuss the contributions 
a sociology of knowledge, particularly in its neo- 
Durkheimian variant, can make for our appraisal of 
postmodernism. We will draw upon the work of Mannheim, 
Latour, and others.
Essentially, we will argue three points. First, while 
this sociological version is not unproblematic, it does 
point to the existence of a different framework for 
approaching such fundamental and traditional philosophical 
distinctions or crucial dualities as reality and 
appearance, truth and myth, knowledge and belief, and 
objectivism and relativism. Secondly, we will argue that 
all of these distinctions, in one way or another, rest on 
the realist position that an objective account of social or 
natural reality is or has been possible. This 
correspondence account (i.e., that theory captures and
258
Ilanguage reports the real) is one which the sociological 
framework seeks to avoid. However, it is important to 
point out that this maneuvering does not stem from the 
claim that the sociological framework has captured the true 
reality which philosophy has somehow missed. Rather, it 
originates in the argument that truth and reality, 
including the sociological versions, need to be thought of 
as the "social constructs" of knowledge and culture 
producers, instead of metaphysical entities existing 
outside of human socio-political activity. Finally, we 
will argue that a perspective of this type allows one to 
avoid the meaningless gibberish or nihilistic silence, the 
sort of reductio ad absurdum. which is often the outcome of 
postmodern philosophical thinking. It, thus, can be seen 
as a possible means for steering clear of the idealistic 
quagmires associated with postmodernism.
In order to explore the potential contributions of the 
sociology of knowledge to our examination of postmodern 
discourse, we will first examine the thought of Karl 
Mannheim, explicating his general vision of what the 
sociology of knowledge should be doing and how it should 
approach the issues of truth and reality. This section 
also contains a discussion of the so-called "strong 
program" in the sociology of knowledge, one which seeks to 
extend Mannheim's vision of sociology to all spheres of 
knowledge. Next, we will take-up the constructivist
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Iposition of Bruno Latour in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Latour's discussion of science provides one of 
the most illuminating examples of how a sociology of 
knowledge model can respond to the general philosophical 
catagories of truth and reality, thus making an important 
contribution to our discussion and appraisal of postmodern 
theory. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of how 
these insights from the sociology of knowledge allow us to 
"place postmodernism in perspective."
It must be added that there are three general 
directions one can take when examining the issues of truth 
and reality from a sociological perspective. First, one 
can explore the phenomenology of everyday life or micro 
"construction of reality" along the lines of Schutz, 
Garfinkel, Goffman, or Berger and Luckmann.2 Secondly, 
one can explore the general "social milieu" which molds all 
forms of knowledge, such as Mannheim's work. Finally, one 
can explore the organization and production of truth by 
certain scientific or intellectual groups, as in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. Generally speaking, the 
first two positions have been concerned with so-called
2 Specifically see, Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology 
of the Social World, trans. by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert 
(Northwestern University Press, 1967), Harold Garfinkel, 
Studies in Ethnomethodoloav (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967), Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of 
Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
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"conunonsense knowledge" and the latter with "specialized 
knowledge." For this presentation, selecting the 
appropriate sociological approach and "level of analysis" 
of reality or truth is not a decision based on who is 
closer to the truth about the social world, but a matter of 
interpretative expediency or practical reason. We wish to 
avoid the momentum distraction sectarian issues: While
utilizing them as we deem fit. We are suspending judgment 
on the relative merits of the micro and macro perspectives 
and the general micro/macro debate in social theory. 
Consequently, since our primary concern is with the 
"specialized knowledge" of postmodernism, we will primarily 
focus on the latter type of sociology, the "macro” one, 
regarless of overlap. We will select from each perspective 
what is necessary for the development and explication of an 
over-all sociology of knowledge framework.
The Sociology of Knowledge: From Mannheim to the 
"Strong Program"
The roots of the sociology of knowledge can be found 
in many of the "classic statements" of nineteenth-century 
European sociology, such as Marx's structure/superstructure 
dichotomy, Weber's discussion of religious types, and 
Durkheim's concept of collective representations. However, 
the sociology of knowledge was only formally introduced as 
a branch of sociological analysis by Max Scheler and given 
a firm direction by Karl Mannheim in the 1920's. For
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Mannheim, the chief spokesperson for the early sociology of
knowledge, its goal was to explore how thinking functions
as "an instrument of collective action."3 In this
respect, the goal of the sociology of knowledge is vastly
different from that of traditional philosophy.
Historically, most philosophy had only concerned itself
with one type of (pure) knowledge and one knowledge-
producing system; with few exceptions, it had not been
concerned with the dynamics of everyday or commonsensical
thought and knowledge. In a paridigmatic statement,
Mannheim's comments,
Philosophers have too long concerned themselves with 
their own thinking. When they wrote of thought, they 
had in mind primarily their own history, the history 
of philosophy....This type of thinking is applicable 
only under quite special circumstances, and what can 
be learned by analyzing it is not directly transferable 
to other spheres of life.4
Traditional philosophy, with its quest for absolute and
universal truth, was not conceptually equipped to address
the historical, cultural, and group variability of
knowledge content. The tendency of much of conventional
philosophy was to label various knowledge claims as either
rational or irrational or to treat them as "closing in on
the truth" (i.e., leading towards cumulative knowledge).
With regard to the former, knowledge either corresponded to
3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. by L.
Wirth and E. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 
1936), p. 1, emphasis added.
4 Ibid., p. 1.
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Ithe rigorous requirements of rational or empirical 
development, proof, and argumentation and was deemed, 
knowledge, or it did not and was labeled, belief. In the 
latter tendency, each historical endeavour was usually seen 
as merely a step on the road to ultimate truth about an 
object or issue (cf. the discussion of rationality and 
progress in Chapter 6). However, the sociology of 
knowledge, as Mannheim conceived it, was to trace the 
social origins of certain "modes of thought."5 For 
Mannheim, these modes of thought had to be located within 
the historically-specific social milieux and the general 
social frameworks which produced them.
Mannheim recognizes that the sociology of knowledge is 
itself historically and socially constituted. In a setting 
where truth can be clearly ascertained there is really no 
need for a sociology of knowledge. When religion, 
philosophy, science, or some other discourse can provide 
the appropriate rationale for the conduct of "intellectual 
business," there is no need for a discussion of the social 
circumstances that produce knowledge. However, in periods 
when truth "slips away," or "dismantles," such as in modern 
society, a "relational" sociology of knowledge is a 
necessity. For Mannheim, the fragmentation of knowledge in 
the modern world has undoubtedly introduced the appropriate 
time for the emergence of a sociology of knowledge. In
5 Ibid., p. 2.
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Mannheim's words,
It is clear that such problems can become general 
only in an age in which disagreement is more 
conspicuous than agreement. One turns from the 
direct observation of things to the consideration of 
ways of thinking only when the possibility of direct 
and continuous elaboration of concepts concerning 
things and situations has collapsed in the face of 
multiplicity of fundamentally divergent definitions.6
The multiplicity of definitions and the resulting
scattering of meaning have forced modern science seriously
to evaluate the underlying factors which influence
knowledge production.
It is in this regard that Mannheim's sociology of 
knowledge can be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to 
reconstruct the basic rational goals of scientific 
investigation. Mannheim, like the Weber of The Methodology 
of the Social Sciences, wanted to disclose the hidden 
social and historical dimensions at work in any scientific 
endeavor.7 Essentially for both Mannheim and Weber, 
laying open the historical context of knowledge was the 
"only way to provide a limited autonomy to scientific 
inquiry."8 The sociology of knowledge will, in Mannheim's 
words, allow us to "calculate more precisely...modes of
6 Ibid., p. 6.
7 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 
trans. by E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (New York: , 1949).
8 Edward Davenport, "The New Politics of Knowledge: 
Rorty's Pragmatism and the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, 
"Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 17, 1987, p. 397.
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thought and to predict...ideological reactions..."9 It 
could be an instrument for further clarifying the factors 
that inhibit non-distorted knowledge of the world.
However, the intrinsic logic of such a sociological 
approach would, at some point, have to dispense with the 
notion that truth claims are evaluated on their ability to 
correspond accurately with the object of analysis or the 
intellectual integrity of what is claimed as true. In 
other words, the sociology of knowledge would have to 
suspend the philosophical quest of determining who is 
telling the truth, since it possessed sociological rather 
than philosophical criterions of judgment. Because 
Mannheim viewed the sociology of knowledge as partly a 
reconstructivist enterprise, that is as way of determining 
the factors that distort truth, he was reluctant to open 
all forms of knowledge to sociological exploration. 
Essentially, he relegated the sociology of knowledge to 
what might be called mundane discourse. The latent 
rationalism in Mannheim forced him to treat science, logic, 
and mathematics as special cases of knowledge. These 
fields were "free floating" and, therefore, not potential 
sites for sociological discussion.10 It was at this point 
of limited effort where, according to David Bloor,
9 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. 1936, p. 189.
10 Cf. Ibid., p. 79.
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Mannheim's "nerve failed him."11 It is also the point 
where, for purposes of further exploration, the Durkheimian 
influenced "strong program" in the sociology of knowledge 
emerged.
The so-called "strong program" of the sociology of 
knowledge sought to go beyond Mannheim's somewhat timid 
approach to knowledge.12 For the advocates of the strong 
program, all knowledge is culturally and historically 
specific and therefore open to sociological investigation. 
Even those fields, such as science, logic, and mathematics, 
which Mannheim placed in a special supra-historical 
category, were to have their social origins explored and 
explicated. In the words of Mary Hesse, "Knowledge is now 
taken to be what is accepted as such in our culture."13 It 
is to be conceived of as a pragmatic construction of 
various social groups, and not as something independent, 
philosophical, or "in the air." For the strong program
11 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 8.
12 For some early examples of the strong program, Cf. 
Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory 
(London, 1974), Harry M. Collins, "The Seven Sexes: The 
Social Destruction of a Phenomenon," Sociology 9, 1975, pp. 
205-224, Barry Barnes and Steve Shapin, Natural Order 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), and 
Ibid.
13 Mary Hesse, The Strong Thesis of Sociology of 
Science," in Revolutions and Reconstructions in Philosophy 
of Science, ed. by M. Hesse (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1976), p. 42.
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there is "nothing in the physical world which uniquely 
determines the conclusions of that (scientific) 
community."14 Often using Kuhn's discussions of paradigms 
in the philosophy of science as a starting point, the 
strong progam argued that even scientific knowledge is to 
be seen as historically and socially contingent.15 All 
types of science cease to be a special and superior form of 
knowledge clearly distinguishable from belief and immune 
from sociological examination. As we shall see, this move 
has important implications for our consideration of 
postmodernism.
Two of the most outspoken advocates of the strong 
program are Barry Barnes and David Bloor.16 For Bloor the 
strong program has four basic tenets:
1. It would be causal, that is concerned with the 
conditions which bring about belief or states of 
knowledge.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, 
rationality or irrationality, success or failure.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation.
The same types of cause would explain, say, true and 
false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. Like the requirements of
14 Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of 
Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 61.
15 Kuhn's work in the philosophy of science helped 
pave the way for these developments in the sociology of 
knowledge. Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
16 Often they are grouped and simply referred to as 
the "Edinburgh School."
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symmetry this is a response to the need to seek 
general explanations.
The strong program as outlined by Bloor seeks to move
beyond traditional philosophical discussions of truth and
reality into a sociological explanation of various forms of
knowledge. In this regard, it is similar to Mannheim's
sociology of knowledge. However unlike Mannheim, it treats
all knowledge forms as sites of sociological investigation.
Each knowledge form is to be seen as relative to social
factors. In fact the strong program go as far as to argue
that relativism is a necessity for all types of social
scientific understanding. Barnes and Bloor write,
Our claim is that relativism is essential to all 
those disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, 
the history of institutions and ideas, and even 
cognitive psychology, which account for the 
diversity of systems of knowledge....It is those 
who oppose relativism and who grant certain forms of 
knowledge a privileged status, who pose the real 
treat to a scientific understanding of knowledge 
and cognition.18
For Barnes and Bloor the fight is between those who want to
grant a privileged position to one form of knowledge over
another (rationalism) and those who treat all knowledge
equitably or symmetrically (relativism). For Barnes and
Bloor, it is no longer possible to defend the rationalist
position that science is hierarchically superior to other
17 Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery. 1976, p. 4-5.
18 Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, 
Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 21-47 in 
M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), p. 22.
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forms of knowledge or belief; it is no longer possible to
simply brush some knowledge claims aside by saying that
they are irrational beliefs (i.e., that they do not meet
the rigorous requirements of science). In their words,
For the relativist there is not sense attached to 
the idea that some standards or beliefs are really 
rational as distinct from merely locally accepted 
as such. Because he thinks that there are no 
context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality 
he does not see rationally and irrationally held 
beliefs as making up two distinct and qualitatively 
different classes of things.19
Determining what is rational and what is irrational or what
is true and what is false are simply matters of preference
based on the prescribed norms and standards existing within
the investigator's locality. There is no need to appeal to
any "higher source" for the determination of these issues
(something akin to the death of God, as asserted by
Nietzsche and the loss of transcendence as emphasized by
others). The answer is to be found within the social
context which imparts the various criterions for judgment.
As an example of the social contingency of cataaories.
Barnes and Bloor discuss the case of the anthropologist
Robert Bulmer and his difficulty in grasping the taxonomy
of the Karam of New Guinea.20 Bulmer found that the Karam
have a taxon called "yakt" which is similar to our
classification for birds. However in the Karam's taxon,
19 Ibid., pp. 27-28, emphasis added.
20 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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bats wars included while cassowaries were excluded. Bulmer
was forced to examine each "bird" before he was able to
distinguish what belong in the "yakt" taxon and what did
not. For Barnes and Bloor, this case is important because
it reveals that even empirical terms like "bird" or "yakt"
are linguistically context dependent. They write:
What these examples show is that even empirical 
term like 'bird' do not constitute a special core 
of concepts whose application depends only upon an 
unconditioned reason. Learning even the most 
elementary of terms is a slow process that involves 
the acquisition from the culture of specific 
conventions.21
As a result, even that knowledge which is supposedly
empirically and universally valid and reliable, such as
science, is dependent upon culturally produced catagories.
Consequently, no rationally based system of knowledge can
escape the conceptual boundaries of society (cf. the Godel
Theorem in physics).
However a central question haunts the strong program: 
How can the sociology of knowledge purport to provide 
reality while denying that privilege to the more 
prestigious natural sciences (i.e., the reflexivity 
problem)? As we shall see in the next section, the bold 
claims of the strong program can produce innovative ways of 
rethinking basic traditional philosophical polarities and 
the means for addressing the dilemma of the preceding 
question.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
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From Logic to Sociologies Latauc-'g Constructivist
View of Science
The strong program in the sociology of knowledge has 
had its most important impact in the sub-field of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. Here, it has been 
especially instrumental in molding what is often called 
"the constructivist thesis" of science.22 Generally, the 
constructivist position within the sociology of scientific 
knowledge has used the strong program as a guide to examine 
empirically how scientists actually go about negotiating 
truth and constructing scientific knowledge. From this 
position, scientists are often approached ethnographically, 
that is, as if they were members of a newly discovered 
tribe.23 The goal of this approach, in accordance with 
the position of the strong program, is to suspend 
philosophical judgments about reality and truth and focus 
on the specifics of how scientists go about forming a 
statement about the world and constructing general truths.
One of the most important proponents of the 
constructivist thesis in the sociology of scientific
22 Harry Collins has described the task of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge as exploring "what comes 
to count as scientific knowledge and how is so to count."
In "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of 
Contemporary Science," in Annual Review of Sociology 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 267 (pp. 
256-285).
23 Specifically see, Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The 
Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essav on the Constructivist 
and Contexual Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1981).
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knowledge is Bruno Latour.24 However, Latour's view of 
science can be seen as more than simply a restatement or 
extension of the relativism of the strong program: his
work contains the seeds of both a "redefined strong 
programme" and an important revision of the tasks of a 
broader sociology of knowledge.25 His insights are most 
relevant to our consideration of postmodernism.
In Science in Action. Latour seeks to open the "black 
box" of scientific fact production. This is accomplished 
by tracing and following the various links which scientists 
utilize in building science. One of Latour's basic 
arguments is that scientific facts must be constructed by 
establishing strong networks. The stronger and more 
encompassing the network, the harder the fact becomes. The 
scientist, by successfully recruiting allies (human and 
non-human), appealing to authority, referring to former 
texts, compiling data, creating computer files, etc., is 
able to create an encompassing network, the sponsorship of 
a sustaining audience, a community of truth. Therefore, 
he/she is able to go from soft rhetoric to hard rhetoric.
In other words, the establishment of a strong network
24 Cf. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory 
Li£&, 2nd ed.(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1986) and Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987).
25 For a discussion of the "redefined strong 
programme" cf. Latour, "A Relativistic Account of 
Einstein's Relativity," Social Studies of Science, 18,
1988, 3-44.
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Iallows the scientist to produce a fact. What becomes a 
scientific fact and an accepted truth is a direct outcome 
of the strength of the ties, or in his words "metrological 
chains," which a scientist or group of scientists is able 
to construct and enforce. If the scientist has been 
successful, reality "has been defined."26 In essence, 
then, reality is a matter of definition; it is defined 
through social networks.
The importance of Latour for our discussion does not
necessarily come from the specifics of his discussion of
science, but from the general sociology of knowledge he
develops and the methodology he uses to explicate it.
Latour seeks carefully to negotiate a path between
rationalism, which emphasizes the cognitive supremacy (or
asymmetry) of science, and an extreme relativism, which
says there is no criterion for determining anything
(symmetry). For Latour, both are unacceptable positions.
Treating science as strictly a rational or cognitive
enterprise denies the important social dynamics which must
be employed to establish scientific facts, while an extreme
relativism denies the existence and establishment of any
facts. For Latour,
If there is no controversy among scientists as to 
the status of fact, then it is useless to go on 
talking about interpretation, representation, a 
biased or distorted world view, weak and fragile 
pictures of the world, unfaithful spokesmen. Nature
26 Latour, Science in Action. 1987, p. 179.
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talks straight, facts are facts. Full stop. There 
is nothing to add and nothing to subtract.27
Latour's position accepts as facts those rare statements
which lack controversy, while he remains relativistic with
regard to the ongoing struggle of scientists to turn soft
statements into hard facts. Latour points out that if a
position, such as relativism, rejects all knowledge claims,
it begins to look ridiculous since there are issues on the
natural world that have been settled by scientists.
However, if we treat science rationalistically, we develop
a distorted view of how science produces hard facts. In
the Latourian position, facts are socially constituted
"hard fiction."
What does distinguish science from other forms of
knowledge is the degree of material and human resources
available for the construction of facts.
The proof race is so expensive that only a few 
people, nations, institutions or professions are 
able to sustain it...this means that the production 
of facts and artefacts will not occur everywhere and 
for free, but will occur only at restricted places 
at particular times.28
Essentially, fact production is relegated to those times
and places which can garner the resources and networks
capable of transforming statements into facts. This does
not mean that knowledge that cannot muster the resources is
invalid, it is simply not "hard knowledge."
27 Ibid., p. 100.
28 Ibid., p. 179.
274
However, the central epistemological question remains: 
do scientists have a superior access to reality which 
enables them to discover truth and report knowledge about 
the world? For Latour, answering this question requires 
one to adopt an asymmetrical view of rational thought and 
irrational belief, something he and the strong program are 
unwilling to do. Traditionally, it has been held that 
every individual who posseses a "sound mind and a sound 
method" has the ability to be as rational as the 
scientist.29 Those who lacked this attribute (i.e., the 
irrational) were merely under the influence of various 
social or psychological prejudices. If those prejudices 
were eliminated, the rationality embedded in all of 
humanity will finally emerge (cf. Condorcet in Chapter 2). 
However for Latour, it is better to think of irrationality 
and rationality, not as states of mind, but as constructed 
labels. Irrationality, like rationality, has to be 
constructed through networks— in this case a network of 
accusers. However, if irrationality is "put on trial," the 
results are at best ambiguous. For every claim of 
irrationality in one knowledge system, exists an element of
irrationality in the rational system doing the accusing.
It turns out that "everyone on earth is as logical or as 
illogical as any one else."30 Latour concludes that "no
29 Ibid., p. 184.
30 Ibid., p. 195.
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asymmetry between people's reasoning can be recognised."31 
Essentially, everyone is a practical reasoner and is as 
rational or irrational as the next person.
However, one may ask: If reasoning is not a matter of
qualitative cognitive differences between people, why do we 
not all share the same beliefs? By eliminating the 
cognitive distinction between rationality and 
irrationality, Latour's is able to answer this question. 
Like the scientist in the laboratory, the practical 
reasoner of everyday life is concerned with "what can be 
tied to a claim to make it stronger and how can the claims 
that contradict it be untied."32 Essentially, people 
neither think logically or illogically— they think 
sociologically. All people move from element to element as 
they construct statements about the world. When a 
controversy starts, "they look for stronger and more 
resistant allies..."33 Some are able to recruit more 
allies than others. As a consequence, their truths become 
"harder."
Consequently, what separates science from everyday 
practical reason or belief is not an issue of logic but an 
issue of the level of controversy and the appropriate 
social ties to mobilize to end the controversy (i.e.,
31 Ibid., p. 196.
32 Ibid., p. 198.
33 Ibid., p. 205.
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Isociologic). Essentially, the difference is a natter of
content rather than forn. The everyday practical reasoner
does not have to mobilize as many allies in the production
or replication of a standard taken-for-granted knowledge as
the scientist does for the production and defense of a hard
fact. As evidence, Latour provides the following example:
'An apple a day keeps the doctor away,' the mother 
said handing out a glowing red apple to her son, 
expecting a grin. 'Mother,' replied the child 
indignantly, 'three NIH studies have shown that 
on a sample of 458 Americans of all ages there 
was no statistically significant decrease in the 
the number of house calls by family doctors; no,
I will no eat this apple.
In mobilizing the statistics of the National Institutes of
Health, the child is acting as if this everyday
colloquialism is in need of the same type of support
employed by science. In other words, the child is treating
this soft fact as if it were a hard fact and in need of the
same type of documentation and supporting allies. Since
this colloquialism has passed from generation to generation
without being challenged, it becomes true. There is no
need to treat it as an irrational belief or as a potential
scientific fact. Essentially, soft fact are basically all
we need for the conduct of everyday life (cf. the taken-
for-granted in everyday life according to Alfred Schutz and
the role of identity).
34 Ibid., p. 206.
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IWhen in the course of human events, of the conduct of
life, we answer such questions as: How much money did I
earn this month? Is my blood pressure above or below
normal? Where was my grandfather bora? Where is the tip
of Sakhalin Island?, depending on who is doing the
questioning, we can either provide soft or hard answers.35
If we provide hard answers, we must appeal to supporting
documents and begin the process of stacking-up hard facts
and constituting hard truth. Latour writes:
Even the question 'who are you' cannot be solved, 
in some extreme situations, without superimposing 
passports to fingerprints to birth certificates to 
photographs, that is without constituting a file 
that brings together many different paper forms of 
various origins. You might very well know who you 
are and be satisfied with a very soft answer to this 
absurd query, but the policeman, who raises the 
question from the point of view of a centre, wants 
to have a harder answer than that...36
Soft answers usually do not require the same type of
"metrological chains" as hard answers. They differ not by
their degree of logic or illogic but by the sociologic
required for their construction. They are "tribe" specific
measures for the accumulation of soft truth.
Latour provides us with three central insights which 
have a bearing on our employment of a sociology of 
knowledge approach to postmodernism. First of all, for 
Latour truth should not be treated logically, but
35 Ibid., p. 252.
36 Ibid., p. 252.
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sociologic-ally. He introduces a move from logic to a 
sociologic. The logical is concerned with drawing 
distinctions between rationality and irrationality and 
between knowledge and belief. Latour and his sociologic 
makes no such traditional philosophical distinctions. Both 
knowledge and belief are equally logical or illogical. The
cognitive quality of these forms of thought cannot be
clearly distinguished. However, while they are not
philosophically distinguishable, they can be sociologically 
differentiated. Belief and knowledge are separated by the 
degree of sociologic involved (i.e., the type of 
association involved, weak or strong).
Secondly, Latour provides us with both a non-
objectivistic and a non-relativistic vision of truth. If
truth claims are not attacked and there is no controversy
among competing truth providers, then the claims are true.
In his words,
...If they are not attacked, people know exactly 
what nature is; they are objective; they tell the 
truth; they do not live in a society or a culture 
that could influence their grasp of things, they 
simply grasp things in themselves; their spokespersons 
are not 'interpreting' phenomena, nature talks 
through them directly.3*
If the so-called "black boxes" of knowledge are sealed,
people do not "live in a world of fiction, representation,
symbol, approximation, convention: they are simply
37 Ibid., p. 206.
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right."38 If there is a controversy, various strategies 
are employed to strengthen the rhetoric into a hard fact 
(cf. the appeal to "principle" as a mask for political 
self-gain or exclusion of others) and forging another 
"black box." Truth, then, is not philosophically 
determined; it is socially determined.39
Finally, Latour provides us with a reply to the issue 
of reflexivity raised in the last chapter. In other words, 
how can sociology defend its own truth claims while 
relativizing (i.e., treating science and belief 
symmetrically) other forms of knowledge? In responding to 
this, Latour argues that we should develop an alternative 
vision of the social. Instead of focusing on the influence 
of class, culture, and politics in the content of a 
knowledge system, we should focus on the "relative solidity 
of associations" (i.e., networks, a sustaining community of 
the faithful)40 While indeed the concepts employed by 
sociologists are arbitrary, the associations they utilize
38 Ibid., p. 206.
39 Latour's constructivist view of science may be 
contrasted with Foucault's and Habermas'. Foucault 
emphasizes the power constraints and dynamics at work in 
the development of knowledge. Habermas sees science as a 
working example of the ideal speech situation. On the 
other hand, Latour is primarily concerned with the 
construction of science. Power plays an important role, 
but it is not the determining factor of science. Nor does 
Latour suggest, as Habermas does, that science is a social 
ideal.
40 Ibid., p. 256.
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Iin constructing the social world are not. Latour writes,
...Our method would gain nothing in explaining 
'natural' sciences by invoking 'social' sciences.
There is not the slightest difference between the 
the two, and they are both to be studied the same 
way. Neither of them should believed more nor 
endowed with the mysterious power of jumping out 
of the networks it builds.41
Sociology, or Latour's account of science, does not have a
privileged position in the production of truth. It cannot
tell scientists what they are really up to. Sociology, like
the natural sciences, must establish "metrological chains"
in order to establish hard facts about society. The facts
it produces do not correspond to the philosophical version
of the real, but are negotiated and forged. Society becomes
what is constructed— either in the hard sense of sociology
or in the soft sense of everyday discourse. Latour writes,
The very definition of a 'society' is the final 
outcome, in Sociology Departments, in Statistical 
Institutions, in journals, of other scientists busy 
at work gathering surveys, questionnaires, archives, 
records of all sorts, arguing together, publishing 
papers, organizing other meetings....The results 
on what society is made of do not spread more or 
faster than those of economics, topology or particle 
physics. These results too would die if they went 
outside the tiny networks so necessary for their 
survival.42
We need not search for philosophical foundations to explain 
sociology's description of the social. Sociology, like all 
forms of knowledge, must establish the networks capable of 
promoting its vision of the world. "A sociologist's
41 Ibid., p. 256.
42 Ibid., p. 257.
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interpretation of society will not be substituted for what 
every one of us thinks of society without additional 
struggle."43 However, this position does not mean that 
sociology or philosophy are useless, only that they exist 
within a matrix of "legitimate" power.
Latour provides us with a particularly appealing version 
of truth and knowledge. He also provides us with a means of 
by-passing the questions of objectivism and relativism 
without destroying all meaning, a most important means at 
our disposal for reconsidering the positions of postmodern 
theory.
Conclusion; A Sociology of Truth 
What can we learn about postmodernism from the 
sociology of knowledge and Latour's reconstituted strong 
program? Most importantly the recent developments in the 
sociology of knowledge make it possible to shift our 
conceptions of truth and reality, rationality and 
irrationality, and knowledge and belief from a philosophical 
logic to what Latour referred to as a sociologic— a process 
we began with the discussion of Durkheim in the last 
chapter. This admittedly agnostic view is void of the 
explicit or implicit reference to the foundational real. It 
helps us rethink the generation of knowledge "without 
reference to realist definitions of *truth,' 'reality,'
43 Ibid., p. 257.
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'f a c t s a n d  'knowledge. ' Unlike postmodernism, it 
accomplishes this redefinition without "textualizing" the 
world and leveling all meaning. As we discussed earlier, 
postmodernism does make a move similar to the one taken by 
the sociology of knowledge (and sociology in general). It 
too seeks to go beyond the metaphysical obsession with 
truth, reality, and context-free knowledge.
However, instead of dropping the search for foundations
and moving in a sociological or constructivist (i.e.,
viewing reality as a social construct) direction, the
postmodernists drop them and move in a nihilistic direction.
Since what counts as knowledge is seen as unverifiable and
arbitrary, postmodernists believe everything is void of
meaning. They are what we might call "frustrated
rationalists:" In other words, they see the revelation of
relativism as meaning the end of all definite knowledge
about the world. However, such as position only seems to
make sense when one thinks there once existed
epistemological certitude and a firm way of knowing which
have somehow been disrupted— rather than context dependent
doubts. Describing this basic insight of the sociology of
knowledge, Mary Hesse writes,
In such a new construal of cognitive terminology, 
rules of argument and criteria of truth are internal 
to a social system....but this account does not remove
a Paul Tibbetts, "The Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge: The Constructivist Thesis and Relativism," 
Philosophy of Social Science, 16, 1986, p. 53 (pp. 39-57).
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the motivation for epistemological studies nor 
emasculate philosophical theories. Such consequences 
only follow for those who retain a rationalist theory 
of knowledge, not for those who accept the redefinition 
of 'truth' and 'rationality' implied by their status 
as internal to given societies. s
It seems evident to us that from a sociology of knowledge
position, the search for context-free rationality (cf. the
positivism of certain types of science) was a misplaced
project to begin with. The loss of philosophical
foundations is no occasion to mourn; nor is it an occasion
to embrace nihilism. It is merely an occasion to suspend
such philosophical distinctions and polarities and move in
another direction. In this regard, the sociology of
knowledge provides both an alternative to (and a means of
criticizing) the extremes of the postmodern orientation
towards knowledge. Leveling all meaning and treating the
world as a text is fine philosophically, but postmodernists
should not expect all realms of knowledge production to
follow suit. The postmodern postion does not enable us to
consider why truth is still a performative concept (i.e., is
socially constraining, cf. our discussion of Durkheim in
Chapter 7) despite its philosophical demise.
Essentially, we may conclude that if truth and reality 
are conceptualized in sociological rather than in the terms 
of traditional philosophy the outcome is very different. 
Instead of ushering in a postmodern world of unfoundational
45 Mary Hesse, "The Strong Thesis of Sociology of 
Science," 1976, p. 46.
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claims, we usher in a different model for understanding what 
makes truth and reality possible. In refusing to "play 
according to the rules and guidelines established by 
traditional philosophy," the sociology of knowledge is 
providing us with a radical program for a rethinking of our 
knowledge of the world.46
In the next chapter, we will utilize this sociology of 
knowledge position described herein to discuss the specific 
organization and production of postmodern theory, culture, 
and knowledge.





GROUP SOLIDARITY AND SYMBOLISM: THE PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION OF POSTMODERNISM
In the previous chapter, we explored how recent 
variants of the sociology of knowledge approach the 
philosophical juxtapositions of truth and falsehood, 
rationality and irrationality, and belief and knowledge.
We concluded that these recent developments provide us with 
a useful way for rethinking postmodernism's collapse of all 
meaning and its leveling and deracination of all discursive 
formations (e.g., literature and science). In addition, we 
argued that the constructivist position in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, specifically Latour's, provides us 
with an account, a sort of gauge, which illustrates how 
knowledge of the world is produced and maintained. As 
such, Latour's becomes an important means for considering 
all forms of knowledge— including the philosophical and 
cultural. Most importantly for our consideration, Latour's 
inspection of the production and maintence of knowledge is 
accomplished without being bogged down in the 
epistemological debate between objectivism and 
relativism.1 In a word, it offers us an alternative 
paradigm and keeps us from falling into a paralyzing debate
1 In fact, this debate becomes meaningless from a 
constructivist or social epistemological position.
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Ion philosophical polarities.
Essentially, we may conclude that recent developments 
in the sociology of knowledge illustrate that knowledge is 
social through and through. There is no internal/external 
distinction (i.e., between the internal rational and the 
external social). We no longer need to argue that the 
sociology of knowledge can only provide a description of 
the social factors that impinge on the creation of rational 
knowledge. We can now conclude that all knowledge, 
including the scientific and the sociological, have social 
origins and all knowledge producers are engaged in the 
activity of constructing rather than revealing the world.
In Sal Restivo's words, "selves, minds, and ideas are not 
merely social products; nor are they merely socially 
constructed; they are social constructs."2 Ideas are 
society inside and out. Therefore, all knowledge can be 
seen, to use Latour's term, socio-logically.
In this chapter, we seek to move from the construction 
of scientific knowledge in general to the construction and 
dissemination of postmodern philosophical and cultural 
knowledge. We intend to combine some of the useful ideas 
gained from our previous discussions of Durkheim and the 
sociology of science with a discussion of the organization
2 Sal Restivo, "The Social Roots of Pure 
Mathematics," in Susan Cozzens and Thomas Gieryn (eds), 
Theories of Science in Society (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), p. 123 (pp. 120-143).
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of social groups so as to examine postmodernism as a social 
construct. As Collins has noted, "Although philosophy may 
not be a 'science,' it has a social structure as an 
intellectual community, which can be understood by 
extending the techniques and theories of the sociology of 
science."3 Such a sociology of postmodernism, then, is 
thought to be congruent with the sociology of scientific 
knowledge since both seek to explain the production and 
consumption of "specialized knowledge" forms.
Principally, we argue that postmodernism and its 
accompanying skepticism and nihilism can be seen, not as 
the final statement upon matters of truth and reality, but 
as a socially and historically contingent discourse. We 
share the view of Eugene Goodheart, who has proclaimed that 
"skepticism is an historically conditioned view of 
experience, which does not disqualify it as a method or a 
system of thought, but its historical character should bar 
it from putting on metaphysical or universalistic airs.”4 
Consequently, while the sociological account to follow 
shares postmodernism's general distrust of any absolute 
claim to foundational truths, it does not see this 
viewpoint as being necessarily "true" or "false." It is
3 Randall Collins, "Toward a Theory of Intellectual 
Change: The Social Causes of Philosophies," Science, 
Technology, & Human Values, 14, 1987, p. 108 (pp. 107-140).
4 Eugene Goodheart, The Skeptic Disposition in 
Contemporary Criticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p. 176.
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Isimply one form of knowledge-of-the-world among many. From 
this position, we can say that postmodernism is a 
perspective which, like all perspectives, must be 
constructed, fortified, promoted, and maintained by 
knowledge and culture-producing communities and 
institutions. Consequently, the structure of those 
knowledge-producing and culture-consuming communities 
becomes of central importance.
One final introductory point. It is worth 
reemphasizing that when postmodernists claim that the 
metanarratives of modernity have collapsed (Lyotard) or 
that it is no longer possible to distinguish fact from 
fiction or TV from reality (Baudrillard), it is simply 
restating the realist view of knowledge in an inverse form. 
In other words, it is de facto assuming that reality 
somehow speaks to and from it. Saying that we cannot be 
sure of anything is merely a negative way of saying that we 
can be sure of everything! Both statements operate under 
the same realist dialectic. From our position, what is at 
stake is not who has the true story of reality, the 
modernists or the postmodernists, but who is able to define 
reality, or the absence of reality in the case of 
postmodernism, and why this is the case. Consequently, we, 
like Durkheim and the constructivists in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, argue that it is the organization and 
production of knowledge which result in reality, or the
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reality of non-reality in postmodernism, and not vice 
versa.5
In order to explicate our sociological treatment of 
postmodernism, we will discuss two questions: (1) Why has
postmodernistic theory been developed and promoted in 
certain intellectual discursive fields and not in others? 
For example we ask, why has postmodernist theory been 
developed in and adapted into literary criticism, 
philosophy, and architectural theory and not in physics, 
biology, or economics? (2) Why has postmodernistic culture 
been an influential form of "cultural capital" in some 
social groups or "life worlds" and not in others? In other 
words, why are artists, cultural theorists, or the new 
service classes more inclined to adopt and promote 
postmodernistic culture or theory compared to factory 
workers, government bureaucrats, or the old bourgeoisie? 
These questions may seem unimportant and irrelevant from a 
philosophical perspective. However, from our socio­
political perspective they are central to the understanding 
of any knowledge/culture system. Furthermore, they point 
to a means for situating the issues of postmodernism within 
what postmodernism itself refers to as the "social context" 
or "human community." If knowledge is variable and 
context-dependent, as postmodernism itself argues,
s For a discussion of this cf. Stephan Fuchs, The 
Professional Quest for Truth. 1991, in press.
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Iquestions and interpretations of the specifics of this 
variability are of utmost importance.
In order to address the above questions, we will first 
discuss the social organization of groups as presented in 
Durkheimian and Neo-Durkheimian sociology. As we have 
already seen, group organization has been used by Durkheim 
to counter the position of American pragmatism. We will 
now use a variation of the Durkheimian position to explore 
postmodernism. The organizational approach is intended to 
supplement the discussion of the construction of knowledge 
discussed in the last chapter. We will then use these 
notions to provide a sociological account of postmodern 
intellectual production and consumption.
The Social Organization of Cognitive Styles
In Chapter 7, we drew upon Durkheim's discussion of 
pragmatism as a means for rethinking the ironically 
omniscient idealism of postmodernism. In addition to that 
"epistemological" discussion, there is also much to be 
learned from Durkheim's and the Neo-Durkheimians' linkage 
of social organization with religious beliefs, 
classification systems, and general cognitive styles. As 
we shall see, this linkage has important ramifications for 
both a general sociology of knowledge and our attempt to 
situate postmodernism within a sociological as well as a 
social context.
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IIn the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
Durkheim develops two important concepts with regard to the
organization of social groups and the types of religious
beliefs held by practitioners.6 First, he introduces the
well-known distinction between the sacred and profane.
Durkheim defines the sacred as those symbols or activities
which have special, extraordinary, or forbidden meaning
attached to them; by the profane he refers to the
commonplace or ordinary. For Durkheim, religion is "a
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
*
things."7 In its "elementary form," this sacredness is 
nothing more than the symbolic elevation of the clan or 
group to the order of a religion. Its origin is not the 
universal psychological condition of humanity or an 
irrational response to environmental unknowns, but the 
social raised to the level of the "holy."
Secondly, Durkheim provides us with a discussion of 
the importance of ritual in the maintenance of the sacred. 
Rituals are the means by which the sacred object is 
constructed, expressed, and maintained. They become a 
means for charging the object with sacredness— of imparting
6 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life, trans. by J.W. Swain (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1964).
7 Ibid., p. 47.
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it with mana.8 When groups join together in a ritual or 
"rite of intensification," they are reaffirming the power 
of the social. They are (re)endowing the social with an 
extraordinary and all-encompassing power. This endowment 
becomes part of the collective consciousness of the group, 
as well as the cognitive structure of the individual 
practitioner.
Consequently, for Durkheim those groups with a high
level of internal solidarity are more likely to produce
religious styles that draw rigid boundaries between the
sacred and the profane. These mechanical societies— i.e.,
those with high "moral density" according to Durkheim, with
a we11-developed "collective conscience"— produce elaborate
and confining religious symbolic codes. Those less rigid
societies with an "organic" sort of solidarity and with a
more complex division of labor produce individualistic and
universalistic religious types (cf. Weber's differentiation
of "sect" and "church"). Describing the emergence of these
"cults of individualism" in modern Western societies,
Durkheim writes,
As individuals have differentiated themselves more 
and more and the value of an individual has increased, 
the corresponding cult has taken a relatively greater 
place in the totality of the religious life and at
8 Cf. Randall Collins, "The Durkheimian Tradition in 
Conflict Sociology," in Jeffrey Alexander (ed.), 
Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 111. As Collins 
points out this would be an important theme in Goffman's 
sociology.
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the sane time it is more fully closed to outside 
influences.9
The final outcome for Durkheim is that religious styles are 
the result of social and organizational typologies. Tight 
social structures produces rigid religious distinctions 
between the sacred and the profane and powerful group 
oriented rituals (e.g., totemism and animism). On the 
other hand, organizationally diverse societies produce more 
individualistic and fragmented religious and ritual styles 
(e.g., civil religions).
In Primitive Classification. Durkheim and Mauss extend 
Durkheim's previous discussion of religion to other types 
of cultural classification and knowledge systems.10 For 
Durkheim and Mauss, "it is because men were grouped, that 
in their ideas they grouped other things."11 For them, 
the classification systems (i.e., the interrelatedness of 
catagories and cultural items) employed by various social 
groups were the product of the level and type of social 
organization present in various societies. In short, 
"logical relations are, in a sense, domestic relations.1,12 
Hhat comes to be a culture's system of differentiation can
9 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life. 1964, p. 424-25.
10 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive 
Classification. trans. by R. Needham (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1963).
11 Ibid., p. 82.
12 Ibid., p. 84.
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be attributed to the level of social integration or type of 
organization present in a given society. Societies with a 
rigid sense of solidarity (i.e., the mechanical) tend to 
have rigid boundaries between individual elements of a 
larger classification system. Cohesive or socially dense 
societies typically have elaborate and rigid symbolic and 
hierarchical differentiations between true and false, right 
and wrong, bird and fish, space and time, workers and 
rulers, etc.. In such settings, "things are above all 
sacred or profane, pure or impure, friends or enemies, 
favorable or unfavorable..."13 It is a strict dichotomy: 
There is not much room for individual interpretation or 
mediation. The symbolic and social order of the group has 
been raised to the level of absolute, non-negotiable truth.
Closely bound groups exert a great deal of control over 
individual members. What the group holds as symbolically 
representative or as a social distinction is to be held as 
sacred by all members of that society. There is no room 
for rule departure or deviance. What is sacred is sacred 
and what is profane is profane. As Durkheim and Mauss seek 
to illustrate, the distinction between sacred and profane 
is not simply an aspect of religious belief, it also 
extends to the logic of classification distinctions. They 
conclude that, the "logical hierarchy is only another 
aspect of social hierarchy, and unity of knowledge is
13 Ibid., p. 86.
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nothing else than the very unity of the collectivity..."14 
Like religion, classification systems are products of the 
type and degree of social organization existing within a 
given group of people.
One of the most influential attempts to develop 
further the Durkheimian position on social organization and 
its relations to cognitive styles can be found in the work 
of Nary Douglas. Her work seeks to extend the sociological 
approach initiated by Durkheim and Mauss to all forms of 
knowledge. Specifically, Douglas has introduced what she 
refers to as the "grid/group theory."15 Her theory is 
loyal to the Durkheimian tradition, yet it seeks to avoid 
the evolutionist ranking of societies and the granting of a 
privileged position to modern systems which can be found in 
Durkheim's position.16
For Douglas, "group" refers to the level of solidarity 
present in a given group. This ranges from loosly knit 
associations to tightly bound and closed groups. Groups 
may have weak or strong group loyalties. Within her theory 
those groups with strong loyalty ties can be said to have a
14 Ibid, p. 84.
15 Her grid/group theory has gone through several 
revisions. For a discussion of this see, James V. 
Spickard, "A Guide to Mary Douglas' Three Versions of 
Grid/Group Theory," Sociological Analysis, 50, 1989, pp. 
151-170.
16 Cf. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 98-99.
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high degree of "group." The second aspect, "Grid,” refers 
to the "scope and coherent articulation of a system of 
classification."17 Like the group dimension, a 
classification system can also vary. In this case, the 
variation is from a coherent, elaborated symbolic hierarchy 
with "caste-like" role and class structures to discrete 
items and loose and mobile role sets.
When combined, these two dimensions provide "four 
extreme visions of social life" and can be employed to 
situate the type of cosmology present within different 
social groups.18 (a) Groups with a low level of group and 
grid tend (LP/LD) to produce a cosmology which "allow 
options for negotiating contracts or choosing allies and in 
consequence it also allows for individual mobility up and 
down whatever the current scale of prestige and 
influence."19 Essentially, this category is 
"individualistic" and corresponds with the social structure 
of "competitive societies."20 (b) A collectivity with low 
group and high grid (LP/HD) "ascribes closely the way an
17 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (New York: Vintage, 
1973), p. 82.
18 Mary Douglas (ed.), Essavs in the Sociology of 
Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 3.
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 Mary Douglas, In the Active Voice (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 212.
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Iindividual may behave."21 The pressure exerted on 
individuals within this classification comes primarily from 
the hierarchical structure of the group. (c) Groups which 
have a high level of group and low level of grid (HP/LD) 
tend to produce social environments where "loyalty is 
rewarded and hierarchy respected" (e.g., large bureaucratic 
organizations).22 At times, this may also be true for 
clans or extended families: Here, the prevalent dichotomy
is between insiders and outsiders (i.e., We/Them).
Finally, (d) groups with a high level of group and a high 
level of grid (HP/HD) produce an environment where "only 
the external group boundary is clear."23 In this 
cosmological type, the group "survives not only by 
justifying its boundary against outsiders but also by 
justifying its separate graded compartments."24
In a certain sense, Douglas combines the two 
contributions of Durkheimian thought discussed earlier into 
a coherent theory of group organization and cognitive 
styles. She takes Durkheim's notion of the types of 
solidarity present in different societies and combines that 
with the complexity and variability of symbolic
21 Douglas, Essavs in the Sociology of Perception.
1982, p. 4.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 Douglas, In the Active Voice. 1982. p. 210.
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organization (i.e., role definitions and other hierarchical 
structures). Like Durkheim, Douglas views cognitive styles 
or cosmologies as "not at all natural but strictly a 
product of social interaction.m2S Those groups with rigid 
control produce one type of cosmology, while those with 
slack or loose control produce another.
For Douglas and Durkheim, belief/knowledge systems are
the outcome of social organization. The specific
sociological issue is not the manifest content of this
knowledge, but the way it is shaped by the type of social
organization present. As Douglas explains,
All the arguments taking place in families, churches 
and sports clubs are about whether the institution 
shall draw its group boundary closer, or relax it, 
apply its rules more strictly, create more rules 
or relax them all....God may be invoked, and curses 
uttered before a rift, or blessings for a truce.26
For Douglas, ideational debates over content are 
essentially sociological debates over organizational form 
and control. The central issue is the degree of control 
that the group is to have over its internal symbolic and 
class hierarchy. Those groups that are "solid" are more 
likely to appeal to established guidelines, while those 
groups that are "loose" are more likely to relax boundaries 
and rule and role distinctions.
25 Douglas, Essavs in the Sociology of Perception. 
1982, p. 5.
26 Ibid., p. 5.
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Another important contribution to the Neo-Durkheimian 
linking of social organization and cognitive styles can be 
found in the work of Richard Whitley. Whitley extends the 
Neo-Durkheimian argument into the production of all types 
of scientific or "specialized" knowledge forms. As such, 
it has special significance in our consideration of 
postmodern knowledge. Whitley has pointed out that 
disciplines with similar organizational types tend to 
produce similar styles of knowledge.27 The style of 
knowledge is dependent, in part, upon the degree of "task 
uncertainty" and "mutual dependence" evident in a 
particular intellectual field. Task uncertainty refers to 
the level of unassuredness or lack of confidence which 
accompanies the production of novel knowledge in a 
particular work organization. Those groups with a low 
degree of task uncertainty are more likely to have 
proscribed, bureaucratic-like procedures for producing 
knowledge, while those with high task uncertainty are more 
likely to engage in ad hoc procedures.
The second aspect of this theory, mutual dependency, 
is an outcome of two organizational processes. First, the 
"extent to which researchers have to use the specific 
results, ideas, and procedures of fellow specialists”
27 Richard Whitley, The Intellectual and Social 
Organization of the Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984). Whitley is also closely connected to the complex 
organizational position.
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(i.e., functional dependence).28 Secondly, the "extent to 
which researchers have to persuade colleagues of the 
significance and importance of their problem..."(i.e., 
strategic dependence).29 Those fields where functional 
dependence and strategic dependence are low tend to produce 
situations where knowledge producers are able to pursue a 
variety of goals "without needing to incorporate specific 
results and ideas of particular specialist 
colleagues..."30 As examples, Whitley cites post-1960 
Anglo-Saxon sociology and management studies. On the other 
hand, intellectual fields where both functional dependence 
and strategic dependence are high tend to produce 
situations where there is a high degree of specialization 
and a strong sense of boundary maintenance (e.g., among 
physicists and mathematicians). These groups have a sharp 
distinction between who is a legitimate knowledge producer 
and who is not and what counts as knowledge and what is 
trivial and unworthy. They also have a well defined 
research agenda which strongly conditions the types of 
problems and solutions that can be put forth by individual 
knowledge producers. As an example of this type of field, 
Whitley cites Twentieth-century physics. Between these two 
extremes lie various degrees of mutual dependence and
28 Ibid., p. 88.
29 Ibid., p. 88.
30 Ibid., p. 90.
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various knowledge fields and styles.
The Neo-Durkheimian position, as presented by Douglas 
and Whitley, leads us to conclude that groups which are 
cohesive and integrated produce what is called a "fact mode 
of reasoning," while loosely affiliated groups produce a 
"conversational mode of reasoning."31 Groups with a tight 
knit structure will appeal to the authority of established 
principles or "facts" (in the Latourian sense) in 
argumentive discourse. They are principally concerned with 
forming and sealing black boxes of knowledge. These groups 
employ what Basil Bernstein has referred to as a 
"restrictive code" in the production of group knowledge.32 
In these groups communicative acts serve to enforce group 
standards. Within conditions where the group has low task 
uncertainity, any attempt to break with the restrictive 
code is often seen as a rebellion against the group itself. 
Knowledge producers are tied into using the proscribed 
procedures of the group code or they face marginality or 
exclusion. On the other hand, those groups that are 
loosely coupled and have a high degree of task uncertainity 
tend to engage in negotiation and arbitration. They
31 Fuchs, The Professional Quest for Truth. 1991, p.
170.
32 Cf. Basil Bernstein, Class. Codes and Control I: 
Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). Bernstein uses 
this term in reference to the socialization style of the 
working class.
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utilize an "elaborated code" of knowledge production.33 
Here, there is importance placed upon individualistic 
speech patterns and discursive conversation. The 
individual within this type of knowledge field is 
professionalized to express and support his or her truth 
claims through appeal to explication, explanation, and 
argumentation. In fields of this type, individual 
producers are more likely to engage in discursive debate 
rather than the establishment of "scientific facts."
Whitley and Douglas, like Durkheim before them, are 
essentially arguing that "cosmologies are sticks people use 
to coerce one another...and that different sticks will work 
in different social contexts."34 Also, they are arguing 
that cosmologies symbolize common group membership. 
Cosmologies are basic distinctions that may be "dressed-up" 
or enlivened by ideological or cultural debate over 
content, but their form remains essentially social in its 
origin. Social organization is an integral part of the 
production and dissemination of knowledge or cognitive 
styles. The source of God may be the social as Durkheim 
proclaimed, but, as Douglas and Whitley seek to illustrate, 
so too is the origins of knowledge and culture (cf. the 
discussion of Durkheim and Nietzsche in Chapter 7).
33 Ibid, Bernstein uses this term in reference to the 
socialization style of the middle class.
34 Spickard, "A Guide to Mary Douglas' Three Versions 
of Grid/Group Theory," 1989, p. 165.
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When we combine the notions obtained from the 
Durkheimian and Neo-Durkheimian discussion of the 
organization of social groups with the arguments obtained 
from the Latourian discussion of knowledge production, 
(i.e., the recruitment and marshalling of allies and the 
production of "hard facts") we find an important means for 
situating the production of postmodern knowledge. In the 
next section, we will explore how these ideas come to bear 
upon one specific cognitive style— postmodern 
knowledge/culture.
The Production of Postmodern Knowledge
When we scan the academic horizon in search of 
bastions or "factories" of postmodern thought, we are often 
led to the doors of Philosophy, Social Theory, and Literary 
Criticism and not to the doors of Economics or Physics.35 
Furthermore, once we enter these "postmodern departments," 
we are often led to the doors of junior or "marginal" 
faculty members.36 From our discussion of Durkheim,
35 While postmodernism has affected a number of areas, 
we will specifically use Philosophy and Literary Criticism 
as paradigmatic examples of postmodern fields throughout 
this section.
36 For a discussion of the marginality of "postmodern" 
practictiners, cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. xviii-xix. 
Describing the post-structuralists, Bourdieu writes, "They 
appear like religious heretics, or, in other words, rather 
like freelance intellectuals installed within the 
university system itself, or at least, to venture a 
Derridean pun, encamped on the margins or in the marginalia
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IDouglas, and Whitley outlined above, our search does not 
simply reveal a methodological and theoretical division of 
labor resulting from the common quest for truth. It 
reveals three very general sociological points: (1)
Different intellectual groups have certain organizational 
characteristics that produce various cognitive styles and 
forms of knowledge about the world. (2) Due to 
organizational differences between fields, various 
intellectual groups have to develop different ranges and 
types of coalitions and cliques to establish and promote 
their particular knowledge about the world. (3) Within 
these groups there are often struggles to establish, 
maintain, or revise the hierarchical and symbolic structure 
of the group. These are instances when ideas become 
symbolic weapons in the battle for discipline control.
Below we will discuss the importance of each of these three 
points in situating the production of postmodern knowledge.
With regard to the first point, if we compare the 
fields where postmodern knowledge has been produced and 
adopted we will first of all note that these intellectual 
fields are "organizationally looser" and have a relatively 
high degree of task uncertainty compared to the fields 
where the issues and problems of postmodern skepticism are 
not an issue. In those postmodem-inclined fields black
of an academic empire threatened on all sides by barbarian 
invasions (p. xix).
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Iboxes of knowledge are rarely ever closed. Knowledge 
claims are continuously debated within the confines of a 
conversational code of conduct, or to use Bernstein's 
terminology, these fields operate under an elaborated or 
discursive code. Within such an organizational setting, 
there is often an emphasis on plurality and multiple 
interpretations, since these fields lack the type of social 
organization necessary for the establishment of what Latour 
refers to as "hard facts." These fields tend to spawn 
metatheoretical discussions, reflexivity debates, and a 
general relativism.37 As Douglas has pointed out,
- "Questioning and doubt can be held in check only by a 
strong institutional structure."38 The disciplines 
associated with postmodernism lack the institutional 
structure and symbolic code necessary for the avoidance of 
skepticism. They are essentially organizations that 
promote a high level of doubt, questioning, conversation, 
and debate.
However, while the "methodology" may be ill-defined 
and the goals pluralistic, these are also fields where 
closely coupled grouped research schools are (and have 
been) often a central locale in the production of 
knowledge. In Whitley's schema, these are fields which may
37 Cf. Stephan Fuchs, "Relativism and Reflexivity in 
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," 1991, in press.
38 Mary Douglas, "Pascal's Great Wager," L'Homme, 93, 
1985, p.19 (pp. 13-30).
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Ibe classified as having a low degree of functional 
dependence and a somewhat high level of strategic 
dependence. In other words, in these postmodern-inclined 
fields, knowledge producers are not tied into using the 
ideas and procedures of fellow knowledge producers.
However, they are obliged to persuade their colleagues of 
the significance of their approach with regard to central, 
long-standing issues or problems within the field. In 
disciplines of this type, there is an attempt to 
demonstrate, in Whitley's words, the superiority of "their 
interpretation to the central issues of the field."39
With regard to postmodern philosophy or literary 
criticism, while there is a theoretical emphasis on 
multiple interpretations, there is also an attempt to show 
that the Derridian, the Lyotardian, or the Rortyian 
interpretation of the current state of knowledge and 
knowing provides an important contribution to the general 
field of philosophy or related problems in the humanities. 
Essentially, the contributions of these individuals 
"tapped-into" the concern over long-standing problems of 
the field. If we compare this with a discipline such as 
sociology where the goals are extremely pluralistic and the
39 Whitley, The Intellectual and Social Organization 
of the Sciences. 1984, pp. 92-93. It could also be argued 
that in the American context the philosophy departments 
that adapted and promoted postmodernism were ones where 
continental philosophy has had a prominent position. 
Departments with a continental focus have traditionally 
been on the margins of mainstream American philosophy.
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functional dependence is quite low and the resulting 
knowledge output is fragmented, we can envision how social 
organization influenced postmodernism's ability to become 
part of the philosophy and humanities intellectual 
landscape. Postmodern practitioners, such as Rorty, 
Lyotard, and Derrida, were able to demonstrate the 
importance of their approach to long standing philosophical 
questions about language, rationality, and universal 
foundations. They were successful in convincing their 
colleagues that their knowledge style offered novel and 
innovative solutions to shared problems.
However, this factor alone does not give us a firm 
sense of why postmodernism became influential. Another 
central aspect was its ability to recruit allies and 
disseminate its knowledge style in a number of related 
fields. Since the goals of Philosophy and Literary 
Criticism lack prescribed procedures of knowledge 
production, the recruitment of allies was perhaps a more 
difficult (and perhaps more critical) task than in fields 
where functional dependence is high. However, since 
knowledge production of this type is often located at 
central knowledge producing institutions, there is an 
opportunity to establish and promote their particular 
knowledge commodity at other, less prestigious institutions 
or centers.
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An illuminating example of the importance of ally 
recruitment and the dissemination of information in the 
production of postmodern theory has been articulated by 
Michele Lamont.40 Lamont uses Derrida as an example of 
how interpretive theories can be located and analyzed 
within the cultural, institutional, and social conditions 
that produce them. For Lamont, the popularity of Derrida's 
deconstructionism is, in part, an outcome of two related 
elements. First, Derrida's philosophy was able to appeal 
to a broad spectrum of intellectuals. Secondly, it was 
very successful in developing institutional support 
networks to "spread the word."
With regard to the first point, Derrida has been 
"successful" by "directing his work to several already 
constituted publics rather than to a shrinking philosophy 
public..."41 During the 1960's and 70's, the French 
government attempted to limit philosophy requirements in 
lycees.42 This was accompanied by both a continued 
assault directed by the social sciences against the 
position and content of traditional philosophy and a 
general decline in the interest of the broader intellectual 
public. The intellectual public had always been an
40 Michele Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French 
Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida," American Journal 
of Sociology, 93, 1987, pp. 584-622.
41 Ibid., p. 587.
42 Ibid., p. 596.
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Iimportant audience and backer of philosophy and the 
humanities. Within Lamont's analysis, what Derrida's 
position accomplished was that it reformulated the 
philosophical project while "attacking the logocentrism" of 
social scientific critiques.43 Furthermore, it did this 
while simultaneously creating an intellectual issue that 
was adaptable and modifiable in other closely related 
disciplines. These disciplines also felt the impact of the 
growing loss of the attention of the general intellectual 
public, which they rely on for support, and the onslaught 
of the social scientific critique. Since these fields 
already have a high degree of permeability (i.e., vague 
distinctions and boundaries between public and professional 
discourse), Derrida's work served as protection against 
these onslaughts while providing them with a novel 
intellectual avenue for their own disciplinary purposes.
Latour has pointed out that often the success of a 
scientific theory or position is an outcome of an ironical 
sense of control. The individual producer must "enrol 
others so that they believe it, buy it and disseminate it 
across time and space" while he or she must also "control 
them so that what they borrow and spread remains more or 
less the same."44 The individual producer must maintain
43 Ibid., p. 596.
44 Bruno Latour, Science in Action. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 121.
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control over his/her intellectual product, while at the 
sane tine allowing roon for the product to be adapted to 
the specific needs of other knowledge producers.
Essentially, this is what deconstructionisn was able 
to do. First, it appealed to those who felt that 
philosophy was under threat of being contaninated by the 
interests of outsiders (e.g., the French governnent and 
social science). Deconstructionisn helped redefine the 
blurring boundary between philosophy and social science.
In Durkheinian terns, it redrew a line between "us" and 
"then." Secondly, deconstructionisn allowed related 
disciplines the roon to adapt it to their own intellectual 
concerns and problens (e.g., literary criticisn, neo-pop 
art, architectural theory, urban studies, etc.). It 
served, to use Olga Ansterdanska's phrase, as a "strategy 
of reinvestnent."45 Since these fields have a loose type 
of social organization and a conversational symbolic code, 
yet rely on certain "trend setting" institutions and 
individuals, Derrida's philosophical position became an 
inportant "cultural investment" for many allied 
disciplines.
Related to this recruitment of allies is the 
dissemination of information. For an idea to be 
"successful" and influential, it must establish networks of
45 Olga Amsterdamska, "Institutions and Schools of 
Thought: The Neogrammarians," American Journal of 
Sociology, 91, 1985, p.335 (pp. 332-358).
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dissemination. The more elaborate and encompassing the 
network, the more "successful" a position can become. 
Within Lamont's analysis, Derrida's popularity can be 
partly attributed to his involvement with journals such as 
Tel Quel and Critique.46 These journals published essays 
in both philosophy and literary criticism. They were 
directed towards an eclectic group of French intellectuals. 
In addition to these "intellectual journals," Derrida's 
work received attention by the more "main-stream cultural 
media." The tendency of this media form is, in Lamont's 
words, to "cater to the intellectual culture of the upper- 
middle class, and their control over access to that market 
is a structural feature of the French intellectual 
scene."47 Derrida's deconstructionism became part of the 
intellectual scenery of the upper middle-class world. To 
be a member of the educated elite and to not know Derrida 
became as atrocious of an act as not having the "proper" 
dialect, "civilized manners," or drinking the right wine. 
Furthermore, it "epitomized dangerously seductive qualities 
of style; as intellectual fashion goes, it was flashy, 
different, ingenious, and slightly exotic."48 It became
46 Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French 
Philosopher, 1987, pp. 597-598.
47 Ibid., p. 598.
48 Maria Ruegg, "The End(s) of French Style: 
Structuralism and Post-Structuralism in the American 
Context," Criticism, 29, 1979, p. 193.
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indispensible for the conduct of "intellectual life" and 
for being in "vogue" (we will return to this point later on 
in the chapter).
Finally, we can turn to our third point. Here, the 
ideas of postmodernism serve to challenge the established 
hierarchy of philosophy and literary criticism departments 
and centers of knowledge production. As pointed out 
earlier, this is the setting in which ideas or theories 
become weapons in the battle for organizational control. 
Postmodernism became a means for younger or marginal 
academics to challenge the "old academism" of their 
philosophical or literary predecessors and for less 
prestigious centers to counter established knowledge 
producing-institutions.49 With regard to the first issue, 
Derrida, Althusser, and Foucault all resisted writing a 
dissertation. They chose not to "play by the rules,” yet 
managed to win the game.50 For them, the dissertation did 
not represent the culmination of academic training, it 
served as a means for controlling and limiting the types of 
intellectual contributions that could be made (e.g., in 
controlling recruitment, graduates, and guild membership). 
It was a form of intellectual censorship made by the "gate­
keepers" of disciplinary authority. As such, it
49 Cf. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus. 1988.
50 Cf. Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French 
Philosopher," 1987, p. 605.
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represented the "old academism” and its strangle-hold over 
"legitimate" knowledge of the world. However, we can argue 
that such a move is only possible when there is a setting 
marked by low functional dependence. If this were a field 
where functional dependence was high, the ability to avoid 
the strategic interactions an'' organizational requirements 
necessary for the establishment of rigid knowledge would 
have severely limited the impact these individuals could 
make. The organization of philosophy and literary 
criticism make it possible to make contributions to the 
central problems of the field while avoiding official 
channels of authority and legitimation (from a socio­
cultural standpoint, it can be said that this is truer of 
France than the U.S., of Europe than North America).
Secondly, the content of postmodernism proved to be a 
powerful means of shifting and realigning not only the 
internal organization of these fields but also the centers 
of knowledge-production. For example in the United States, 
centers of deconstructionism developed not only at the 
traditional literary centers of Yale, Cornell, and Johns 
Hopkins but also at the University of California-Irvine and 
SUNY-Binghamton.s1 Postmodernism became an avenue for 
both the reconstruction of the philosophical and literary 
enterprises and a realignment of the sites of knowledge
51 Cf. Jonathan Arc, et al. (eds.), The Yale Critics: 




When we combine the three points discussed above, we 
have a means for understanding postmodern knowledge as a 
social construct. First of all, it was manufactured within 
organizational confines which allowed for knowledge of this 
type to be formed. Secondly, it was successful in 
recruiting allies from a number of related fields (e.g., 
those fields that have traditionally looked to philosophy 
for information). Finally, it served as an ideological 
weapon in the battle for redefining the philosophical 
enterprise and relocating sites of intellectual production. 
Essentially, it became a tool for gaining and legitimating 
a new form of political control. As a consequence, we can 
conclude that sociological factors played an important role 
in the "success" of postmodernism. Without these 
organizational and interactional factors, postmodernism 
would probably not have been developed or disseminated in 
the style that it was. It perhaps would have remained, 
like many theories or assumptions, a set of "illegitimate" 
ideas on the fringe of mainstream philosophical and 
literary discourse.
If postmodernism was simply a set of academic theories 
we would have been able to end our discussion here.
However, due to postmodernism's success in recruiting 
allies in related fields and in becoming an important form 
of "cultural capital" for the "educated public," it has had
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the distinction of being a movement which has affected a 
number of culture-producing and consuming realms and a 
number of social groups. This being the case, we must in 
some way provide a marketing account, that is, of the 
"audience structure" and the subsequent consumption of 
postmodern.
The New Bourgeoisie and the Reception of Postmodern Culture 
If we were to ask a farmer in Iowa or a miner in West 
Virginia to describe the impact that postmodern culture has 
had on his or her life, we would find, after the laughter 
or blank stare had ceased, that it has had none. However, 
if we were to ask an educated upper middle-class 
professional in a larger metropolitan area the same 
question, we would perhaps find answers ranging from the 
introduction of postmodern teapots, to the impact of 
postmodern MTV, to a discussion of the impact of Umberto 
Eco or Italio Calvino on contemporary literature. Within 
the anatomy of our argument, what this social distinction 
reveals is not a difference in the ontogenetic ability of 
people to understand the complexity of "high culture" or 
the relativistic "different strokes for different folks," 
but that the reception of postmodern culture, like its 
production, is context and group specific. The culture 
audience, like the knowledge/culture producer, has a group 
structure and a cognitive style.
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Only the "trained eye" can recognize postmodernist 
culture and its often critical irony (cf. our discussion of 
the Plaza d'Italia in Chapter 6). Only certain groups or 
classes possess the cultural capital necessary to "get the 
joke" and only they can promote it as a means for 
distinguishing themselves from other culture-consuming 
groups near their situs in the social hierarchy. It is, to 
use another Bourdieu-type term, an outcome of the social 
"habitus" of a particular group.52 By habitus, Bourdieu 
means the different classification schemes which structure 
the cognitive distinctions and action pathways of a given 
social group. Each group uses this habitus to define 
itself (i.e., We/Them) and to distinguish itself from other 
groups in the occupational structure of a society. 
Culturally, each social group struggles to impose the 
"taxonomy most favorable to its characteristics, or at 
least to give to the dominant taxonomy the content most 
flattering to what it has and what it is."53
Within this Bourdieu-based argument, those who ascribe 
to the anti-aural and anti-authentic characteristics of 
neo-pop art or to the ironical aesthetics of the AT&T 
Building in New York, or for that matter the philosophy of
52 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgement of Taste, trans. by R. Nice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1984). While Bourdieu is 
concerned with French distinctions, his general analysis of 
class cultures is applicable to other Western societies.
53 Ibid., p. 476.
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Lyotard or Derrida, are using these cultural goods as a 
form of capital to purchase status. They are engaged in 
defining the boundary of their group and in distinguishing 
themselves from other groups. They are, to invoke 
Durkheim, attempting to forge a new version of the sacred. 
They, like the religious practitioners and the "primitive 
classifiers," are imparting mana to new symbolic objects. 
These groups are using postmodernism as part of a rite of 
intensification. This being the case, the questions 
become; who and why? Below we will attempt to answer these 
questions.
In societies with a complex division of labor and a 
competitive hierarchical structure, intellectual and 
cultural products tend to be highly used as status markers. 
Historically, this is specifically true for the European 
and American upper-middle class or bourgeoisie, whose 
location in the stratification system has made them an 
important niche for dissemination and consumption of "new" 
and "in vogue" forms of culture. Due to this group's 
general lack of social cohesion and its relatively "high" 
place in the stratification system or hierarchical and 
control structure, cultural goods within it tend to be used 
as a means of individual and group differentiation. In 
other words, cultural goods come to have symbolic exchange 
value.
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This characteristic is particularly true for the so- 
called "new middle-class" or service class. Since this 
group, specifically its upper echelon, is becoming a more 
integral and powerful aspect of the post-industrial socio­
economic environment, its cultural tastes and expressions 
are often used as a means of distinguishing itself from the 
old bourgeoisie (i.e., the industrial capitalists). This 
parallels the old industrial bourgeoisie's use of cultural 
goods to distinguish itself from the landed aristocracy.54 
Just as ideas become ammunition in the battle for control 
in knowledge producing communities, cultural style becomes 
a battle ground for the struggle to control the tastes and 
cognitive styles of fellow members and society as a whole.
The new middle class must distinguish itself by 
employing new cultural symbols or by giving new meaning to 
old ones. Describing the cultural patterns of this new 
class in France, Bourdieu writes,
(They) have abandoned the champagne of the vieille 
France industrialists (and the whole view of the world, 
and of France, and of France in the world, which 
went with it) for the whisky of American style 
managers, the cult of 'literature' (delegated to 
their wives) and economic news which they read in 
English.55
In the French case, whiskey, literature, and economic news 
become part of a general lifestyle which displays their
54 Cf. Stuart Ewen, All Consuming Images: The Politics 
of Stvle in Contemporary Culture (New York: Basic, 1988), 
pp. 26-32.
55 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, pp. 314-15.
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status position. Lifestyle becomes a personal comment on 
belonging and a political statement on social position.
The French service class, like their American, British, or 
German counterparts, is systematically employing culture as 
a means of differentiation and potential domination— of 
making their hegemonic mark. To paraphrase Marx, cultural 
"property is man's personal, distinguishing and hence 
essential existence."56
In addition to the upper echelons of the new, post­
industrial bourgeoisie, the lower echelons of this group 
tend also to be important sites of contemporary cultural 
innovation. This echelon tends to be manifest in 
occupations such as advertising, sales, magazine 
journalism, TV and video production, counseling, marriage 
therapy, etc.57 Often this group has experienced 
downwardly mobility compared to their initial status during 
early family socialization. They have a acquired a high 
level of cultural capital, yet possess a relatively low 
level of economic capital. The new petit bourgeoisie is 
generally engaged in what Bourdieu refers to as the 
"symbolic work of producing needs."58 This group is
56 Karl Marx, "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of 
Political Economy" in Earlv Writings (New York: Penguin, 
1974), p. 266.
57 Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized 
Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 
p. 295.
58 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, p. 345.
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engaged in the promoting of information technologies and 
the marketing and selling of symbolic products. This class 
"had to produce the need for them in potential consumers by 
a symbolic action tending to impose norms and needs, 
particularly in the areas of life-style...or cultural 
consumption."59 Generally, they can be classified as 
"need merchants."60 They can become members of the upper 
echelons of the new bourgeoisie through the "successful" 
deployment of the "symhoiic violence needed to create and 
sell new products."61
With regard to cultural patterns, this group is very
likely to consume and promote products that have been
deemed illegitimate by other hierarchically-higher social
groups. Objects which had been deemed "low brow," camp, or
kitschy by the old or new bourgeoisie undergo
"refiguration" in the hands of the new petit bourgeoisie.
These objects become reinterpreted and made desirable.
Describing the cultural preference of this group in the
French context, Bourdieu writes,
Their ambivalent relationship with the educational 
system, inducing a sense of complicity with every 
form of symbolic deviance, inclines them to welcome 
all the forms of culture which are, provisionally at 
least, on the (lower) boundaries of legitimate 
culture— jazz, cinema, strip cartoons, science 
fiction— and to flaunt (for example) American fashions
59 Ibid., p. 345.
60 Ibid., p. 365, emphasis added.
61 Ibid., p. 358, emphasis added.
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and models— jazz, jeans, rock or the avant-garde 
underground..,a
In the American context, "fifties furniture" and "fifties
anti-sex and anti-drug films" are reinterpreted by this
class and made acceptable and "in." These objects are
stripped of their old meaning and replaced with an
interpretation which expresses the cognitive orientation of
the new petit bourgeoisie, i.e., as new consumables.
This group, it is apparent, is a prime site for the
reception of postmodern cultural products. The symbolic
deviance of postmodernism, coupled with the symbolically-
oriented professions of the petit bourgeoisie make
postmodernism a prime vehicle of symbolic identification
and differentiation. In other words, this class uses
postmodernistic culture as a weapon in its ressentiment and
assertiveness of status. Describing the "art of living”
adapted by this group, Bourdieu writes,
Guided by their anti-institutional temperament 
and the concern to escape everything redolent of 
competitions, hierarchies and classifications and, 
above all, of scholastic classifications, hierarchies 
of knowledge....these new intellectuals are inventing 
an art of living...they adopt the most external and 
most easily borrowed aspects of the intellectual 
life-style, liberated manners, cosmetic or sartorial 
outrages, emancipated poses and postures, and 
systematically apply the cultivated disposition to 
not-yet-legitimate culture (cinema, strip cartoons, 
the underground), to everyday life (street art), the 
personal sphere (sexuality, cosmetics, child-rearing, 
leisure) and the existential (the relation to nature
62 Ibid., p. 360.
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love death),a
It is a social group that seeks to rebel against form 
itself (cf. Simmel discussion of modernism in Chapter 3): 
Breaking form will allow it to make its cultural mark.
Like the early twentieth century Dadaist, this group seeks 
to use "illegitimate" cultural products to distinguish 
itself, to promote its rather weak hierarchical position, 
and to alter the hierarchy of society as a whole.
Essentially, we can conclude that this petit 
bourgeoisie group is— to use Mary Douglas' terminology— low 
on both group and grid. It has, in Lash and Urry's 
terminology, "a pre-eminently destructured and decentered 
habitus."64 Since this group is characterized by looser 
group and grid distinctions, it promotes a sense of 
symbolic and hierarchical decenteredness. Members of this 
group refuse to "be pinned down in a particular site in 
social space."65 They see themselves as "unclassifiable, 
'excluded,' 'dropped out,' 'marginal,' anything rather than 
categorized, assigned to a class, a determinate place in 
social space."66 This self-identification leads them, not 
only to see themselves as "unclassifiable" and
63 Ibid., pp. 370-71.
64 Lash and Urry, Disorganized Capitalism. 1987, p.
296.
65 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, p. 370.
66 Ibid., p. 370.
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indeterminate, but also ipso facto the social and natural 
world. As a consequence of this decentered habitus, this 
group uses object reinterpretation to shake the old system 
of classification, differentiation, and stratification. 
Postmodernistic culture with its decenteredness and anti- 
hierarchical stance becomes a prime means of group 
identification and differentiation. It becomes an 
instrument for the formation and expression of a new form 
of "semiotic power."67
We may conclude that such an organizational and 
hierarchial structure produces a cognitive style that is 
universalistic, skeptical, and indeterminate. As Mary 
Douglas has pointed out, "Sustained skepticism is a 
feasible stance for those who do not expect to command or 
unify society, but stand apart from it.”68 The new petit 
bourgeoisie is in an ironical societal position. It is an 
emerging group that is becoming more influential in terms 
of sheer numbers, yet their access to power is overshadowed 
by the financial and cultural capital of the upper echelons 
of the new bourgeoisie. Consequently, their cultural 
strategy becomes one of breaking down hierarchical 
boundaries and their corresponding cultural forms. 
Postmodernism becomes both this group's cultural and
67 Cf. John Fiske, Reading the Popular (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), p. 132.




In this chapter we have tried to show how 
postmodernism is socially-produced, promoted, and 
maintained. From the position outlined herein, 
postmodernism can be viewed as the outcome of various 
social and organizational dynamics and their related 
production and consumption patterns. In regard to the 
production of postmodern knowledge, the organization of 
knowledge producing communities illustrates how a knowledge 
system of this type could be produced. Skepticism is a 
problem, not because it is a natural outcome of "deep 
investigation," but because certain disciplines lack the 
organization necessary to, in Latour's terms, form black 
boxes, i.e., sealed knowledge or "truth." However, this 
does not mean that these fields are immature or worthless. 
In fact, politically they may be liberating since they are 
more likely to promote a sense of openness, conversation, 
and debate. Like the production of postmodernism, its 
consumption also has social origins. The new, 
postindustrial bourgeoisie, particularly the lower 
echelons, are more likely to consume and promote 
postmodernism due the their decentered habitus. In short, 
we may conclude that postmodernism is a social construct.
It is social through and through.
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One final point. The treatment presented in the 
chapter should in no way suggest that postmodernism is an 
"invalid" or "irrational" theoretical or cultural 
expression. Such a stance represents the type of 
assymetrical arguement which we have tried to avoid. Our 
treatment simply means that postmodernism, like all forms 
of knowledge, must be socially established, maintained, and 
disseminated within the confines of social organization.
It is not outside of the social processes that produce and 
shape all forms of knowledge. In this regard, our approach 
has been in keeping with the deconstructivist orientation 
postmodernism has taken toward modern discourses. However, 
in our case we sought to describe a sociological 
deconstruction of its organizational hierarchical 
structure. In our final chapter we will discuss some of 




Readers of this work may conclude that they have been 
led full circle. What began as a description of 
postmodernism's undermining of modem culture's search for 
epistemological certitude, or in Derridian terms 
"presence," has led back to the reestablishment of what 
Lyotard referred to as a master narrative of modernity—  
only this time the Emperor has sociological clothes. In 
this final chapter, I wish to show why this is not the 
impression that should be left or the conclusion that 
should be drawn. Here, I want to restate some of the 
central points made and discuss the purpose and possible 
objections to the critique of postmodernism rendered in 
this dissertation. Specifically, I will reemphasize three 
issues: (1) The outline of the general postmodern
framework discussed herein; (2) what a social or 
constructivist epistemology can contribute to a rethinking 
of postmodernism's collapse of all meaning and leveling of 
distinctions between science and literature; and (3) how 
social organization structures knowledge production and 




The first part of this dissertation was concerned with 
providing a general postmodern framework. In other words, 
we were concerned with outlining some of the general 
assumptions and theoretical positions of postmodernism. 
Here, we used postmodernism, not as a unified phenomenon or 
as a logical "movement of history," but as a heuristic 
device to capture and describe a number of related 
practical and theoretical changes occurring in contemporary 
culture (e.g., movements such as post-structuralism, neo­
pop art, architecture). We concluded that postmodernism 
can be seen as a philosophical and cultural rebellion 
against three overlapping modernistic principles; 
correspondence referentialitv. subject centered explanatory 
and creative models, and the teleoloqical progression of 
rationality.
We also emphasized that it is important to resist the 
tempting strategy of placing modernism and postmodernism in 
exclusive categories. Each cultural and theoretical 
position can perhaps best be seen as a social truth 
movement. Each movement seeks to define what knowledge and 
culture are. They are, and have been, in competition with 
one another over defining reality (cf. A. Touriane's 
conceptualization of society as being composed of a series 
of social movements). What we call "reality," "knowledge,11 
"truth," and "society" are the outcomes of this struggle.
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ICertainly, the positions we outlined do not exhaust all the 
complexities, idiosyncrasies, and varieties of 
postmodernism, but they do, I believe, enable us to 
construct an overall vision of the postmodern perspective.
Essentially, the postmodernists argue that language and 
power shape our experience of the world to the extent that 
no reliable and universalistic knowledge is possible. It 
is no longer possible to adhere to the Enlightenment 
principles that language is merely a medium for the 
conveyance of the real world, that human subjectivity 
provides a pure, uncontaminated realm for knowledge 
acquisition or creative expression, or that the progression 
of rationality leads to personal and societal emancipation. 
Instead, knowledge acquisition is shaped by the dynamics of 
power, pre-existing linguistic hierarchies, and cultural 
biases. Revealing that knowledge is shaped by power and 
linguistic hierarchies leads postmodernists to level all 
meaning (i.e., no interpretation, lay or professional, is 
philosophically superior) and collapse all distinctions 
between literature and science (i.e., no discourse has a 
privileged access to the real). The outcome for many is to 
become, to invoke Nietzsche, "accomplished nihilists"—  
joyfully welcoming the end of all meaning (cf. our 
discussion of Baudrillard in Chapter 7).
The critique of postmodernism rendered in this work 
accepts postmodernism's anti-foundational revelations
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(i.e., its deconstruction of first principles), yet it 
rejects the nihilistic conclusions that the postmodernists 
reach. From the perspective outlined herein, levels of 
meaning and the distinctions between literature and science 
were never grounded in pure ideational differentiations. 
They are and have been socially constructed distinctions. 
From our position, postmodernism does not go far enough.
It employs an anti-idealistic "methodology." but in the end 
it draws idealistic conclusions. Postmodernism illustrates 
how social interests act upon ideational distinctions, 
(e.g., Lyotard's language games, Foucault's intrusion of 
power, Derrida's biased hierarchies) but in its conclusions 
it often abandons this social perspective for an idealistic 
"end of meaning" argument. In other words, when it is 
revealed that philosophical or cultural foundations are 
biased, postmodernism tends to announce that it is no 
longer possible to have any validity claims. From our 
perspective, these issues are best understood from a 
constructivist or social epistemological perspective. This 
move leads to our second point, the importance of a social 
epistemology in evaluating postmodernism's conclusions.
Social Eplgteaolgqy
When postmodernism is reduced to its finest dimension 
it can be seen as a specific answer to the long-standing 
epistemological question: How do we know? As discussed
330
above, for the postmodernists, the traditional 
philosophical answers to this question are no longer 
plausible. Reliable knowledge of the world can no longer 
be grounded in the Cartesian or Rousseauian subject, the 
progression of history, a simplified language, a self- 
evident hierarchical logic, or any other foundational 
position. Power, language, and culture exert too much of 
an influence over knowledge for the question, "how do we 
know?," ever to be secured and settled. This being the 
case, it is no longer possible to make philosophical 
distinctions between true and false knowledge forms. In 
the words of Lyotard, we can merely "gaze in wonderment at 
the diversity of discursive species..." or in Neo- 
Nietzschian terms, enjoy the Dionysian ecstasy associated 
with the end of meaning.1
The account presented in this dissertation agrees with 
the postmodern deconstruction of traditional philosophical 
truth, yet it draws very different conclusions as to what 
that deconstruction of traditional philosophy means. 
Essentially, it can be argued that this deconstruction 
leads in three directions. One is the path taken by many 
postmodernists. They believe that once the act of knowing 
has been reduced to a power based-rhetoric, all meaning 
effectively ends. It is no longer possible systematically
1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report of Knowledge, trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxv.
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to make the distinction between the correct and the 
incorrect or the right and the wrong. As such, we are 
adrift in a cosmos of meaninglessness. We are no longer 
able to legitimize our theoretical differentiations. 
Another path is the one taken by neo-rationalists such as 
Habermas and Davidson. This position argues that 
Enlightenment rationality may have been mistaken in 
grounding rationality in the condition of subjectivity 
(i.e., in the Cartesian rational self or the Rousseauian 
expressive self), but there are other human or social 
conditions that can be used as means for developing a 
reconstructed rationality. For this position, truth (or a 
foundation) exists but not in its traditional hiding 
places. Finally, a third position— the one we have 
attempted to chart. This position parallels 
postmodernism's linking of rationality and power, yet it 
reaches very different conclusions. Instead of arguing 
that all meaning collapses into a sea of confusion and 
nihilism, as the postmodernists do, or arguing that 
rationality resides in new places, as the neo-rationalists 
do, this position argues that meaning is created and 
recreated within the confines of social interaction and 
organization. Simply revealing that truth is an outcome of 
power or a biased hierarchy or that knowledge is culturally 
determined does not disqualify it completely. From this 
position, truth remains a socially contingent and
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constituted ideology that is created by knowledge/culture 
producers.
A critic of the constructivist epistemology outlined 
in this dissertation is likely to respond that if truth is 
merely a social construct existing within a power nexus, 
then how can we critigue any knowledge or political system? 
How can we say that a position is incorrect or that a 
political order is exploitative? Doesn't our position 
inevitably make might right? This, I believe, is a danger 
only if we adhere to the traditional foundational view of 
epistemology and politics— that is, that a truth claim and 
a political program (e.g., liberalism, conservatism, 
socialism) are grounded in some supreme access to the 
actual, unmediated workings of the world or in some type of 
human essence. As Marx stated in the "Thesis on 
Feuerbach," "The guestion whether objective truth can be 
attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, 
but is a practical question...man must prove the truth."2 
Marx recognized that truth is a political product.
Political and scientific truth, do not lie hidden waiting 
for the proper methodology, political party, or charismatic 
personality to uncover and act upon them. They are forged 
and constructed through practical action. Truth is human, 
all too human— it is political. As Marx recognized,
2 Karl Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," in Marx and 
Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International 
Publishers, 1985), p. 121 (pp. 121-123).
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scientific and political "truth" do not need a philosophy 
to ground them or to give then "objective" meaning. All 
the foundation necessary is, and can be, developed through 
praxis. Consequently, we need not languish over having no 
theoretically-privileged position from which to critique a 
truth claim, war, exploitation, or the political order. We 
must simply realize that any critique must be constructed. 
We need not wait for the "truth" to reveal itself to the 
those with the proper level of rationality or the 
"politically correct" and suddenly to shower down on the 
misinformed (i.e., those with "belief" or "false 
consciousness").
Social Organization and Postmodern Skepticism
The final central point we sought to develop in this 
work is that ideational skepticism, including 
postmodernism's, is a problem only for certain forms of 
knowledge. Philosophical skepticism is not a universal or 
ahistorical problem that is the outcome of some type of in- 
depth analysis. It is not inevitable as Nietzsche thought. 
The social organization of certain knowledge-producing and 
consuming communities influence the degree of skepticism 
that is produced.3 For those organizations with a tight
3 Some have also pointed out that the scattering of 
meaning and the resulting skepticism may be tied to the 
late or multi-national phase of capitalism (cf. Jameson, 
1984). Although we have not pursued this line of inquiry, 
a connection could be established, specifically with regard
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and rigid group and hierarchical boundaries, skepticism is 
not a problem. As Latour points out, if a position is not 
attacked "people know exactly what nature is...," i.e., 
what is right.4 Translating this statement into our 
account, we may conclude that if there is an organizational 
environment which does not spawn, suppress, or channel 
dissenting opinions and if a position has the endorsement 
of the power brokers or matrix, that position becomes 
"true." There is literally no "outside" from which to 
launch a critique. On the other hand, those organizations 
which have a loose organizational structure are likely to 
spawn skepticism, since they have few formalized codes for 
determining legitimate and non-legitimate knowledge. 
Furthermore, fields of this type lack closed boundaries 
between who is and is not a legitimate knowledge producer, 
which further complicates the divisions between sureness 
and unsureness. Consequently, the ability of a position to 
be attacked and for skepticism or nihilism to develop is 
dependent upon the type of organization present. A similar 
type of dynamic also occurs for culture-consuming groups. 
Those groups with what was referred to as a "decentered 
habitus" (Bourdieu's term) are more likely to promote the 
anarchistic style of postmodern culture.
to the issues of style over substance and appearance over 
reality in a consumer society.
4 Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 206.
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The Durkheimian-based connection of cognitive style 
and organizational structure has often been interpreted in 
a conservative manner. In other words, the social-control 
school which uses Durkheim as a point of reference, often 
interprets this revelation as arguing for stronger, more 
rigid form of control to counterbalance the loss of 
authority and meaning. This need not be the case. As Mary 
Douglas points out, when we debate the appropriateness of 
knowledge systems for determining the structure of the 
world, we are not selecting the true from the false, the 
rational from the irrational, or knowledge from belief.5 
Essentially, we are debating the type of social 
organization we want to have. Do we want to have a tight- 
knit group with a rigid hierarchy or do we want loose 
social relations and a pluralistic and indeterminate 
hierarchy? We can have truth and a firm distinctions 
between true and false and right and wrong if we are 
willing to forgo autonomous social relations and forge a 
restrictive group boundary, group code, and mobility 
structure (not that this is necessarily an individual 
choice). However, the price for this sureness and 
righteousness may be too high. Perhaps, a loose type of 
organizational control is more conducive to the type of 
world which we would want to inhabit or the one we believe
5 Cf., Mary Douglas (ed.), Essavs in the Sociology of 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 5.
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Iwe can construct— but again this is a political rather than 
purely philosophical decision.
Summary
What we have tried to accomplish in this dissertation 
is not a standard sociological critique of a belief or 
knowledge system. I think such a standard realist-based 
critique is impossible— if by critique we mean unveiling 
some hidden element that is the root cause of postmodern 
thought and culture. It is impossible for the sociologist, 
philosopher, or cultural critic to look down from a secure 
pedestal of positivistic or realist epistemology and 
proclaim that what postmodernism actually reflects is the 
crisis of late capitalism (Jameson, 1983), the 
differentiation of society (Lash, 1990), or the further 
fragmentation of modernist culture (Bell, 1976). As both 
postmodernism and the sociology of knowledge clearly 
demonstrate, this type of realist based critique is no 
longer possible.
However, one of the critical points argued in this 
dissertation is that while a realist epistemology is 
unacceptable, we are not left without the ability to 
produce any knowledge. We can argue that postmodernism is 
a result of social factors as long as we realize that we 
are forming a construct of postmodernism within the 
confines of pre-existing social organization. We must
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dismiss the idea that critiques are launched by "free- 
floating" intellectuals who miraculously capture an issue 
such as postmodernism as it "really exists." In other 
words, our critiques do not reveal the truth of 
postmodernism. It is through our critiques that we 
construct the meaning of postmodernism (or any movement, 
problem, or issue). Inevitably some of these constructed 
meanings will go further than others. This perhaps has 
little to do with their accurate correspondence with the 
real, but with the ability of various positions to 
disseminate information and recruit allies within pre­
designed organizational confines.
Essentially, what we have done, or attempted to do, is 
provide a construction of postmodernism. This, I believe, 
is different from both the realist and interpretative 
approaches. A constructivist account recognizes that it, 
like all knowledge, is forged and produced. This account, 
like all accounts, assumes that it has something to 
contribute; otherwise, it would be unproductive to point 
out that the world has meaning or it does not have meaning. 
In this regard, our account has employed the same types of 
rhetorical styles and maneuvers that can be found in other 
knowledge claims to establish its view of representing 
"what is going on." Yet, from a social epistemological 
position this does not discredit it. It only points to one . 
of the means in which all knowledge is produced or
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constructed.
While it would be tempting to argue that sociology 
should attempt to hasten the move from an epistemological 
to a socio-logical or constructivist way of approaching the 
issues of truth and knowledge, this, I believe, would prove 
non-useful and contradictory. The sociology of knowledge 
position does not demand that all disciplines "see the 
light" and interpret the world as sociologists do: This
would be in direct contradiction with its position. As 
Mary Hesse has pointed out, the sociology of knowledge does 
not "remove the motivation for epistemological studies nor 
emasculate philosophical theories....such a consequence 
only follow for those who retain a rationalist theory of 
knowledge."6 In other words, since we are not saying we 
have a privileged position from which to launch accurate 
critiques, we abandon the rationalistic premise that one 
knowledge form must prove its superior access to truth. 
Sociology cannot claim that it has the true narrative about 
how knowledge comes about, a narrative that philosophy has 
somehow missed. Sociology can only claim that it has a 
certain role to play in the construction of knowledge.
This is achieved not through uncovering a new version of 
the real, but through the establishment of the authority to
6 Mary Hesse, "The Strong Thesis of Sociology of 
Science," in Revolutions and Reconstructions in Philosophy 
of Science, ed. by M. Hesse (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1976), p. 46.
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define "hard knowledge" of the social. This, of course, 
does not make it more "valid," only more socially 
"legitimate."
As P. Bourdieu says in his book, Homo Academicus. 
sociologists can overcome the dichotomy of objectivistic 
explanation and subjectivistic understanding by turning 
upon themselves the very tools of objectivism that they 
routinely employ upon others. In other words, sociology 
may be an instrument of intervention in the politics of 
intellectual life.7
Durkheim and Mauss end Primitive Classification with
the following statement:
As soon as they (philosophical problems) are
posed in sociological terms, all these questions, so
long debated by metaphysicians and psychologists, will
at last be liberated from the tautologies in
which they have languished. At least, this is a new
way which deserves to be tried.8
Our position does not retain Durkheim's and Mauss1
optimistic belief in full disclosure or that a social
epistemology is the answer to old philosophical problems,
but their basic point summarizes what we have tried to
illustrate about a sociological construction of
postmodernism. Philosophical distinctions may be
ideationally unsupportable, but they remain powerful and
7 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988).
8 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive 
Classification, trans. by R. Needham (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 88.
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Binary Oppositions: A term used by structuralists to refer
to the dual code existing within a language and culture 
(e.g., delineations between beautiful/ugly, 
knowledge/belief, good/bad, etc.).
Bio-power: A term used by Foucault to refer to the body as
a construct of historically and socially constituted power. 
This may be contrasted with a natural conception of the 
body which argues that the body is an unchanging and stable 
entity.
Correspondence referentiality: A term used to describe the
belief that the mind captures and languages reports 
unmediated reality. There are no differences between word 
and world (cf. nominalism).
Decentering the subject: For postmodernists the term
refers to the process of removing the Cartesian subject 
from the center of knowledge or removing the Rousseauian 
subject from the center of expression.
Deconstructionism: A process of reading a text where the
underlying philosophical hierarchy is revealed and shown to 
be rhetorically favoring one term over another rather than 
being a philosophically "real" distinction.
Habitus: A term used by Bourdiue to describe the social
space and underlying logical or binary code which orients 
action and thought within a given social group or class.
Ideal speech: A term used by Habermas to refer to the ideal 
conditions of a non-distorted and non-power contamination 
discourse. For Habermas, this is a normative prescription 
for contemporary problems.
Langue: A term used by Saussure to refer to an underlying,
pre-conscious linguistical logic which provides the rules 
for the construction of everyday speech.
Logocentrism: A term used by Derrida and the
postmodernists to describe the privileging of speech over 
writing in Occidental thought. It illustrates the search 
of Western thought for a firm foundation and a final word 
on nature and society.
Metanarrative: A term used by Lyotard to refer to the 
supporting meta-theoretical positions which have been used 
as an underlying rationale or logic in modernity (e.g., 
scientific accumulation, emancipation, creation of wealth).
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Nominalism: A philosophical position which argues that 
languages and definitions do not refer to things but deal 
with the terms we attach to things.
Parole: A terms used by Saussure to describe everyday
speech patterns which are shaped by an underlying langue.
Performative contradiction: A term used by Habermas to
refer to the inability of Adorno and Horkheimer and the 
post-structuralist to account for their rational 
denouncement of rationality.
Presence: A term used by Derrida to refer to Western
philosophy's search for unmediated reality. The goal of 
traditional philosophy has been to eliminate the 
encumbrances for bringing the object under the direct light 
of investigation and explanation.
Text: A term used by deconstructionists to refer to
everything (i.e., "there is nothing outside of the text"). 
Within deconstructionism literal everything can be seen as 
a text and investigators/scientists as literary critics.
The Problem of Reflexivity: Within the sociology of
science the term refers to the inability of sociologists to 
state how their truth claims are superior to other truth 
claims.
Theory of Communicative Action: Habermas's social theory
which argues that the linguistical rules of the life-world 
can serve as a foundation for examining all discursive acts 
and for launching a critique of power.
Totalizing Discourse: A term used by postmodernists to
describe any position which seeks to give a complete and 
all-encompassing explanation of a phenomenon.
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